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It was late June 2005 when my plane swooped down into Ulaanbaatar, 
Mongolia, and I was struck by the sparse landscape, looming power stations 
(labelled conveniently and in huge numbers as 1, 2 and 3) and ring of ger 
villages encircling the city. The drive from the airport to the Chinggis Kahn 
Hotel is short and bumpy, while traffic chaos is typical of any transitional 
country. Mongolia is a country three times the size of France with a 
population of under 3 million, the majority of whom live in the capital. 
Its average per capita income level is $3,300 USD (indexed in 2010), while 
its growth rates for the last decade have fluctuated between 6 per cent and 
8 per cent per year. It is one of the fastest growing economies in the world 
mostly due to its rich deposits of natural resources. This is a country that 
was the land of the conquerors and is now sandwiched between Russia to 
the North, China to the South, North Korea to the East and the post-Soviet 
countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan – to the West.
As I reflected on Mongolia’s size, geographical position, relative economic 
wealth and unbelievable natural beauty, I asked myself, ‘How and why did 
its people in 1991 decide to overthrow the Communist regime and establish 
a multi-party democracy? And how has it managed to sustain this democracy 
against all odds?’ In the short space of less than two decades, Mongolia 
overthrew the past regime with comparatively little violence (although key 
dissenters were killed), established a functioning party system, carried out 
successive elections in which power has been transferred between different 
political parties and passed its own 9th Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) on democracy, zero tolerance of corruption and human rights that 
joined the eight other well-known MDGs. Throughout the 20 years of this 
new democratic period, Mongolia has suffered challenges to its systems and 
democratic institutions (including some violent contestations over electoral 
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results and a corruption scandal preceding the 2012 elections), but it has 
not experienced a reversal, or ‘rollback’ of democracy to the degree that has 
occurred in other similar new democracies (see Diamond 2008).
In late 2010, I once again found myself descending into a mountainous 
and sparsely populated country with its own looming power stations that 
has also been building democratic institutions since the end of the Cold 
War. The site of my arrival was Santiago de Chile. In contrast to Mongolia, 
Chile had had a long experience with democracy from the nineteenth 
century until 1973, when President Salvador Allende was overthrown by 
the military and the country endured 18 years of dictatorship under General 
Augusto Pinochet. But Chile underwent a rapid transition to democracy 
after Pinochet’s 1988 defeat in a plebiscite, rather than a popular uprising 
that sought to unseat him from power. Like Mongolia, Chile has been able to 
avoid a return to authoritarianism and an alternation of power between the 
broad leftist coalition Concertación (which won all the post-1989 elections 
until 2009) to the rightist National Renovation party led by former LAN 
Chile CEO Sebastian Piñera. In my meeting with former President Patricio 
Aylwin (or Dom Patricio as his supporters call him), he said ‘it does not 
matter to me that the right has won in Chile, since it is a great sign of the 
health of our democracy’. These are very wise words indeed and will be 
reiterated throughout this book.
Chile has now had five democratically elected governments since 
Pinochet and has joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) along with other wealthy and stable democracies. 
It rose to international fame with the military coup of 1973, sending 
dissidents and exiles throughout the world and becoming a pariah state for 
many years as the international community mobilized around its frequent 
and serious abuse of human rights. International pressure on the issue 
of human rights continued after Pinochet’s departure from formal power 
with his 1998 detention in London based on a request for extradition to 
Spain from a judge seeking redress for past crimes against humanity. While 
Pinochet never saw justice, the principle of ‘universal jurisdiction’ (the 
idea that jurisdiction over crimes extends beyond the boundaries of the 
prosecuting state) was buttressed as the Law Lords in the United Kingdom 
agreed that a former head of state was not immune from prosecution 
for crimes against humanity. The story of Chile is thus one of successful 
democratic transition and one of advance (albeit incremental) for the 
human rights movement.
Contrast these pictures with those of Mexico. Again, as we approached 
Mexico City – a sprawling metropolis of 20 million people – I reflected on 
the process of democratization in a country that had undergone a prolonged 
revolution between 1910 and 1917, a period of contestation between the 
end of the Revolution and the consolidation of authority under the Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), and 
one of the most successful periods of authoritarian rule that effectively 
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ended in 2000 with the election of the main opposition party Partido Acción 
Nacional (National Action Party, PAN) to the Presidency. Mexico is an 
upper-middle-income country that has developed to the stage that it is now 
a full member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a member of the 
OECD (like Chile) and one of three partners in the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) along with the United States and Canada. Over 
the last decade, it has seen remarkable rates of economic growth, decreasing 
rates of inflation, greater trade links with other countries, and it is the 
leading producer of smart phones (especially the Blackberry), television sets 
and automobile parts.1
Long before its ‘official’ transition to democracy in 2000, Mexico has 
struggled with classic problems of economic development, including 
successful state-led growth and stagnation between the 1950s and 1970s, 
economic liberalization and a debt crisis in the 1980s and integration 
into the world economy in the 1990s. Throughout these decades, political 
representation was dominated by the PRI as it gradually liberalized its 
political system, established the Instituto Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral 
Institute, of IFE) and conceded defeat at the Presidential level in 2000 with 
the election of Vicente Fox from PAN.
These twin processes of economic modernization and political 
liberalization have been marred by political and social disturbances such as 
student and teacher mobilizations in the 1970s and 1980s; an armed rebellion 
in Chiapas in the 1990s that struggled against Mexico’s participation in 
processes of economic globalization; and a highly profitable and increasingly 
violent drug trade that since 2006 has led to tens of thousands of killings 
and disappearances.2 The federal structure of Mexico with 32 states 
and more than 3,000 municipalities has provided a set of incentives for 
corruption and impunity that have had profound human rights implications 
and undermined democratic development in a country that has competitive 
elections, well-developed political parties and the alternation of political 
control of government. Moreover, the process of democratization itself is 
seen by many as a possible reason for the instability since it has transformed 
the informal and authoritarian form of rule in ways that have not yet been 
consolidated and provided opportunities for conflict, violence, corruption 
and impunity (see, e.g. Snyder 2007; Philip and Berruecos 2012).
This contrast of contexts between Mongolia and Chile on the one 
hand and Mexico on the other provides the starting point for this book. 
Democracy and human rights have an inherent appeal that has inspired 
human communities around the world to throw off their authoritarian past 
and to embrace a set of institutions and values that at their heart place the 
idea of human dignity and human well-being. The desire for democracy is 
strong, and it is one that has increased dramatically in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Indeed, since 1974, more than 90 countries have embraced 
democracy in ‘waves’ that have spread from Southern Europe, to Latin 
America, to Eastern Europe and to parts of Africa and Asia (Huntington 
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1991; Doorenspleet 2005). Figure 1.1 shows the historic trends in the growth 
of democracy, both in terms of the number and percentage of democracies 
in the world and the various ‘waves’ that characterize the trends. The period 
between the middle of the nineteenth century to 1920 saw a large increase in 
democracy. The interwar period saw a dramatic decrease, with democratic 
gains in the immediate post-World War II period, but democratic collapse 
during the 1960s (partly explained by the growth in newly independent 
countries after decolonization and partly the turn towards authoritarianism 
in Latin America). But it is clear that from 1974, the world has witnessed an 
impressive and steady growth of democracy such that by today, roughly 60 
per cent of all countries in the world are ruled by democratic governments.
In late 2010 and early 2011, countries across the Middle East and North 
Africa have shown dramatic popular mobilizations that led to regime change 
and new elections in Tunisia and Egypt, international intervention and 
regime change in Libya, challenge and oppression in Yemen and Bahrain 
and prolonged and violent conflict in Syria. While not a ‘Fifth Wave’ of 
democracy, there is much expectation among observers and concerned 
parties in the region as these countries undergo rapid political changes that 
were unimaginable only a few years ago. The self-immolation of a student in 
Tunis led to a mass uprising that toppled the Ben Ali regime; a style of social 
mobilization that spread quickly to Cairo and in time led to the collapse 
of the Mubarak regime after 30 years in power. Similar to social protest 
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FIGURe 1.1 The growth of democracy (number and percentage).
Source: Polity IV.
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two countries adopted a language of rights that started with an economic 
critique and expanded to include a demand for the protection of civil and 
political rights (see Foweraker and Landman 1997; Breuer et al. 2012). 
Early concessions by the regimes in both Tunisia and Egypt were simply not 
enough as the protest movements remained steadfast in their determination 
to rid their countries of unsavoury rulers. Time will tell as to whether these 
processes will usher in solid and stable democratic regimes, but the appeal 
of democracy and human rights and the inability of the leaders to bottle up 
their people are testimony to the ideas put forward in this book.
Alongside the development of democracy, the appeal of human rights 
formalized and codified legally after the mass atrocities of World War II is 
one that has become increasingly accepted as a global moral discourse that 
has intuitive appeal to millions of people around the world. But despite its 
appeal, there are many and diverse paths to democracy, and despite their 
acceptance, the ways in which human rights are given expression at the local 
level vary tremendously. Moreover, and this is the cautionary element of 
the entire argument presented in this book, the maintenance of democratic 
institutions and the protection of human rights remain precarious even in 
the best of times. Economic fluctuations, the rise of undemocratic forces in 
society, ‘uncivil’ movements, terrorism and natural disasters carry with them 
the serious potential to undermine hard fought freedoms and cherished 
institutions in the oldest and the newest democracies in the world. But this 
is not a book about so-called illiberal democracy, where the improvement 
in rights protection has not kept with the development of democratic 
institutions (See Zakaria 2003); an idea that seems to focus rather too 
much on the deficiencies of new democracies and remains unreflective on 
the many problems in so-called established democracies. It is ultimately 
a cautiously optimistic book about the triumph of ideals and how these 
ideals have found expression through the development of international and 
domestic institutions and have been supported through the vigilance of mass 
publics inspired by the basic idea that government ought to be subject to the 
will of the people.
Since World War II, when the world emerged from one of the most appalling 
periods of violence and human suffering, democracy and human rights have 
become a set of successful political ideas that challenge oppression, celebrate 
humanity and protect us from the worst forms of our own behaviour; what 
Susan Mendus (1995) has called ‘bullwarks against the permanent threat 
of human evil’. Democracy and human rights channel and shape popular 
preferences into governing programmes, and they construct an endurable 
architecture for sustainable and long-term self-rule. But despite their 
appeal and their power, democracy and human rights are precarious and 
subject to significant challenge on a daily basis by governing elites tempted 
to undermine rules and institutions for enhanced personal power and by 
mass publics disenchanted with the partial and incremental satisfaction of 
popular demands (see Chapter 2).
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At a more abstract and theoretical level, the book’s argument is founded 
on assumptions about human nature found in Thomas Hobbes, but seeks 
to show that the world has sought to construct solutions for everyday 
governance that are based on institutions found in the work of John 
Locke and notions of justice found in John Rawls. Hobbes assumes that 
the ‘state of nature’ (a mental construct or thought experiment constructed 
for theoretical purposes) is comprised of rational individuals who pursue 
their own self-interest through any means, including the use of violence or 
‘warfare’ in the terms he uses in Leviathan. Locke, on the other hand, shows 
how constraints on the rational pursuit of self-interest are possible without 
the existence of an all-powerful leviathan and that institutions and the rules 
that govern them can be constructed in ways that prevent otherwise self-
interested individuals from engaging in the worst forms of behaviour towards 
one another. Rawls, however, reminds us that even within (and between) 
societies with well-developed forms of these institutions, there is still the 
need to think about how the fruits of development and benefits of society 
are distributed in ways that benefit the least well off. The establishment and 
maintenance of democracy combined with the protection of human rights 
across all their dimensions provide a contemporary solution for realizing 
these key ideas from Hobbes, Locke and Rawls.
To sustain these claims, this book takes a thematic journey through a 
complex set of global developments over the last 60 years. Rather than chart 
the history of democratic and normative achievements, the book examines 
different sets of ‘thematic couplets’ that frame our thinking about current and 
future trends in the world. These couplets include abundance and freedom 
(Chapter 2), democracy and human rights (Chapter 3), waves and setbacks 
(Chapter 4), evidence and explanations (Chapter 5), agents and advocates 
(Chapter 6), truth and justice (Chapter 7), threats and pitfalls (Chapter 8), 
benefits and outcomes (Chapter 9) and hopes and challenges (Chapter 10). 
Each couplet addresses a natural set of tensions between themes and the 
balanced, cautionary approach of this book.
Chapter 2 examines the global expansion of economic wealth and the 
quest by ordinary people to achieve greater freedom in their own countries, 
while at the same time arguing that much of the expanse in wealth 
remained in the global north (although is beginning to be challenged from 
the BRIC countries) and much freedom has come under threat during the 
so-called war on terror since 11 September 2001. For the latter half of 
the twentieth century, development practitioners and policymakers have 
debated whether economic abundance is compatible with political freedom 
or whether the real route to rapid economic development is through 
authoritarian and non-democratic means. Far from arcane debates or stale 
academic discussion, this topic is once again at the forefront of discussion 
with the rise of China as an economic powerhouse which has tremendous 
economic capacity and very little political freedom. China has overtaken 
the World Bank as the largest donor to developing countries, is now the 
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second largest economy in the world and is likely to overtake the United 
States in the next 10 years. The chapter examines this debate and the current 
understandings of the relationships between economic development (i.e. 
abundance) and democracy (i.e. freedom) with fresh eyes as policymakers 
in the OECD countries look for linkages between their aid policies and 
political institutions, and the United Nations system looks past 2015 and 
the new ‘sustainable development goals’.
Despite the impression that democracy and human rights are inherently 
compatible concepts and ideas, Chapter 3 examines the tension between 
them in order to show that the two are not completely intertwined and can 
in some ways be contradictory. To do so, the chapter maps out ‘thin’ and 
‘thick’ definitions of democracy, outlines the main contours of contemporary 
human rights and what they mean and then shows how the two concepts 
overlap and explains why such an overlap is important. It argues that any 
attempt for human rights to ‘hegemonize’ the concept of democracy is 
unhelpful for bringing about democratic reform, since the idea of democracy 
is grounded in accommodation and agreement, while the idea of human 
rights has been codified through international law, which carries with it 
an inherent sense of judgement against a well-defined standard. I illustrate 
these discussions with graphical representations of the main ideas and the 
connections between them to show that some idea of ‘partial overlap’ is the 
most fruitful way to conceive of them.
In the 1990s, Samuel Huntington’s notion of ‘waves’ of democracy was 
a popular way to describe democratic developments in the world from 
the nineteenth through to the twentieth century. Chapter 4 uses this idea 
of wave as a foil and device to examine democratization in comparative 
perspective. It argues that the waves of democracy in the twentieth century 
were indeed unprecedented as this ‘tantalizingly strange’ (Dunn 1993) idea 
has caught the imagination of more and more people around the world. But 
it also shows that the later waves have been accompanied by an unexpected 
decline in the protection of human rights within many ‘new’ (third and 
fourth waves) democracies (see Smith-Cannoy 2012); a trend that has not 
been helped by the fact that many historically won rights protections have 
been compromised in many ‘old’ (first and second waves) democracies as 
the threat of terror raised alarm about too much ‘openness’ and freedom 
(see Brysk and Shafir 2007). Moreover, the erosion of rights commitments 
has been accompanied in some cases with democratic setbacks, in countries 
such as Peru, Ecuador, Russia, Fiji, São Tome and Mali.
One function of this book is to describe and categorize the many 
developments the world has witnessed since World War II, and the other 
function is to examine how such developments can be explained using 
systematically collected evidence. Using the so-called modernization school 
as a backdrop, ‘straw man’ and starting point, Chapter 5 reviews the main 
conceptual and explanatory frameworks used to explain the variation in 
democracy and human rights across countries and over time. The chapter 
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discusses the structural (or economic), rational (or self-interested) and 
cultural (or ideational) explanations for patterns in democratization and the 
variation in human rights protection. In other words, the chapter examines 
the degree to which economic development (and the broad sets of social 
changes that it entails), the interplay of power politics (at the national and 
international level) and the appeal and construction of ideas explain why 
democracy comes about, how it can be sustained and why human rights are 
better protected in some parts of the world than others.
While Chapter 5 looked at the broad explanations for the patterns in 
democracy and human rights, Chapter 6 focuses on how people and states 
(also known as agents) seek to bring about democracy, build democratic 
institutions and advocate for the promotion and protection of human 
rights. Such agents include domestic elites in government and opposition, 
international actors such as the United States and the European Union, as 
well as the relative power and impact of networks of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) fighting for human rights and justice. These so-
called transnational advocacy networks (Risse et al. 1999) connect agents 
at the domestic level who confront their regimes to international actors that 
put pressure on those regimes to bring about reform. Over time, it is possible 
to say that the appeal of democracy and human rights has been ‘socially 
constructed’, or built out of a long series of interactions that combine the 
rational pursuit of material self-interest and the normative values associated 
with the promotion and protection of human dignity.
The process of democratic transition and the construction of institutions 
for the guarantee of human rights in many countries carry with them the 
need to confront the atrocities of the past. Authoritarian governments 
commit crimes against humanity as part of their overall strategies to 
maintain stability, security and control over their societies. Their atrocities 
include the use of arbitrary detention, torture, ‘disappearance’, exile and 
assassination. In countries that have emerged from prolonged periods of 
civil conflict (as in Peru between 1980 and 2000) or foreign occupation 
(as in East Timor), similar such atrocities have been committed. In over 
30 transitional and post-authoritarian countries, there have been formal 
institutions, commissions or other bodies that have sought to capture the 
‘truth’ about past wrongs as a means to bring about democratic longevity 
and respect for human rights. Chapter 7 shows that the focus on the past, 
memory work and truth commissions has sought public recognition of 
atrocities that were committed and justice and reconciliation for the victims 
and their families. But the chapter also shows that the verdict after many 
years of such bodies carrying out their different mandates is that we now 
have much more truth about what has happened (e.g. under Augusto 
Pinochet in Chile, under Apartheid in South Africa and during the conflict 
in Peru) than real justice for the victims. But great lessons have been learnt 
and the constraints of democracy and human rights continue to be seen as 
suitable political and legal solutions to move countries forward.
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Despite the advance of democracy and human rights charted in the first 
chapters of the book, there remain significant threats and pitfalls to their 
long-term sustainability. Chapter 8 argues that these can be understood 
in the following four groups: (1) inter-state and intra-state conflict, (2) 
economic globalization and inequality, (3) global terrorism and its response 
and (4) environmental degradation and climate change. Democracy and 
the protection of human rights (as well as the international connections 
that result) are generally good for reducing international and domestic 
conflict, but war between and within states can and does break out in ways 
that can destroy democracy and lead to gross human rights violations. 
Prolonged and deeply embedded patterns of land and income inequality 
have a negative relationship with the protection of certain human rights. 
The threat from terrorism and its response in the twenty-first century 
continue to undermine the very rights commitments that were the hallmarks 
of the twentieth century. Finally, the challenge of sustainable development 
is at the forefront of policymakers’ minds as the world finds ways in which 
to increase economic abundance and raise overall levels of welfare without 
long-term adverse effects on the environment, while a large proportion of 
the world continues to be vulnerable to environmental change.
A popular refrain in political discussions is ‘so what?’ ‘What are the 
benefits and positive outcomes associated with democracy and human 
rights?’ Chapter 9 explores the idea and burning question as to whether 
democracies and ‘rights-protective’ regimes, to use a phrase from Jack 
Donnelly, actually deliver tangible benefits to the people. It examines the 
benefits that are intrinsic to democracy and the value for individuals living 
under democratic conditions. It looks at the ‘pacific’ benefits of democracy 
at the international and domestic levels of conflict prevention. Drawing 
primarily on the development literature, the chapter shows that democracies 
are no worse at pursuing economic development, actually enhance the 
human-related dimensions of sustainable development and provide a 
set of institutions that are best equipped to guarantee the protection of 
human rights.
Chapter 10 concludes with a survey and summary of the main points 
of the book and maps out the both the hopes about and challenges for 
the future, taking into account the demographic shifts in different parts of 
the world, the continuing problem of religious extremism, discrimination, 
ethnic and other violence, as well as the many social, political institutions 
that remain weak in the world. Taken together, I hope the chapters in this 
book will allow you to think critically about developments in the world 
with respect to democracy and human rights so that the next time you fly 
into a capital city and try to get a feel ofyour surroundings, you will have 
a deeper understanding of the precariousness of the human conditions but 
also the remarkable ways in which we have sought to struggle for better 
systems of governance that at their heart have a genuine concern for human 
dignity.
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 1 These and other macro-economic indicators formed part of a keynote 
presentation by the Minister of Finance of Mexico Ernesto Cordero at the 
London School of Economics on 21 March 2011.
 2 Data released by the government and published by the Guardian newspaper 
in the United Kingdom suggest that the total killed between 2006 and 2010 is 
more than 31,000, but the figure may be even higher as these killings are only 
those that can be documented, while many others remain unreported.
Dahl, Robert (2000) On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Diamond, Larry (2009) The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free 





The ‘Arab Revolutions’ of 2011 have reopened a set of age-old questions 
about economic and political modernization. These questions centre on 
the relative complementarity between economic abundance and political 
freedom. Are the richest countries in the world also the most politically 
free? Are they politically free because they have economic abundance? Or 
are they rich because they are politically free? If the rich democracies of the 
world got there in following a certain path, is that path still available for 
other countries? Are there alternative pathways to economic abundance that 
do not involve political freedom? Has the global spread of democracy since 
the 1970s brought with it greater economic abundance? Do Singapore and 
China offer examples of successful economic development in the absence 
of political freedom? Or do the development models being followed by 
democratic Brazil and India offer better examples? Do certain phases of 
capitalist development require authoritarian rule? Does it make sense to say 
that some countries are not yet rich enough to embrace democracy? These 
and related questions are key to understanding developments in the world 
today and are likely to captivate the public imagination for many years 
to come, particularly after the financial crisis of 2007 and all that is has 
brought with it, as well as the dramatic re-emergence of democracy on the 
global political agenda since the Arab Spring.
The correlates of democracy
The first set of answers to these key questions emerged in the late 1950s 
as scholars started to look at systematic evidence that compared levels of 
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economic wealth and the type of regime. Those that looked at many countries 
at once sought to collect data on a range of economic indicators that were 
meant to measure economic wealth (such as rates of urbanization, paved 
roads, electricity, newspaper circulation, etc.) and then compared them across 
different kinds of government. The most famous study of this kind was 
conducted by Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and was framed with a simple 
question: ‘are wealthy countries more democratic?’ He compared economic 
indicators across what he called ‘stable democracies’, ‘unstable democracies’, 
‘unstable dictatorships’ and ‘stable dictatorships’. He found that his collection 
of ‘stable democracies’ had on average higher values across his collection of 
indicators than any of his other regime types. He concluded from this evidence 
that ‘the more “well-to-do” a nation, the more likely it will be to sustain 
democracy’. Using data from the contemporary world, his basic insights 
can be demonstrated easily. Figure 2.1 is a plot between democracy (on the 
vertical axis) and development (on the horizontal axis) in which it is clear that 
those countries with higher levels of development (measured here in terms of 
per capita GDP) are indeed those countries with higher scores for democracy 
(measured here in terms of the presence of basic democratic institutions).1
While his comparisons (and those illustrated in Figure 2.1) presented 




































































































































FIGURe 2.1 Development and democracy.
Sources: Mean combined democracy score from Polity IV data for 2007–2009; 
natural log of mean per capita GDP from the World Bank 2007–2009.
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and political freedom, many questions remained, since his findings said 
nothing about whether this relationship is causal or in which direction 
that it goes. In other words, does development cause democracy or does 
democracy cause development? Many commentators thought that he had 
made a causal claim, while many others thought he had not. Lipset himself 
published a follow-up article in 1994 and argued that he never meant to 
make a causal argument. Nevertheless, academic research and policy 
prescriptions that built on his early work often assumed that he had made a 
causal argument and then sought ways of refining his analysis or setting out 
policy objectives that made a direct link between economic abundance and 
political freedom. Using different definitions of democracy (see Chapter 3) 
and different ways of measuring democracy and development, there are 
two competing views about the causal relationship. The first argues that 
Lipset was broadly correct and that the types of large-scale social changes 
that accompany economic development lead to democratization (see, e.g. 
Boix 2003; Boix and Stokes 2003). The second argues that any positive and 
statistically significant relationship between levels of economic development 
and democracy comes from the fact that when countries make a transition 
to democracy under conditions of relatively high economic development, 
then they tend to remain democratic (see e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000). These 
are fundamentally different claims. One claims that development causes 
democracy while the other claims that development sustains democracy 
once it has been established. The proponents of each view claim to have 
settled the question with statistical evidence, but like all analyses, the results 
depend very much on how things are defined and measured. The debate thus 
continues.
But Lipset’s work also inspired another line of research that examined 
the economic benefits of democracy. Here, analysis flips the causal question 
around and asks if democracy is good for economic development. The 
idea here is that the democratic institutions reflect and respond to citizen 
preferences and make leaders accountable for their economic decisions, and 
thus key feature of economic development ought to be better realized through 
democracy than through non-democracy. Indeed, the United Nations has 
long advocated that democracy is the better political system for realizing 
the Millennium Development Goals; a set of measurable goals with eight 
targets that ought to be met by 2015. The answers to this question, like those 
above, vary depending on what is meant by economic development. In terms 
of annual changes in Gross Domestic Product, it appears that democracies 
are no better than non-democracies in promoting economic growth (see 
e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000). But they are no worse either. When different 
indicators of development are used, such as the distribution of income and 
human development (itself a combination of per capita GDP, life expectancy 
and literacy), democracies perform much better than non-democracies, 
and among the world’s poorest countries, democracies outperform non-
democracies (Halperin, Seigle and Weinstein 2010; and see Chapter 9). In 
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Development as Freedom, Amartya Sen (1999) claims ‘No famine has ever 
taken place in the history of the world in a functioning democracy’. Since 
democracies are based on the accountability of leaders through the electoral 
process and other institutions, Sen argues, it is not possible for leaders to 
ignore the plight of their population to the point where people are actually 
starving. At a more general level, it is possible to see the positive association 
between democracy and human development (see Figure 2.2).2 On balance, 
the figure shows that those countries with higher levels of democracy have 
higher levels of human development. In addition to these kinds of positive 
benefits relating to different features of development that go beyond 
mere consideration of growth rates, democracy also brings other benefits, 
such as greater freedom, protection of human rights (see Chapter 3) and 
accountability of government. Democracy thus offers a collection of ‘goods’ 
that make it a preferable political system even if other systems have shown 
higher rates of economic growth.3
But these different sets of findings have led to a range of expectations 
that are based on, in my view, a false equivalence between democracy and 
development, or abundance and freedom. On the one hand, there is an 
expectation that abundance will necessarily lead to freedom and on the 





































































































































FIGURe 2.2 Democracy and development.
Sources: Mean combined democracy score from Polity IV data for 2007–2009; 
human development index (per capita GDP, litereacy, life expectancy), UNDP. 
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abundance will follow shortly thereafter. For many states in the developed 
world, investment in economic development that carried with it the promise 
of political modernization and democratization was a very attractive way 
of conducting foreign policy and overseas aid strategies. From John F. 
Kennedy’s ‘Alliance for Progress’ in Latin America in the 1960s to current 
aid strategies, there is an in-built assumption that economic modernization 
breeds democracy and thus ‘pumping’ money into less developed countries 
has a good chance of encouraging democracy.4 Indeed, in the context of 
the Cold War, such a strategy was seen as a way to avoid ‘any more Cubas’ 
and subsequently as a way to encourage democracy in the Soviet Bloc and 
satellite countries. For some, the logical extension of this ‘modernization’ 
perspective is that not only do such strategies yield democracy, but they 
can be accelerated through either the ‘export’ of democracy, as it was 
understood by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, or the forceful 
imposition of democracy through foreign invasion as understood by 
George W. Bush and his neo-conservative advisors between 2000 and 2008, 
such as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz. Interestingly, 
this latter position on the forceful imposition of democracy supported by 
neoconservatives is based on the early modernization logic of Lipset and 
on the belief that particular outcomes can be ‘socially engineered’ (see 
Fukuyama 2006).
The modernization logic, as forceful as it is, is subject to a number of 
remarkable exceptions. Indeed, at precisely the time modernization theory 
was being articulated, a number of countries in Latin America that had 
reached particular phases of capitalist development experienced profound 
democratic breakdown. In 1964, Brazilian democracy was overthrown by 
the military, which ushered in a period of authoritarian rule that lasted 
until 1989. In 1966 and again in 1976, the military in Argentina ousted its 
democratic leaders and oversaw two brutal periods of authoritarian rule. 
The latter period lasted from 1976 until 1983 and featured the infamous 
‘Dirty War’ that led to thousands of people ‘disappearing’. The militaries in 
Uruguay and Chile overthrew their democracies in 1973, where authoritarian 
rule as in the other cases led to large-scale human rights violations and 
subsequent international condemnation. A popular argument at the time 
was that these military coups were part of the modernization process and 
that particular phases of capitalist development ‘required’ authoritarian rule 
to oversee the developmental process (see O’Donnell 1973). Modernization, 
it would seem, did not necessarily lead to democracy in every case.
The idea that different modes of capitalist development required 
particular regime types also influenced policy in the 1980s and 1990s in the 
era of World Bank and IMF ‘structural adjustment’ programmes (economic 
models that sought to allocate good and services primarily through price 
mechanisms). Based on a series of comparative studies that examined the 
relative economic success of the ‘East Asian Tigers’, the World Bank and 
IMF became convinced that export-led growth (i.e. the export of finished 
capital goods such as cars, household appliances, electronics, etc.) was 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy16
both desirable for long-term economic development and that it required 
some form of labour control or repression (see Geddes 1990; Brohman 
1996; Stiglitz 2002). Indeed, many of the Tigers were not democratic and 
a combination of state control and coordinated development of the export 
capacity had produced remarkable growth rates. One long-term consequence 
of this experience, it could be argued, is that authoritarian states today such 
as China can claim that they are in the middle of precisely such a phase of 
development and not yet ready for democracy. In contrast, Brazil and India 
are democracies and ‘emerging economies’ that are in the middle of a period 
of impressive economic growth that challenges this authoritarian view.
Another consequence of the analysis of the relationship between 
abundance and freedom is that there is some sort of ‘threshold’ of 
development after which the survival of democracy is nearly 100 per cent 
guaranteed. In rejecting the notion that development necessarily leads to 
democracy, Przeworski et al. (2000) nevertheless conclude that such a 
threshold exists and that it is possible to put a value on it. For the global 
data that they analysed, if democracy is established in a country that has a 
level of per capita GDP greater than $5,500 (as measured in 1995), then the 
probability of democracy collapsing in that country is very close to zero. 
In other words, new democracies in rich countries have a greater chance of 
survival than in poor countries. The idea that greater economic abundance 
provides governments with latitude to supply goods, services and the 
benefits of economic development to potential opposition makes sense; 
particularly, if one has an instrumental view of politics and political power. 
Elected elites have won power and will distribute economic benefits to stay 
in power through the electoral process. If opposition groups receive enough 
economic benefit from such elites, then the motivation to disrupt democracy 
is low, and democracy survives. Such narrowly constructed arguments in 
the political economy of democracy have been very popular in accounting 
for its survival (see Przeworski 1991; Bates 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Bueno de Mesquita 2010).
But many countries in the world have established democracy under 
economic conditions that are well below this threshold figure of $5,500 per 
capita GDP. Indeed, the beginning of this book provided a short summary 
of the case of Mongolia, which at the time of its transition had a per capita 
GDP of less than $1,000. Recall that the argument is not that democracy 
cannot be established in poor countries but that the probability of survival is 
much lower for poor democracies. For the Mongolians and on this reading, 
democracy was a precarious venture since the economic conditions for 
survival were not in place. But democracy did survive as it has done in 
many other countries that have made democratic transitions under such 
conditions of economic scarcity, where per capita GDP figures are unlikely 
to reach the threshold values for some time to come. The fact that these 
democracies have survived does not discredit the argument from Przeworski 
et al. (2000), but it does give hope to those poor democracies struggling to 
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develop and maintain their democratic institutions. It is thus important to 
recognize that democracy can survive in poor countries and that democracy 
does not need to wait for high levels of development.
There is one final consequence of the assumed affinity between abundance 
and freedom that involves the raised expectations about the speed with 
which democracy can deliver greater economic benefits. We saw above that 
democracy does deliver better developmental outcomes, but many in new 
democracies expect these to take place rather more quickly than they do in 
practice. Citizens are eager for change and expect higher levels of economic 
development and fairer distribution of the benefits of development. The 
simple causal link between development and democracy, which often ignores 
complex sets of intervening factors, can ultimately threaten the process of 
democratic consolidation if citizens expect too much of their new democracy. 
This is particularly the case if the lack of economic performance or a slow 
pace in economic growth during the new democratic period leads to a 
certain nostalgia for earlier periods of economic prosperity under conditions 
of non-democratic rule (see Landman 1999: 626). Such cases of ‘democratic 
disillusionment’ are not rare. In Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 
mass publics in some countries showed disenchantment with democracy 
as economic liberalization in the absence of regulation became associated 
with market distortions, speculation, corruption and new inequalities that 
undermined basic standards of living. Supermarkets with a narrow selection 
of goods during the Communist period gave way in some countries to low 
availability of any goods during the new democratic period. Such scarcity, 
if prolonged, can lead to increased levels of political support for former 
communist leaders, new nationalists and other authoritarian actors. In the 
late 1990s, analysis conducted by Marta Lagos (1997) showed that Latin 
American mass publics were indeed disenchanted with democracy. Measures 
of ‘satisfaction with democracy’ were as low as 11 per cent in Mexico (itself 
undergoing a prolonged period of democratic transition) to high of only 
52 per cent in Uruguay, which by that time had been democratic for over 
10 years. She subsequently showed (Lagos 2003) that between 1996 and 
2002, satisfaction with democracy in the region peaked in 2000 at 37 per 
cent and declined by a few percentage points in the ensuing years.
But democratic satisfaction is not low only in Latin America. Figure 2.3 
shows mass public support for democracy ‘as an idea’ and satisfaction with 
democracy as a system that delivers goods and benefits to the public. The 
differences between the two are striking as across the world support for 
democracy is consistently higher than satisfaction with democracy, while 
across the different regions it is apparent that there is great variation in 
both measures. Support for democracy is highest in the European Union at 
nearly 80 per cent, but satisfaction is only 53 per cent. For Africa, support 
is less that in the European Union but satisfaction is higher at 58 per cent. 
The difference between support and satisfaction is the least for East Asia 
at 61 per cent and 55 per cent respectively. For India, Eastern Europe and 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy18
Latin America, the differences between support and satisfaction are large, 
where satisfaction is the lowest in Eastern Europe at just 29 per cent.One 
reading of these figures suggests that despite the advance of democracy 
and despite different levels of economic development, democracy receives 
mixed reviews as an idea and as a system for delivery of benefits, which is 
consistent with the idea that too much expectation about what democracy 
can deliver may lead to popular dissatisfaction. Another reading suggests 
that despite geographical and economic position, democracy receives levels 
of public support greater than 50 per cent worldwide and that democracies 
themselves have a lot of work to do to improve levels of satisfaction. Both 
readings are consistent with the main argument of this book about the 
inherent appeal of democracy.
political actors and political processes
If the natural affinity between abundance and freedom (or development 
and democracy) is upheld at the global statistical level, there are certainly 


















FIGURe 2.3 Support for and satisfaction with democracy by region, 1998–2002.
Source: Lagos (2003).
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to look more closely at other factors that may play an intervening role, 
such as political actors, processes, structures and institutions. Analysis of 
these kinds of features have typically been conducted on smaller sets of 
countries and have focused more on the evolution of processes over time 
and pathways followed by different groups of countries. In such studies, 
economic development is seen as an external factor that drives other changes 
and characteristics within countries, such as the emergence of new social 
classes and the conflicts or alliances that form between them; the power 
and stability of the state domestically and how it is affected by international 
factors; and the ways in which new social groups find representation and 
inclusion in new political institutions. Since socio-economic development 
differs across a different array of what economists call ‘factor endowments’ 
(i.e. the relative distribution of land, labour and capital), different paths 
to modernity are possible that may not necessarily include democracy. 
Dependencies on small sets of factor endowments can create oligarchies 
with vested interests (e.g. in agriculture or industry) whose political interests 
may not favour democratization. Industrializing countries generate large 
urban working classes that can mobilize for inclusion and challenge existing 
power structure that in certain cases lead to democratization, while in others 
some form of clampdown, co-optation or authoritarian control. The state 
apparatus, originally seen as an organic result of modernization and a way 
to raise taxes for maintaining stability and security, can be ‘captured’ by 
different vested interests that vary in the degree to which they are supportive 
of democracy. These and other intervening factors that lie between economic 
development and political regimes suggest that democracy is but one possible 
outcome and not the only outcome despite the compelling arguments found 
in the modernization school.5
In Industrialization and Democracy, de Schweinitz (1964) compared the 
cases of Britain, the United States, Germany and Russia and found that 
the ‘stable’ outcomes in Britain and the United States (i.e. democracy) were 
largely owing to a set of unique features in those countries that were not 
available to Germany and Russia, which were considered ‘unstable’ and 
‘not democratic’, respectively. While he concluded that the ‘Euro-American’ 
route to democracy was likely to be closed, there certainly remains open the 
possibility for other paths to democracy. In The Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, Barrington Moore (1966) compared ‘routes to modernity’ 
in countries that had bourgeois revolutions (France, Britain and the United 
States), communist revolutions (Russia and China) and fascist revolutions 
(Germany, Italy and Japan) to show that particular configurations of 
features in these cases (such as class alliances and the role of violence) were 
associated with the political outcomes that were obtained. His conclusion 
that some sort of ‘violent break’ from the past was a key factor in bringing 
about democracy was subsequently challenged by Rueschemeyer et al. 
(1992), who looked at a much larger collection of countries to examine 
the relationship between capitalist development and democracy. Like their 
predecessors, their analysis focused on configurations of factors (such as the 
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state, the nature of development, the relationships and alliances between 
different social groups and relative political power of different interests) 
and concluded that there is not an automatic association between economic 
development and democracy. Rather, capitalist development is varied 
according to initial factor endowments and that emergent groups capture 
the state and or demand inclusion in the national political system differently 
and thus affect the possibility, timing and pace of democratization.
As we shall see in Chapter 5, popular explanations for the emergence 
of democracy also focus on the role the political actors play in choosing 
and ‘crafting’ democracy (DiPalma 1992). Such choice-based frameworks 
focus on the elites within the authoritarian regime and the elites within the 
opposition. The analysis is confined to a range of choices open to these 
elites in ways that allow them to reach significant political accommodation 
in moving their society towards democracy. But like the comparative studies 
outlined above, the analysis of elites often reveals that democracy is but one 
outcome among many available and that a specific set of choices across 
cases has been taken that has yielded an initial commitment to democracy. 
For such studies, democracy is a fairly narrow but stable outcome based 
on the idea of the ‘institutionalization of uncertainty’ (Przeworski 1991), 
where elites play the game of democracy without knowing the outcomes of 
electoral competition but with the knowledge that they may be successful 
in obtaining power in the future. The promise of power is enough to buy 
allegiance to the new rules of the game and that with time, democracy 
becomes ‘the only game in town’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). Such a narrow 
view of democracy and a narrow focus on elites allow for a more precise 
set of analyses on interests, choices and relative power. It also includes 
the possibility that democracy will not come about, or that it could be 
reversed at a later date; something popular explanations often exclude. But 
such a focus also tends to exclude attention to masses, social movements 
and popular mobilization for democracy that has characterized many 
democratic transitions since the third wave in the 1970s. Any discussion of 
democratization ought to consider both the so-called bottom-up processes 
and top-down processes to provide a fuller account of what has happened 
and how.
examining the ‘outliers’
The discussion of actors and processes complements our discussion of the 
overall relationship between development and democracy. In many ways, 
such a focus seeks to get inside the ‘black box’ of modernization and look 
at the different ways in which processes of development affect different 
groups, how groups create and/or respond to different sets of incentives and 
how democracy is but one outcome out of many possible outcomes for the 
ways in which a society will be governed. Now, if we revisit the relationship 
depicted in Figure 2.1 and focus on the Arab world, we discover a selection 
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of countries that are relatively wealthy (certainly in the top half on the scale 
of development) and yet not at all democratic. Such exceptions to a general 
rule are referred to as ‘outliers’ (a term made popular by Macolm Gladwell 
in a book by the same name) and challenge us to think of explanations for 
the exceptional position. It also allows us to consider the broader questions 
posed in this chapter alongside the question about actors and processes. 
Figure 2.4 reproduces the relationship from Figure 2.1 but highlights these 
outlier cases, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. These 
countries all experienced significant challenges to their governments from 
popular protests and rebel movements, and in the case of Libya, military 
action from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As outlier 
countries, analysts tend to see them as paradox cases of democratization. 
On the one hand, they have high levels of economic development (measured 
in terms of per capita GDP) and yet they have had prolonged periods of 
authoritarian rule where dissent has not been tolerated. It is clear that many 
of them enjoy vast sources of wealth based on their rich oil and natural gas 
deposits. The natural resources, however, tend to be highly concentrated 
within particular regions of these countries and controlled by a very small 





































































































































FIGURe 2.4 Development and democracy revisited.
Sources: Mean combined democracy score from Polity IV data for 2007–2009; 
natural log of mean per capita GDP from the World Bank 2007–2009.
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based their power on these resources and have relied on the strong arm of 
the state to maintain stability and authority.
But across many of the cases, the events of early 2011 started as economic 
critiques of a model of development that is highly dependent on a concentrated 
set of natural resources and then evolved into a broader political critique and 
demand for basic freedoms (see Foweraker and Landman 1997). It is not 
clear whether these movements and political transformations are analogous 
to the movements that shook Eastern Europe in 1989, but it is fairly clear 
that it will be impossible for these countries to revert back to the status quo 
ante (see Carothers 2011). The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and the Mubarak 
regime in Egypt have been ousted in relatively rapid fashion. Events in 
Egypt ushered in a political process that includes presidential elections in 
November 2011 and a number of associated political reforms. Based on what 
we do know about development and democracy outlined in this chapter, if 
democracy does become established in many of these cases, then the material 
conditions for its survival are already present. The key challenge will be the 
democratization of economies that are so highly dependent on one or two 
major exports, and the emergence of new forms of political representation 
that are less reliant on tribal links and traditional clans. This is not to say 
that there is some ‘western’ route to democracy, but as we shall see in the 
next chapter, democracy is founded on the fundamental principles of popular 
sovereignty and collective decision-making that is inclusive, participatory 
and accountable. The route to such an outcome is not predetermined but will 
be crafted by those who seek a different form of political regime supported 
by a level of economic abundance that bodes well for democracy.
summary and implications
The simple association between abundance and freedom, whether through 
an intuitive sense about how the world ‘works’ or through the examination 
of comparative data has captured the imagination of scholars, commentators 
and policymakers for many years. But as I have shown in this chapter, the 
relationship is not as simple as it seems. There are large questions about 
whether the relationship is directly causal, indirectly causal or mutually 
reinforcing, and it is clear that it leads to a number of raised expectations 
about likely outcomes if one or the other changes dramatically. For me, the 
two are associated to the degree that higher levels of economic wealth provide 
governments with a resource base that allows them to deliver public goods 
to their populations, but that the impulse for democracy comes from much 
more than a simple set of underlying socio-economic changes that somehow 
culminate in democracy. The evidence presented that democracy survives if 
it is established in a wealthy country is very convincing and logical. It has 
been equally clear that not only are there many routes to democracy but that 
democracy itself is one of many possible outcomes.
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The chapter has also shown that democracy tends to be a system that 
provides a better quality of development. It is a political system that is 
no worse than non-democracy in delivering economic growth, but it is 
markedly better across a broader set of macro-economic indicators that 
measure human development and inequality. Development does not require 
a period of authoritarianism to ready a society for democracy, and there 
are numerous examples of democracy having been established and having 
survived in poor countries. But such poor democracies may well have a 
number of additional challenges in maintaining their democratic institutions 
over the long run since resources are relatively scarce and the possibility of 
satisfying potential democratic ‘spoilers’ is much lower. We have also seen 
that beyond development, democracy brings with it other benefits, including 
a greater protection of human rights, a reduction in state violence such as 
genocide and or ‘politicide’ and even less violence with other countries.
The discussion presented in this chapter focused on abundance and 
freedom and left open the question of what constitutes democracy. The 
chapter did not define the concept but rather focused on its relationship 
with patterns of economic development. The next chapter sets out to define 
democracy and human rights and examines the conceptual and empirical 
relationship between the two.
notes
 1 Statistically, the relationship is positive and significant (Pearson’s r  .295; 
p  .001), which means that wealthier countries tend to be more democratic 
and that if we collected the same data on the same sample of countries at a 
different point in time, then we would be more than 99 per cent certain that a 
similar positive relationship would be found.
 2 As in the relationship depicted in Figure 2.1, the relationship depicted in 
Figure 2.2 is positive and statistically significant (Pearson’s r  .357; p  .001). 
But this relationship is somewhat stronger than the one depicted in Figure 2.1.
Diamidis, Peter H. (2012) Abundance: The Future is Better Than You Think. New 
York: Free Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin (1960) Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New 
York: Anchor Books.
Norris, Pippa (2011) Making Democratic Governance Work: The Impact of 
Regimes on Prosperity, Welfare and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
sUGGesTIons FoR FURTheR ReadInG
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy24
 3 Even the evidence that non-democratic governments are better at overseeing 
economic growth has been challenged on the grounds that democracies survive 
economic downturns, while many authoritarian states do not, and thus on 
aggregate, average levels of growth will be lower for democracies than for non-
democracies (see Przeworski and Limongi 1997).
 4 For an overly optimistic view about the natural association between economic 
development and democracy, see Singer (1997); and for a brilliant and 
insightful critique of policies based on this assumption, see Cammack (1997).
 5 Foreign Affairs has a resource on The Modernization School, see http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-read-on-modernization-theory.
ChapTeR ThRee
Democracy and human rights
Introduction
The twin ideas of democracy and human rights that frame this book have 
long histories. Democracy has its origins in Ancient Greece and since then 
has been a relatively rare and recent form of political rule (see Finer 1997) 
compared to other political systems that have characterized the history 
of the world, such as monarchy, oligarchy and authoritarianism. Despite 
its growth in popularity (see Chapters 1 and 4 in this volume), however, 
as an idea, it remains an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Gallie 1956) and 
much debate continues over the definitions, components and meaning of 
the term democracy.1 Certainly, the renewed attention to democracy in light 
of the events in the Middle East and North Africa will once again invite 
commentary on definitions and ‘models’ of democracy (Held 1996). Some 
have argued that human rights have an equally long history (see, e.g. Ishay 
2004), but most scholars and practitioners see human rights as a modern 
‘construction’ (e.g. Donnelly 1999) that developed out of the tradition of 
citizenship rights and was then universalized through a set of practices and 
agreements that have yielded the international system for the promotion 
and protection of human rights that we now have today.
The history of citizenship is one of a struggle for rights, as subjugated 
populations increasingly articulated their grievances in the language of 
rights and as modern states formed, rights became extended through law 
and enforcement mechanisms that provided greater legal protections to 
an increasingly wider range of rights concerns (see, e.g. Barbalet 1988; 
Foweraker and Landman 1997). The current system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights is thus an international version of rights that had 
long been grounded in the nation state, which are now seen as an inherent 
feature of all human beings by virtue of them being human (Donnelly 1989). 
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They thus transcend the nation state in terms of individual entitlement to 
an enjoyment of these rights wherever a person may find him or herself. But 
like democracy, the idea of human rights and its purported universality are 
still open to debate with respect to contested philosophical foundations for 
their existence (see Ingram 1994; Mendus 1995; Freeman 1994; Landman 
2005b) and the different ways in which they are understood across different 
political contexts found in the world today.
Despite these different historical trajectories, there is much overlap between 
democracy and human rights, as both are grounded in shared principles of 
accountability, individual integrity, fair and equal representation, inclusion 
and participation and non-violent solutions to conflict. This chapter provides 
different definitions of democracy, outlines and discusses the wide range of 
contemporary human rights and explores the linkages between democracy 
and human rights both in theory and in practice. What we shall see is that 
democracy and human rights are highly complementary to one another, but 
they are not equivalent and they are not are perfect substitutes. Rather, each 
of the concepts retains its own set of core features while also exhibiting 
certain shared features. It will also be made clear that there are certain 
tensions between democracy and human rights, which reside in conflicting 
principles upon which they are founded and the pragmatic ways in which 
they are realized, as well as the kinds of politics that they make possible.
‘Thick’ and ‘thin’ definitions of democracy
As outlined above, democracy is arguably the oldest concept of the two 
under consideration here and it was first formulated in the work of Aristotle, 
whose notion of ‘polity’ most closely matches the modern conception of 
democracy used today. While polity refers to the ‘good’ form of rule by the 
many2, modern conceptions of democracy are based on the fundamental 
ideas of popular sovereignty and collective decision-making in which rulers 
are in some way held to account by those over whom they rule. But beyond 
this basic consensus on what is otherwise a highly contested concept, there 
are many variations of democracy, or ‘democracy with adjectives’ (Collier 
and Levitsky 1997) that have been in use by scholars, practitioners and 
policymakers. These definitions can be grouped broadly into (1) procedural 
democracy, (2) liberal democracy and (3) social democracy, the delineation 
of which largely rests on the variable incorporation of different rights 
protection alongside the general commitment to popular sovereignty and 
collective decision-making.
Procedural democracy
Procedural definitions of democracy draw on the seminal work of Robert 
Dahl (1971) in Polyarchy and include two dimensions of contestation and 
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participation. Contestation captures the uncertain peaceful competition 
necessary for democratic rule; a principle which presumes the legitimacy of 
a significant and organized opposition, the right to challenge incumbents, 
protection of the twin freedoms of expression and association, the existence 
of free and fair elections and a consolidated political party system. In 
reference to some of the discussions in the previous chapter, this idea alone 
has motivated much foreign and aid policy in ways that have led to the 
‘electoral fallacy’, or the over-enthusiasm among certain policymakers for 
the existence of successive elections as a key indicator for the existence of 
stable democracy. Participation, on the other hand, captures the idea of 
popular sovereignty, which presumes the protection of the right to vote as 
well as the existence of universal suffrage, or that principle that enshrines 
the right of participation in the democratic process to all within a country’s 
jurisdiction regardless of social categories, such as race, religion, ethnicity, 
gender, sexual orientation, etc.3 The history of suffrage suggests that this 
is a right that has been the result of long and widespread social struggle 
as mentioned above, at least among Western democracies, while new 
democracies have enshrined, at least formally, universal suffrage in their 
new (or resurrected) constitutions during their own moments of transition.4 
Table 3.1 summarizes this definition and its components. Such a procedural 
definition of democracy can be considered a baseline set of conditions and 
lower threshold that can be used to assess and enumerate democracy in 
the world. Indeed, the figure depicting the growth of democracy in the 
Chapter 1 (see Figure 1.1) is based on this more narrow conception of 
democracy for determining the scores used to count the number and 
percentage of democracies in the world.
Liberal democracy
Liberal definitions of democracy preserve the notions of contestation 
and participation found in procedural definitions, but add more explicit 
references to the protection of certain human rights. As outlined above, 












Freedom of expression Free and fair elections
Freedom of association Consolidated party 
system
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these rights were traditionally understood as citizenship rights, but with 
the advent of the contemporary international law and practice they have 
become largely understood as human rights (see below). Definitions of liberal 
democracy thus contain an institutional dimension and a rights dimension 
(see Foweraker and Krznaric 2000). The institutional dimension captures 
the idea of popular sovereignty and includes notions of accountability, 
constraint of leaders, representation of citizens and universal participation 
in ways that are consistent with Dahl’s ‘polyarchy’ model outlined above. 
The rights dimension is upheld by the rule of law and includes civil, political, 
property and minority rights. The protection of these rights provides a 
particular set of guarantees that guard against the threat of a ‘tyranny of 
the majority’ and have their provenance in the 1776 American Declaration 
of Independence and the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizen. Table 3.2 summarizes this definition of democracy. Such a 
definition is arguably richer (or thicker) as it includes legal constraints on 
the exercise of power to complement the popular elements in the derivation 
of and accountability for power. For liberal definitions, popular sovereignty 
and collective decision-making are simply not enough as outcomes under 
such a system can undermine the rights of individuals and groups. And we 
shall see later on in this chapter that many new democracies have been 
relatively successful in establishing procedural democracy, but have struggled 
to guarantee the kinds of rights that constitute the liberal definition.
Scholars such as Larry Diamond (1999) and Fareed Zakaria (2007) 
have written extensively about this ‘gap’ between the institutional 
and rights dimensions that characterize the new democracies that have 
emerged since the late 1970s. Indeed, Zakaria calls such a state of affairs 
‘illiberal democracy’, but what is interesting is that if one looks closely 
at the collection of so-called ‘advanced democracies’, especially since the 
advent of the 2001 ‘war on terror’, there are also evident gaps between the 
institutional and rights dimension in these democracies as well. Across a 
wide selection of these democracies, we have seen the passage of anti-terror 
legislation that undermines many historic rights commitments relating to 
arbitrary detention, privacy and freedom of movement (see, e.g. Brysk 
and Shafir 2007), while the prosecutors of the war on terror have sought 
ways to reinterpret legal protections relating to such human rights as the 
Table 3.2 Liberal democracy
Institutional dimension  
(popular sovereignty)
Rights dimension  
(rule of law)
Accountability Restraint Civil rights Property rights
Representation Participation Political rights Minority rights
Adapted from Foweraker and Krznaric (2000).
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right not be tortured, or other forms of cruel, degrading and inhumane 
treatment (see, e.g. Sands 2006).
Social democracy
Social definitions of democracy maintain the institutional and rights 
dimensions found in liberal models of democracy but expand the types of 
rights that ought to be protected, including social, economic and cultural 
rights (although some of these are included in minority rights protection seen 
in liberal definitions). Such an expanded form of democracy, as summarized 
in Table 3.3, includes the provision of social and economic welfare and 
the progressive realization of economic and social rights. It also includes 
the protection of cultural rights, which are concerned with such issues as 
mother tongue language, ceremonial land rights and intellectual property 
rights relating to cultural practices (e.g. indigenous healing practices and 
remedies that may be of interest to multinational companies). Conceptually, 
those advocating a pure liberal model of democracy argue that including 
such social dimensions mixes intrinsic and extrinsic features of democratic 
performance, since it is possible for non-democratic regimes to provide social 
and economic welfare as well as the realization of their associated rights. 
This has long been the argument of socialist regimes, particularly those of 
the former Soviet Union, the Communist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Cuba, as well as in the case of Venezuela under the Bolivarian Revolution 
of President Hugo Chavez. Proponents of human rights, on the other hand, 
argue that the sharp distinction between categories of rights is false, since 
the exercise of one category of rights is related to the other category of 
rights, and both sets are required for full experience of democratic rule. For 
example, access to health, education and welfare will have an impact on an 
individual’s ability to participate in the democratic process through voting, 
acquiring and understanding political information and having the personal 
capacity and capabilities for critical engagement in the political system. Thus 
for a full experience of democracy, both sets of rights are required.
Beyond these conceptual and theoretical debates, which see social 
democracy as a ‘type’ that ought to include this fuller selection of rights 
protection and provision of social programmes and policy, we saw in the 
Table 3.3 Social democracy
Institutional dimension  
(popular sovereignty)
Rights dimension  
(rule of law)
Accountability Restraint Civil rights Property rights
Representation Participation Political rights Minority rights
Economic rights Social rights
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previous chapter that empirical research on the benefits of democracy 
includes growth rates that are not worse than under non-democratic rule and 
patterns of human development that are much better. Moreover, Donnelly 
(1999) argues that in the relationship between development, democracy and 
human rights, European welfare states have come closest to the normative 
ideal of ‘rights-protective’ regimes, since the welfare system acts to alleviate 
the worst effects of market capitalism by providing a social safety net. Such 
an understanding of course has been significantly challenged in Europe 
since the 2007 financial crisis, as governments across the region have had 
to cut back on public expenditure in ways that have caused great pain for 
those most in need of the services expected from the welfare state. Cuts in 
such countries as Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
have affected public service workers, those in receipt of housing benefit, 
educational grants, child benefit and other services typically provided by 
the state.
The different models of democracy are summarized in Figure 3.1 as a series 
of concentric circles that capture the notion of ever-thickening definitions 
of democracy. A version of this figure has been used by the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a 29-member state 









FIGURe 3.1 Thin and thick definitions of democracy.
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around the world.5 The figure should not be misunderstood as representing 
a causal ordering or chronology of democratic development. Rather, it 
should be seen as a way to represent the core features of democracy (popular 
sovereignty and collective decision-making) and the increasing overlap with 
various rights protections. The North American tradition of democracy tends 
to concentrate on the liberal model, while European and African countries 
tend to concentrate on the social model. Indeed, in Africa, and in particular, 
the African Union political discourse, there is great attention to the basket 
of economic, social and cultural rights as essential for democracy in the 
region. As we shall see below, the main human rights instrument in Africa is 
entitled the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which signals 
this normative commitment to collective rights found within the social 
democratic model. Overall, it is important in any discussion of democracy 
to take account of these various definitions, which should serve as a general 
guide to the different ways in which democracy has been understood and 
how it will be understood in new democracies.
human rights: evolution and protection
While there is empirical support for the normative definition of social 
democracy, the previous section made it quite clear that there are still lines 
of demarcation between these different definitions of democracy that are a 
function of the rights protection that they include (see also Beetham 1999). 
But thus far, we have not defined human rights explicitly nor have we 
examined the expansion of human rights, the systems for their promotion 
and protection and the discourses that have diffused the idea of human rights 
around the world since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
In their modern manifestation, human rights have become an accepted 
legal and normative standard through which to judge the quality of human 
dignity as it is experienced by over 7 billion people around the world in 
a multitude of very different social, economic and political contexts. This 
standard has arisen through the concerted efforts of thousands of people 
over many years inspired by a simple set of ideas that have become codified 
through the mechanism of public international law and realized through the 
domestic legal frameworks and governmental institutions of states around 
the world.
Human rights are moral claims accorded legal recognition and states are 
legally obliged to ensure that they respect, protect and fulfil these claims. 
Respecting human rights requires the state to refrain from violating them. 
Protecting human rights requires the state to prevent the violation of human 
rights by ‘third’ parties, such as private companies, non-governmental 
organizations, paramilitary and insurgency groups and ‘uncivil’ or 
undemocratic movements (see Payne 2000). Fulfilling human rights requires 
the states to invest in and implement policies for the progressive realization 
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of human rights. As expressed in international law, they are ‘specific norms 
that emerged from a political project’ that commenced in the aftermath of 
World War I and gained traction as an immediate consequence of World 
War II (Nickel 2007: 7). The 1945 Charter of the United Nations endorsed 
the existence and necessity of human rights, and the international human 
rights regime that has emerged since is a ‘deliberately constructed, partial 
international order’ that consists primarily of states that establishes a set of 
norms prescribing the behaviour of those states that become its members 
(Hasenclever et al. 2000: 3). The regime focuses on holding governments 
accountable for their policies and practices that affect their citizens. The 
regime is wholly centred on ensuring the protection of human dignity and 
the prevention of its violation by states.
In order to realize these aims, the international human rights regime 
comprises formal institutions (UN and regional bodies) and informal ones 
(non-governmental organizations), which are involved in the processes of 
standard setting, monitoring and enforcement (Beetham 1999; Nowak 
2003; Landman 2006a). Beginning with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948, the UN has developed the majority of international 
human rights standards that exist today and created a system of institutions 
to implement these standards and monitor their implementation. These 
institutions include bodies that have responsibility for each of the human 
rights treaties (known as ‘treaty bodies’), ‘charter’ bodies who derive their 
authority directly from the UN Charter and specialized agencies, all of which 
are engaged in standard setting, monitoring and enforcement.
Regions have been involved in the development and implementation of 
human rights treaties that in many ways reflect their own historical and 
cultural contexts. Three regions of the world – Europe, the Americas and 
Africa – have set up human rights regimes with human rights standards 
and associated institutions. Europe has three regional mechanisms – the 
Council of Europe (COE), the European Union (EU) and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – which together forms an 
intricate, elaborate and expanding system of human rights protection in the 
region. The European Convention on Human Rights adopted in 1950 under 
the aegis of the Council of Europe provides individuals the right to appeal 
to the European Court of Human Rights once legal remedies are exhausted 
in their domestic jurisdiction. The OSCE has additional institutions that 
monitor different dimensions of human rights in Europe, while the European 
Union has a variety of policy instruments for the promotion of human 
rights, the most important of which include the Copenhagen criteria for 
membership of the European Union. The Inter-American system created 
by the Organization of American States (OAS) stands second only to the 
European system in terms of its spread and effectiveness with a body of law 
made by and applicable to those states that are party to the 1969 American 
Convention on Human Rights. It is the only system that allows for in situ 
visits by personnel from the regime to investigate human rights conditions. 
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The third regional human rights system is in Africa under the auspices of the 
African Union. Established by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights in 1979, its recent developments include the establishment of an 
African Court of Human and People’s Rights in 2006 to address individual 
complaints on violations of the Charter. While efforts to develop a regional 
human rights system in Asia are in their infancy, the League of Arab States 
has made considerable progress with the adoption of the 2004 Arab Charter 
on Human Rights, which came into force in 2008.
human rights: definition and content
The content of human rights as established in international law is dependent 
on the creation and adoption of legal standards by states, which allow the 
human rights community to hold states accountable for those actions that 
violate the dignity of individuals residing within their jurisdictions. The 
International Bill of Rights – the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – and the 1984 Convention against Torture 
(CAT) highlight the legal protections that individuals can claim from 
the state. The two Covenants also reflect the most commonly accepted 
categorization of human rights: (a) civil and political rights, (b) economic, 
social and cultural rights and (c) solidarity rights.
As we saw above, the first two categories form part of the different 
definitions democracy. But what do these different categories of rights mean? 
Civil and political rights protect the ‘personhood’ of individuals and their 
ability to participate in the public activities of their countries. Economic, 
social and cultural rights provide individuals with access to economic 
resources, social opportunities for growth and the enjoyment of their distinct 
ways of life, as well as protection from the arbitrary loss of these rights. 
Solidarity rights seek to guarantee for individuals access to public goods 
like development and the environment, and some have begun to argue, 
the benefits of global economic development (Freeman 2002; Landman 
2006a). This categorization loosely follows a temporal frame; since we saw 
earlier that human rights can be seen as the consequence of struggles of 
peoples against oppression and injustice, successive generations of people 
have fought for distinct ‘generations of rights’ with civil and political rights 
comprising the first generation, economic, social and cultural rights making 
up the second generation, and solidarity rights, the third. While such a 
history in the struggle for rights has been well documented, the division of 
rights in this way is no longer part of the international discourse on human 
rights. Rather, the international community speaks of human rights as 
equal, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent, where the enjoyment and 
implementation of one set of rights are inextricably linked to the fulfilment 
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of the other rights (Boyle 1995; Alfredsson and Eide 1999; Donnelly 1999; 
Freeman 2002).
Beyond the International Bill of Rights and the Convention against Torture, 
a second set of treaties protects the rights of individuals who by virtue of 
being members of a particular group or possessing certain characteristics 
may be particularly vulnerable to rights violations. The 1966 International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) addresses all forms of racial discrimination, the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) specifies the legal protections to be given 
to the rights of children and the obligations accrued to the state to uphold 
these rights and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) highlights the rights of women and ensures them 
protection from discrimination on arbitrary or unjustified grounds. Other 
rights protections have been provided to individuals with disabilities, who 
belong to an indigenous or ethnic population, and migrant workers.
Taken together, there are now a large number of human rights that have 
been formally codified (see Table 3.4) which can be enumerated from the 
different treaties. As definitions and assumptions vary, the total number of 
rights that ought to be protected also varies, but the list in the table comprises 
Table 3.4 List of human rights protected under international law
1. Non-discrimination
2. Life
3. Liberty and security of the person
4. Protection against slavery and servitude
5. Protection against torture
6. Legal personality
7. Equal protection of the law
8. Legal remedy
9. Protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile
10. Access to independent and impartial tribunal
11. Presumption of innocence
12. Protection against ex post facto laws
13. Privacy, family, home and correspondence
14. Freedom of movement and residence
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15. Nationality
16. Marry and found a family
17. Protection and assistance of families
18. Marriage only with free consent of spouses
19. Equal rights of men and women in marriage
20. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
21. Freedom of opinion and expression
22. Freedom of the press
23. Freedom of assembly
24. Freedom of association
25. Participation in government
26. Social security
27. Work
28. No compulsory or forced labour
29. Just and favourable conditions of work
30. Trade unions
31. Rest, leisure and paid holidays
32. Adequate standard of living
33. Education
34. Participation in cultural life
35. Self-determination
36. Protection of and assistance to children




41. Compulsory primary education
42. Humane treatment when deprived of liberty
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58 rights about which there is reasonable consensus across commentators 
and analysts. For some, this list constitutes a celebration and achievement of 
the human rights movement since the 1948 Universal Declaration has a total 
of 30 articles delineating sets of rights and the subsequent standard setting 
has led to a greater number of issues being given the status to be recognized 
as human rights. For others, the list in Table 3.1 may be an illustration of the 
problem of human rights ‘inflation’ where too many issues are afforded 
the status of human rights and therefore lead to a dilution of the power of 
the concept and the moral weight behind it. For example, protection against 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile receives unassailable support, while the 
right to rest, leisure and paid holidays may raise an eyebrow or two from 
many quarters, especially during times of economic downturn.
Whether too many or too little, the list of human rights is a function of 
those rights that have been codified in international law, and nation states 
around the world have chosen to participate in the international regime of 
43. Protection against imprisonment for debt
44. Expulsion of aliens only by law
45. Prohibition of war propaganda and incitement to discrimination
46. Minority culture
47. No imprisonment for breach of civil obligations
48. Protection of children
49. Access to public service
50. Democracy
51. Participation in cultural and scientific life
52. Protection of intellectual property rights




57. Prohibition of the death penalty
58. Prohibition of apartheid 
Sources:  Davidson 1993: Appendix 1; Gibson 1996: 37–38; Green 2001: 1069; 
Donnelly 2003: 24.
Reproduced from Landman, 2006a: 16; and Landman and Carvalho, 2009.
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human rights through signing and ratifying the various treaties for their 
protection. Table 3.5 shows a list of the main international human rights 
instruments, along with the number and percentage of countries that are 
a party to these treaties. This means that they have signed and ratified the 
treaties and are therefore obliged to uphold the protection of human rights 
contained within them. It is clear from the table that the 1989 Convention 
on the Rights of the Child enjoys most international support from countries 
(99 per cent participation) and that the 1984 Convention against Torture the 
least support (76 per cent participation). There are political and pragmatic 
explanations for the variations in participation observed in the table, where 
some treaties have sets of obligations that compromise or undermine 
fundamental national interests or practices of some states. For example, 
many states in the United States have the death penalty for individuals under 
the age of 16, which would be considered a violation of the rights outlined 
in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Across the Tables 3.4 and 3.5, however, it seems very clear that the 
international regime has grown both in breadth and in depth such that a 
larger number of rights protections have been formally codified and an 
increasing number of countries have formally committed themselves to the 
protection of human rights. Canadian MP and political theorist Michael 
Ignatieff (2001) describes these developments as nothing less than a ‘juridical 
Table 3.5 Main international human rights treaties





1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR)
167 86
1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
160 82
1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD)
174 89
1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
187 96
1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
149 76
1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 193 99
1990 Convention on Migrant Workers 45 23
2006 Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 104 53
Source: http://www.bayefsky.com, accessed on 14 December 2011.
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revolution’ in the area of human rights. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
this juridical revolution has not necessarily been met by a steady increase 
in the actual protection of human rights; a gap that lies at the heart of 
this book’s argument about the precarious nature of this particular set of 
ideals. Indeed, in 1999, in an article in the New York Times, David Reif 
reflected precisely on the ‘precarious triumph’ of human rights. On the 
one hand, it is a triumph, since even the most optimistic of observers at 
the time of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights could have 
imagined the subsequent growth and influence of human rights discourse 
and doctrine. It is precarious since these very same achievements can be 
reversed as many countries witnessed in the first decade of the twentieth 
century as governments responded to the threat of terrorism. But small 
legal victories against rescinding rights commitments and the ways in which 
popular actors have embraced the discourse of rights in the ‘Arab Spring’ of 
2011 demonstrate the power and resilience of these ideals.
democracy and human rights
The parallel stories of democracy and human rights are certainly intriguing 
on their own, but this book is also concerned with the degree to which 
the two concepts exhibit overlaps and inter-relationships. We saw in the 
beginning of this chapter that there is a ‘Venn diagram’ of increasing 
overlap between democracy and human rights depending on the definition 
of democracy that one adopts. Procedural definitions have the least overlap 
while social definitions have the most. It is fairly straightforward and 
intuitive to see the fundamental links between democracy and human rights. 
But are these connections that are made theoretically upheld empirically? 
Are democracies better at protecting all human rights? Or just some human 
rights? Can authoritarian regimes use the power of the state apparatus 
and coercive institutions to bring about radical social change that provides 
most advantage for the least well off and thus offer better protections for 
social and economic rights? The Cuban regime has long been praised for 
its socialized medicine and the Chinese regime has significant progress in 
achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), especially 
in the reduction of poverty in the rural areas of the country.
The large-scale quantitative analysis of human rights protection conducted 
since the late 1980s has shown consistent and significant positive effects of 
democracy on civil and political rights. Using data collected in increasingly 
large samples of countries across space and time, the empirical political 
science of human rights has shown that democracies are better at protecting 
civil and political rights (see, e.g. Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and 
Tate 1994; Poe et al. 1999; Landman 2005a) and that improvements in 
the protection of such rights occurs even within a year after a transition 
to democracy (Zanger 2000). But such a general finding for democracy’s 
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impact on human rights has been qualified by other research, which shows 
that processes of democratization take time to become embedded and that 
for those regimes somewhere between authoritarianism and democracy may 
experience greater violations of civil and political rights, the so-called more 
murder in the middle thesis (Fein 1995). And other research has shown that 
the crucial institutional arrangement within democracy that has the greatest 
probability of reducing civil and political rights violations is a significant set 
of constraints on the authority of the executive (Buena de Mesquita et al. 
2005). Elected executives without constraint from the legislative assembly 
through control over cabinet selection and the use of veto powers may well 
abuse their power of office and use the state to violate civil and political 
rights. As we shall see in the next chapter, there have many instances of 
so-called delegative democracies (O’Donnell 1994; Foweraker et al. 2003) 
in which executives have made too much of their electoral mandate to rule 
and have engaged in ‘extra-constitutional’ behaviour that carries with it less 
respect for civil and political rights.
These findings suggest that the relationship between democracy and civil 
and political rights is far from perfect despite having an overall positive and 
significant relationship. Figure 3.2 shows a scatter diagram of measures of 








































































































































FIGURe 3.2 Democracy and human rights.
Sources: Mean combined democracy score from Polity IV data for 2007–2009; mean 
Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) score for the Physical Integrity Rights, 2007–2009. 
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includes the protection of rights relating to freedom from arbitrary detention, 
torture, assassination, disappearance and exile. The figure shows many 
things at once. First, it shows the overall positive and significant relationship 
between democracy and human rights popular in the research literature on 
this topic. The scatter of data points exhibits a pattern that spreads from 
the lower left quadrant (low democracy-low rights protection) to the upper 
right quadrant (high democracy-high rights protection) suggesting that on 
balance, countries that are more democratic are better at protecting personal 
integrity rights. Second, the figure shows a wide range of significant ‘outliers’ 
where in the upper left quadrant there are countries that despite not having 
high levels of democracy nevertheless do not engage significantly in the 
violation of personal integrity rights. It is interesting to note, however, that 
Bahrain features in this group of countries but that during the Arab Spring 
of 2011 the regime has resorted to the abuse of these rights when facing 
a popular challenge to its continued rule. In the lower right quadrant is a 
collection of countries that despite having relatively high levels of democracy, 
nonetheless have significant problems with the violation of personal integrity 
rights. These are the countries that scholars, such as Larry Diamond and 
Fareed Zakaria mentioned above, find highly problematic and indicative of 
a democratic failure among certain democracies. The notable cases are those 
that have made relatively recent transitions to democracy (e.g. Mexico), that 
have had significant difficulties in consolidating democracy since transition 
(South Africa), that face internal conflict (Colombia) or that face a mix of 
internal and external conflict (Israel).
Beyond these somewhat crude empirical observations, there is a final 
tension or contradiction worth discussing before drawing our conclusions 
for this chapter. Democracy is founded on the set of principles and 
ideas that have been outlined here but it is often the product of political 
accommodation at key moments in a country’s history and associated with 
notions of balance, possibility and working towards agreeable and peaceful 
solutions to conflicts of interest. The American Founding, for example, 
was based on a compromise between the interests of large and small states, 
concerns over the power of the executive (e.g. Hamilton wanted a king), 
balance of power between the federal and state governments, among many 
issues debated at the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. The 
‘path dependencies’ related to the decisions made at the Convention still 
affect American democratic politics today on key issues such as the death 
penalty, abortion, immigration, taxes, commerce, sentencing, among many 
other issues. More recent democratic transitions in Portugal, Spain, Chile, 
Brazil, Mongolia and Mexico, among others, are also characterized by this 
notion of political accommodation of difference.
Human rights, on the other hand, are based on notions of a ‘moral 
compass’, adjudication or judgement and a certain absolutism in reference 
to the international law of human rights that can close down options 
and moments of political accommodation. As we shall see in Chapter 7, 
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many countries included different kinds of ‘truth’ processes as part of their 
democratic transitions, which sought to uncover the true nature and extent 
of ‘past wrongs’ and atrocities committed during periods of Apartheid (in 
the case of South Africa), authoritarian rule (e.g. Argentina and Chile), civil 
war (e.g. Guatemala, El Salvador and Sierra Leone) and foreign occupation 
(e.g. East Timor). Modelled after the International Military Tribunal and the 
Nuremberg Trials used in post-war Germany, these ‘truth commissions’ as 
they became known often have been quite good at uncovering truth. Large 
sections of the human rights community have adopted a position critical 
of any use of ‘amnesty for truth’ (as in South Africa) and have called for 
prosecution and retributive justice for the victims of these regimes and 
experiences. While such a position has great moral authority, political 
realities in many countries have meant that there has been less justice for 
the victims than the human rights community would have wanted, but this 
suboptimal achievement of justice is then balanced against future stability 
and sustainable democracy.
Such an outcome illustrates the tension between the kind of political 
‘accommodation’ that accompanies moments of democratic transition and 
the absolutist position adopted by much of the human rights community. 
Many countries have made successful transitions to democracy, but there 
remain serious questions about a large number of perpetrators responsible 
for carrying out arbitrary detention, torture, assassination, disappearance 
and exile who have escaped prosecution for their past deeds. Moreover, 
there are countries that have undergone democratic transitions that have 
either not engaged with an official truth process, only recently adopted a 
truth process (e.g. only in 2012 has Brazil established a truth commission 
for to investigate its 25 years of military rule between 1964 and 1989) or 
are still considering which options are politically possible (e.g. Spain and 
Northern Ireland6). But as we shall see in Chapter 6, it has often been the 
struggle for human rights that has challenged status quo power relations 
and existing regimes; regimes which then make concessions and in many 
cases undergo processes of democratic transition. In this way, there is both 
complementarity and contradiction between democracy and human rights.
summary and implications
This chapter has provided an overview of definitions of democracy and 
specification of the growth and proliferation of human rights in the latter 
half of the twentieth century. It argued that democracy is based on the core 
principles of popular sovereignty and collective decision-making and that 
different definitions of democracy – procedural, liberal and social – are 
derived from the degree to which they incorporate sets of human rights, 
including civil, political, economic, social, cultural and minority rights. We 
saw that human rights have grown in breadth and depth since the 1948 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, such that today there are as many 
as 58 different rights delineated in the various international treaties for the 
protection of human rights and there are varying degrees of participation 
from countries in the international human rights regime. Moreover, Europe, 
the Americas and Africa have established regional systems for the protection 
of human rights, while the Arab league is in early stages of doing the same. 
Asia, which itself covers a diverse set of countries in South Asia, East Asia 
and Southeast Asia, has yet to embark on this path. We have seen that the 
complementarity between democracy and human rights that exists in theory is 
born out empirically, at least with respect to the protection of political integrity 
rights, while the findings for democracy’s impact on human development 
bode well for a demonstration of complementarity for social and economic 
rights (see, e.g. Landman and Larizza 2009). But the complementarity is not 
perfect, where many outliers are present and many contradictions between 
the two remain, especially with respect to democracy’s capacity for political 
accommodation and the ‘adjudicative’ nature of human rights.
It is important to note, however, that the Arab Spring of 2011 once again 
reminds us of the power of the language of rights and its possibility for bringing 
about democratic change. Critiques of authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East and North Africa have in part adopted a language of rights that includes 
economic as well as civil and political demands. To illustrate the power of 
these ideas, consider the words of Yemeni journalist and human rights activist 
Tawakkol Karman, who writes with respect to the Saleh regime,
Saleh’s regime carried out 33 years of rule through blood and corruption. 
We have brought it to its knees through our determination, and through 
the steadfastness of young people who have confronted the bullets of 
the regime with bared chests. With politicians and members of the army 
standing beside us, our success will go further.7
Strong words indeed and indicative of the passion for change in the region, 
as well as the longstanding appeal of two powerful ideas: democracy and 
human rights.
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notes
 1 In a number of public gatherings where I have shared the podium with 
political theorist David Beetham, he has always qualified this claim about 
democracy by saying that the term may well be ‘essentially contested’ but 
democracy is not ‘essentially contestable’. This is an important clarification 
since although human communities may disagree on the definition of 
democracy, they can nonetheless agree on its desirability as a form of rule.
 2 For Aristotle, ‘democracy’ was the corrupt form of rule by the many and 
was seen as ‘mob rule’. Modern understandings of democracy, however, use 
democracy in similar ways to his use of the term ‘polity’.
 3 The only remaining justifiable restrictions on participation are age and mental 
ability, but there is little consensus on threshold conditions for these two 
categories. There is the additional debate surrounding suffrage for prisoners, as 
in many states across the United States, convicted felons lose their right to vote 
forever, and in Europe, the United Kingdom is challenging the right to vote for 
prisoners.
 4 There is an interesting historical case in which the military regime in Brazil 
(1964–89) extended the right to vote to illiterates in the hope of gaining 
electoral support for the pro-military political party in the Brazilian Congress, 
but when this new group of enfranchised individualized exercised their right to 
vote, the opposition party was to gain. The regime thus retracted the right until 
the democratic transition many years later (see Skidmore 1993).
 5 The figure originated in a lecture I delivered to the staff at IDEA in 2005 as 
part of its 10-year anniversary celebrations and has since been worked into 
many of its work programmes and publications, the last of which was a global 
consultation project that examined the degree to which the European Union 
was working in the areas of democracy building across its foreign policies. See 
IDEA (2009).
 6 The case of Northern Ireland is an interesting one, since as part of the United 
Kingdom it has always been considered a democracy, but over 30 years of 
violence limited the degree to which citizens could express their democratic 
will, and restrictions put in place and tactics used to combat terrorism 
compromised certain freedoms and resulted in the United Kingdom being 
taken to the European Court of Human Rights for the ways in which the 
government treated terror suspects in prison. The post-Good Friday period has 
seen a national debate on whether Northern Ireland should engage in a ‘truth’ 
process, while the Saville Inquiry set up to investigate the Bloody Sunday 
killings took 12 years to issue its report, which was published on 15 June 
2010. I took part in a Chatham House event that brought together experts 
and representatives from Northern Ireland and Peru to explore the advantages 
and disadvantages of establishing a truth commission for Northern Ireland. 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Britain and Ireland (TRCBI) has 
been proposed, but to date has not made much progress.
 7 Tawakkol Karman, ‘Our revolutions doing what Saleh Can’t – uniting Yemen,’ 





In 1991, Samuel Huntington published a book entitled The Third Wave, which 
described the development of democracy since the nineteenth century as a 
series of ‘waves’ that were characterized by the ‘ebb’ and ‘flow’ of democracy 
over time. A wave is defined as a group of transitions from non-democratic 
regimes to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time 
and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during 
the same period. History has indeed shown that democracy has come and 
gone in many countries, but with the advent of Huntington’s ‘third wave’ 
in 1974, it appears that democracy has become more ‘sticky’, with fewer 
democratic setbacks and new opportunities for democratic transformation. 
The developments in the Middle East and North Africa in 2011 show that 
at least the appeal of democracy and the promise of greater rights protection 
have been a powerful force for change in the region. The prognosis for the 
successful installation of democratic regimes across the region, however, 
remains highly uncertain, as even in the early stages of transformation, great 
variation across the different countries is evident even though the impulse 
for change within them has been largely similar.
For Huntington, the first wave began with the advent of ‘Jacksonian 
Democracy’ in the United States when suffrage was extended to the majority 
of white males (clearly an issue that was subsequently challenged by the 
suffragette movement and the civil rights movement) and continued until 
1922 when Mussolini took power in Italy. During this period, the total 
number of democracies peaked at 29 and then dropped to 12 by the end. 
The second wave began just after World War II and extended until 1962, 
with 36 democracies that then dropped to just 30 by 1972. The third wave 
began with the Portuguese transition to democracy in 1974, which was 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy46
then quickly followed by Spain and Greece and many countries in Latin 
America beginning with the 1978 transition in Peru and ending with the 
Chilean transition in 1989 (see Foweraker et al. 2003). In Asia, South Korea 
and Thailand joined these other countries in the third wave. Some have 
argued that the period that followed the 1989 collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Communist countries of Eastern Europe constitutes a ‘fourth wave’ 
of democracy (Doorenspleet 2005), which according to Larry Diamond 
(2011) has seen signs of reversal across 18 countries ranging from Pakistan 
in 1999 through to Mozambique in 2009. Yet, at the time that Diamond’s 
list appeared in print, the popular uprisings in the Middle East and North 
Africa and the top-down reforms taking place in Burma have provided 
renewed signs of democracy’s resilience after this period of alleged decline.
This chapter puts these overall trends into perspective with respect to 
the arguments being advanced in this book. First, the chapter examines 
the spread of democracy through the various waves to illustrate the ebb 
and flow over time in the number and percentage of democracies. It also 
considers two international efforts to support democracy – the Community 
of Democracies and the six United Nations International Conferences on 
New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD1–ICNRD6). Second, the chapter 
examines the growing gap between procedural democracy and liberal 
democracy, where it appears that many new democracies (and a few old 
democracies) have had difficulty protecting certain sets of human rights, 
despite an overall positive relationship between democracy and human 
rights. Third, the chapter discusses the relationship between the timing of 
democratization and the protection of human rights in principle and rights 
in practice (Foweraker and Landman 1997; Landman 2005b; Landman and 
Carvalho 2009). As outlined in the previous chapter, human rights have 
been codified through international law and states ratify the various treaties, 
which commit the state to the protection of human rights in principle. But 
states are also obliged to respect, protect and fulfil human rights such that 
citizens and residents within the jurisdiction may exercise their rights in 
practice. We will see that the timing of democracy has an impact on both 
these understandings of human rights in significant ways that are worth 
our attention. Fourth, the chapter examines significant cases of democratic 
reversal (Ecuador, São Tome, Fiji, Cote d’Ivoire), attempted reversal 
(Guatemala) and democratic erosion (Venezuela, Russia, Central Asia) as 
an illustration of the precariousness of democracy of the kind with which 
Diamond has become concerned. The chapter concludes with an assessment 
of these trends as a means to consider the democratic prospects for the 
countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
democracy’s journey
The journey that democracy has taken from the nineteenth century until 
today has shown great variation across geographical space, over time, and 
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within democracies as the quality of democracy has changed and continues 
to change. Figure 4.1 takes the data used in Figure 1.1 and adds markers 
for Huntington’s ‘waves’ to show the ebb and flow of democracy over time. 
Both the number of democracies and the number of countries vary over time 
and thus the percentage of democracies is a better indicator for the growth 
in democracy. Huntington’s waves are quite clear from these data where 
the peaks and troughs roughly map onto his different time periods for the 
waves. Table 4.1 breaks down these waves into the regions and countries 
from them that comprise the wave. As is clear from the table, the first wave 
Table 4.1 Waves of democracy: regions and countries
Wave Europe Regions
1828–1926 Western Europe North America: United States and Canada
1934–1962 Western Europe Latin America: Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia 
South Asia: India
1974–1989 Southern Europe Latin America: Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Brazil, Guatemala
1990 onwards Eastern Europe Latin America: Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, Mexico
Africa: Benin, Mali, Lesotho, Niger, South Africa, 
Malawi
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FIGURe 4.1 Waves of democracy.
Source: Polity IV.
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was largely confined to Western Europe and the United States. The second 
wave also featured countries in Western Europe, but added countries in 
Latin America, as well as India. In the late 1940s and 1950s, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela and Colombia crafted elite agreements to end periods of violence 
and promulgate democratic regimes that were a key feature of second-wave 
democratization. After partition in 1947, India went on to become the 
world’s most populous democracy and is now an emerging power owing 
to its high rates of economic growth. The third wave involved countries in 
Southern Europe and Latin America, with democratic transitions in Portugal, 
Greece and Spain, followed by Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil 
and Guatemala. The fourth wave was more geographically diverse with 
its origins in Eastern Europe, and then Latin America (Chile, Nicaragua, 
Panama and Mexico), Africa (Benin, Mali, Lesotho, Niger, Malawi and 
South Africa) and Asia (Taiwan, Mongolia, Thailand and Cambodia). As we 
shall see in greater depth in the next chapter, one of the popular explanations 
for the development of democracy focuses on what is called geographical or 
‘spatial’ diffusion, and certainly the regional trends depicted in this table 
illustrate that many processes of democratization have taken place among 
adjacent countries. The diversity of the fourth wave challenges this notion 
of adjacent diffusion, but the events in the Middle East and North Africa 
once again lend support to this idea, which has featured in many policy 
discussions.1
It is important to observe that throughout the four waves, there has been 
a distinctive European influence as the first two waves featured Western 
Europe, the Third Wave featured Southern Europe and the Fourth Wave 
featured Eastern Europe. It is of course well known that democracy was 
first conceived in Ancient Greece, but it did not start to flourish until the 
nineteenth century in the United States and Western Europe. The two world 
wars interrupted the growth of democracy but also convinced many states 
that democracy was the best form of government for avoiding violence and 
inter-state war. The rebuilding of Europe after World War II had an underlying 
democratic logic, as countries embraced democracy and constructed super-
national institutions to ‘lock in’ future generations of leaders in ways that 
have sought to avoid democratic breakdown (see Moravcsik 2000). The 
Council of Europe (COE) was the first set of supranational institutions 
and was in part fortified by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(see the Chapter 3), but the evolution of the European Union, originally 
established to build and protect Europe’s energy markets, has in many ways 
superseded the COE and now has political criteria relating to democracy 
and human rights for those states wishing to become members. It also has 
its own monitoring agency in the form of the EU Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) based in Vienna.
The story of democracy in Europe is often underappreciated and in many 
ways has not yet been told. Interestingly, the social history of democracy in the 
region involves a long and somewhat bloody transformation from feudal states 
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to nation states to empires and wars to democratization and enlargement. And 
this political transformation was accompanied by an economic transformation 
from agrarian production to industrialization to post-industrial welfarism to 
economic integration. These twin processes of transformation have indeed 
created a strong union of relatively stable and peaceful democracies. Such a 
story of democracy in Europe does set an example for what can be achieved 
in the short space of time, particularly if one focuses on that period of time 
since the mass atrocities and casualties committed during World War II. But 
to see Europe as the centre of gravity for democracy would be mistaken, 
as democratic traditions have developed elsewhere such that any talk of 
democratic diffusion ought to consider the lessons of democracy flowing to as 
much as from Europe. Indeed, in Mobilizing for Human Rights, Edward Cleary 
(2007) makes a very strong case of a long history of rights traditions in Latin 
America that have had a profound impact on democratic and authoritarian 
periods of rule. Many third- and fourth-wave democracies in Europe and the 
European neighbourhood looked to Latin America for suitable institutional 
arrangements and variously adopted presidential and semi-presidential 
systems that are distinctly non-European in character. Experiences with 
‘truth commissions’ in Latin America in the 1980s served as early models 
for transitional justice and ‘lustration’ that then featured in such processes of 
transition seen in South Africa, Eastern Europe, East Timor and Sierra Leone 
(see Chapter 7 in this volume and Hayner 2010).
Any consideration of the international dimensions of democracy must 
also address the large role that the United States has played in shaping 
the course of democracy since the end of World War II. The Marshall Plan 
itself was a large economic and political intervention from the United States 
into Europe that helped rebuild countries, strengthen nascent democratic 
institutions and encourage democracy across continental Europe. The 
Portuguese, Spanish and Greek transitions during the Third Wave fit within 
larger logics of the Cold War initially and then European enlargement, 
while post-Cold War democratization has been accompanied by significant 
economic, military and technical assistance from the United States through 
such agencies as the National Endowment for Democracy and USAID to 
support the development of political parties, media, non-governmental 
organizations and militaries. In security terms, the United States has 
maintained significant military bases throughout Europe and NATO has 
been a mainstay feature of Cold War politics and is now engaged in new 
interventions such as the one in Libya as a result of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1973.
Any attempt to map the growth of democracy worldwide, however, 
necessarily relies on definitions of democracy and ways of turning such 
definitions into threshold conditions for counting democracies. For example, 
in order to count the number of democracies in the nineteenth century, one 
has to adopt a fairly narrow definition of democracy that does not include 
universal suffrage. Many countries had established competitive elections and 
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had reasonably well-developed political parties, but the parties were dominated 
by elites, and votes were limited to property-owning white men, effectively 
disenfranchising large segments of the population. Indeed, in Capitalist 
Development and Democracy, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) 
argue that the United States was not really democratic until the 1964 voting 
rights act, which gave African Americans the right to vote. Moreover, the 
struggle led by women’s movements around the world has achieved at different 
periods suffrage for women. As women make up more than 50 per cent of 
the population in most countries, since women tend to have higher rates of 
longevity than men, denial of this fundamental right undermines the notion 
of democracy. Most people find it surprising that Switzerland, a so-called old 
democracy (i.e. one that achieved democracy before the third wave) did not 
extend the right to vote to women until as late as 1971.
It is thus clear that any discussion of the growth of democracy must include 
a consideration of human rights in the ways that were outlined in Chapter 
3. From the trends in democratization discussed in this chapter thus far, we 
have seen a number of countries where basic democratic thresholds have been 
achieved, but closer examination of rights protections suggests that many 
democracies still have a gap between the procedural-institutional dimensions 
of democracy and the fuller rights dimensions. There are some clear trends in 
the data on different measures of rights and their relationship to democracy. 
Analysis of the ratification of human rights treaties has shown two major trends. 
First, older democracies tend to ratify fewer human rights treaties than newer 
democracies. Second, when ratifying these treaties, older democracies file more 
‘reservations’ to these treaties than newer democracies (see Landman 2005a). 
Reservations are formal exceptions to the content of a treaty to which a state 
may have a particular objection, given its own legal culture or legal system. 
For example, the United States lodged a reservation about the death penalty 
when it signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, since 
under the US Constitution, the jurisdiction over the use of the death penalty 
is left to the individual states in the US Federal system. While reservations do 
not necessarily invalidate treaties, there are degrees to which such reservations 
undermine a treaty’s true ‘object and purpose’. What is interesting here is that 
well-established democracies ratify fewer treaties with more reservations than 
newer democracies. One popular explanation argues that older democracies 
have more established legal systems and constitutional protections in place and 
that they take their treaty obligations more seriously than newer democracies. 
Another popular explanation argues that many new democracies ratified all 
the human rights treaties with little to no reservations because they wanted to 
attract international economic and technical assistance.
But what about the actual protection of human rights? Figure 3.2 in 
the previous chapter showed the general positive relationship between the 
level of democracy and a combined measure of civil and political rights. 
The overall relationship is not perfect as is evident from the scatter of 
countries in the figure, and there are many democracies on the right hand 
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bottom area of the figure that have high levels of democracy, but relatively 
low levels of human rights protection (and compare the regional charts in 
Figure 4.2 and 4.3). For the purposes of our discussion here, these lower levels 
of rights protection are among the newer democracies. We can thus conclude 
that older democracies are better at protecting civil and political rights than 
newer democracies, even though these democracies ratify fewer treaties with 
more reservations. The higher ratification rates from the new democracies 
with the associated poorer performance in rights protection have led some 
to argue that many new democracies made ‘insincere commitments’ to the 
international law of human rights (see Smith-Cannoy 2012).
democratic setbacks
Beyond these general trends in democratization and the relationship 
between democracy and human rights, both in principle and in practice, 

















































































FIGURe 4.2 Mean democracy scores by region.
Source: Polity IV 2010.
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considering in any overall assessment of democratization in the world. 
In the preceding sections, we have seen a fairly positive story about the 
growth and proliferation of democracy in the world, which in many ways 
accelerated from 1974 onwards with the advent of the third wave. This 
process means that more countries in the world are democratic than non-
democratic and that the final region in the world that has seemed impervious 
to democratic transformation has begun to experience cracks in the edifice 
of authoritarianism. The world was surprised at the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the Eastern European transitions, the release of Mandela and the South 
African transition and has once again been taken by surprise by the rapid set 
of transformations in the Middle East and North Africa. But to focus only on 
these positive developments ignores the notion of precariousness developed 
throughout this book. There are stories of democratic setback, but like the 
stories of democratic advance, they exhibit great variation in the nature and 
extent to which they have come about in individual countries. We will now 
consider notable examples of failed democratic reversal in Spain (1981), 

















































































FIGURe 4.3 Mean human rights score by region.
Source: Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI), 2010, physical integrity rights index.
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democratic reversal in Peru (1992), Pakistan (1999), Ecuador (2000), São 
Tome (2003), Fiji (2006), Honduras (2009) and the Ivory Coast (2011); and 
democratic rollback in Venezuela, Russia and Central Asia.
On 23 February 1981, Antonio Tejero led a group of 200 armed officers 
from the Guardia Civil in an attempted coup in the Spanish Congress during 
the elections for the Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo. The group held 
the congress hostage for 18 hours, but the King of Spain Juan Carlos I 
broadcast a televised address in which he denounced the coup and asked for 
the maintenance of law and order and the continuance of the democratically 
elected government. Even the coup attempt had been preceded by a period 
of increasing political tension and popular disaffection with the government, 
democracy prevailed and Spain has not experienced any further such 
attempts since. In similar fashion, a band of army mutineers known as the 
‘carapintadas’ (painted faces) staged a series of uprisings against Argentina’s 
new democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín between 1986 and 1988 and 
against the successor government of Carlos Menem in 1990. These uprisings 
were carried largely in response to the continued investigations into military 
atrocities committed during the now infamous ‘dirty war’, which was 
reputedly responsible for the death and disappearance of approximately 
30,000 people. Like in Spain and Argentina, disgruntled military personnel 
made two coup attempts during the Cerezo Presidency in 1988 and 1989, 
but on 25 May 1993, successor President Serrano dissolved congress in an 
attempted ‘autogolpe’ (or self-coup). A combination of popular protests 
and the denunciation from the Court of Constitutionality with the support 
of the military meant that Serrano did not have the necessary political 
support to succeed.
Across these three examples, democratic institutions, though weak and 
popular support for democracy, though young, led to the failure of such coup 
attempts in these countries. The figure of the King in Spain, Presidents Alfonsín 
and Menem in Argentina and the court in Guatemala were such that these 
attempted coups simply did not garner enough popular support to succeed. 
The resilience of nascent democratic institutions and popular support for 
democracy in these cases led to the failed reversals. But in other cases, coup 
attempts have been successful and ushered in periods of authoritarianism 
even though the countries had just recently undergone prolonged processes 
of democratic transition. In 1992, just 2 years after being elected on a broad 
populist platform for reform, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru succeeded 
in bringing about an autogolpe, dissolved congress and oversaw a period of 
authoritarianism that would last until his infamous exile from the country 
in 2000 (see Chapter 7 in this volume). On 21 January 2000, a coalition of 
an indigenous people’s organization and junior military officers fomented 
a coup against President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador and sought to establish 
a populist democracy based on the ideas of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela 
(see below). While the president was exiled and the coup enjoyed a certain 
amount of popular support, it was soon reversed by senior military officers 
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and a new President was installed. The final and most notable case of a coup 
against democracy took place in Pakistan on 12 October 1999 when the 
Chief of the Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Prime Minister 
Nawaz Sharif. In this case, the judiciary held that the coup was legal and 
justified, and after a period of emergency rule, Musharraf won a popular 
referendum in 2002 and stayed in power for another five years.
Less-well-known cases include those of São Tome in 2003, Fiji in 2006, 
Honduras in 2009 and the Ivory Coast in 2010. The 16 July 2003 coup 
São Tome was short-lived and another attempt in 2009 was thwarted. Both 
insurrections led by the military were ostensibly driven by concerns over 
economic inequality and corruption and in particular, the relationship of 
these two issues to the promise of billions from auctioning rights to the 
country’s oil supply. Fiji has long been subjected to military coups, with four 
such events during the 1980s and 1990s. The 2006 coup took place in early 
December after a period of rising tensions between the military and civilian 
leaders over the 2000 coup, while the coup itself received endorsements 
from courts and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, and the new military 
government of Frank Bainimarama positioned itself as ‘clean-up’ operation, 
effectively ridding the system of corruption, electoral irregularities and over-
dependence on ethnic divisions. Bainimarama restored the presidency to 
Josefa Iloilo in 2007, and after a court ruling that the government was not 
legitimate, Epeli Nailatikau was put in power and new elections scheduled 
for 2014. As a consequence of these developments, Fiji has been suspended 
from the Commonwealth.
The cases of Honduras and Ivory Coast involved constitutional and 
electoral issues. In 2009, a dispute over proposed constitutional reforms 
in Honduras culminated in a coup against President Manuel Zelaya. 
Instigated by the Supreme Court, which saw Zelaya’s proposed reforms 
as a veiled attempt to bring a Chavez style government to Honduras2, 
the military removed him from office and exiled him to Costa Rica. 
International reaction from the United Nations, the Organization of 
American States, the European Union and the United States3 objected to 
this ousting, and a final resolution of the crisis involved the installation 
of a new president Profirio Lobo with elections on 27 January 2010. 
Ivory Coast has had many tensions and disputes relating to its democracy, 
and it has had a history of military intervention since its independence 
in 1960, while the most recent events involved a post-election dispute over 
the results. On 2 December 2010, Mr Alassane Outtara was declared the 
winner of the presidential elections with 54.1 per cent of the popular vote 
compared to 45.9 per cent for the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo. 
A standoff with increasing violence from both sides ensued, ushering 
in a foreign intervention from UN and French military forces (i.e. the 
former colonial power) and threats of an intervention from the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces was made. By April 
2011, Ggagbo had surrendered and power was restored to Mr Outtara. 
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In this case, the integrity of an electoral result was contested by the sitting 
president but defended by external forces and power was restored to the 
winner of the election.
These cases were all examples of overt challenges to democratic rule, 
where the sitting president is ousted, the congress is sidelined or the 
incoming president is prevented from assuming power. But there are cases 
in which democratically elected leaders use the office of the executive to 
concentrate their base of personal power, marginalize opposition forces 
and undermine the quality of democracy itself. In such cases, democracy 
is not overthrown but eroded, and so-called strong men (and it really is 
men) seek to remain in office indefinitely through the manipulation of 
popular opinion and concentration of power. The most notable cases in 
which this has occurred are Venezuela under Hugo Chavez, Russia under 
Vladimir Putin and The Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
and Kirgizstan.4
Venezuela has been a democracy for over 50 years when in 1958 a 
new ‘elite settlement’ ended a prolonged period of conflict and ushered in 
democracy. The Pact of Punto Fijo provided a framework for democracy 
that included a power-sharing arrangement between the forces on the left 
(represented by the Democratic Action party, Acción Democrática or AD) 
and the on the right (represented by the COPEI – Social Christian Party 
of Venezuela. Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente – 
Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela).5
Democracy in Venezuela from this settlement until the late 1980s 
proceeded along a path of ‘taking it in turns’ where power would alternate 
between these two parties; however, the confined nature of the system led to 
calls for reform and popular unrest in the early 1990s, and an unsuccessful 
coup attempt in 1992 led by Hugo Chavez, a career military officer who 
had founded Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement. After his release from 
prison, he founded the Fifth Republic Movement and was elected president 
in 1998. Upon assuming the presidency, Chavez steadily increased power into 
the office of the executive and ruled over Venezuela in highly personalistic 
fashion, while at the same time holding periodic elections for his continued 
rule across three consecutive terms (1999–2000, 2000–06, 2006 to the 
present) and surviving a popular referendum for his removal in 2004. Long-
time scholar of Venzuelan politics Daniel Levine argues that throughout 
his time in office, Chavez had been ‘chipping away’ at democracy, and that 
more recently his use of emergency powers and ‘enabling laws’ gave him 
unprecedented power over Venezuela that has transformed his ‘erosion’ of 
democracy into an ‘avalanche’ (see Levine 2011). These powers included 
more state control over the media and the internet, more constraints on 
civil society and NGOs, blocking international funding for organizations 
that promote political rights, undermining judicial independence and 
constraining opposition parties in the National Assembly. Coupled with 
this erosion of democratic institutions, the Chavez regime was accused 
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of having one of the worst records for corruption in the whole region of 
Latin America, according to research conducted by the NGO Transparency 
International.
Commentators have made comparisons between Venezuela and Russia, 
where similar moves to concentrate executive power have taken place. 
Indeed 20 years after newly democratized Russia survived a coup attempt 
to reverse Gorbachev’s reforms and oust newly elected President Boris 
Yeltsin, the world has watched as Prime Minister (and Former President) 
Vladimir Putin continues to undermine democratic institutions. The end 
of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were some of the 
most momentous occasions of the twentieth century, and many previously 
authoritarian countries in Eastern Europe embraced democracy. Hopes were 
high for Russia as Gorbachev initiated reforms that led to new democratic 
elections in 1991, but Russia has in many ways followed a political course 
that marked it out as significantly different from other post-Communist 
states, many of which have now become EU member states (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia). Russia and, as we shall see, the post-Soviet republics in 
Central Asia, have consolidated power in the executive and limited the 
power of other political institutions, undermined the protection of human 
rights (most notably in the conflict with Chechnya) and stalled democratic 
progress to the degree that now commentators see Russia as increasingly 
authoritarian (see Hassner 2008; Shvetsova 2010).
Across Russia and Central Asia, we have seen an increasing concentration 
of executive power and a deepening suspicion and consequent repression of 
civil society and many civil and political rights. The war in Chechnya and the 
Russian ‘war on terror’ have led to widespread abuse of human rights (FIDH 
2002), including arbitrary detention, disappearances and extra-judicial 
killings. Vladimir Putin has for the medium term and despite widespread 
demonstrations, consolidated power in Russia, while the presidents in 
the Central Asian republics have proved resistant to regular democratic 
alternation of power, despite the optimism with which their countries were 
greeted after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2012, Russia passed a new 
law that requires internationally funded domestic NGOs to register with the 
government as ‘foreign agents’, which in effect limits their ability to provide 
a basis for political dissent (failure to comply with the law carries fines and 
possible imprisonment).6 Alongside this new law, the drama of the ‘Pussy 
Riot’ trial, sentencing and release of one musician have raised significant 
concerns about the protection of freedom of expression in Russia. The 
Central Asian republics showed a remarkable formal commitment to the 
human rights agenda through ratification of all the major international 
human rights instruments in the early 1990s and yet have had dismal records 
in the actual protection of human rights across the region (Landman 2005a; 
Smith-Cannoy 2012).
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summary: The fifth wave?
The waves and setbacks documented here should demonstrate why any 
assessment of the prospects for democracy in the world should remain 
cautiously optimistic. On the one hand, the world has seen a proliferation 
of democracies from 1974 onwards that has really exhibited a ‘wave like’ 
pattern. The rapid pace in and spread of democratization in the world has 
been truly unprecedented and has been a remarkable historical development 
that should not be under appreciated. The appeal of democracy has 
stretched across the world and now includes struggles in the final region 
long thought to be impervious to such change. On the other hand, many 
of the newest of these democracies have struggled with a large number of 
challenges. In the case of the former Communist countries, governments 
have had to oversee the dual transition from a command economy to a 
market economy alongside the development of democratic institutions, the 
holding of elections and the open competition of nascent and transformed 
political party organizations. In capitalist countries, governments have had 
to grapple with transitions from long periods of authoritarian rule, and in 
the case of Latin America, economic contractions relating to dependent 
capitalist development and the debt crisis of the 1980s. African countries 
that have embraced democracy have had similar challenges relating to 
patterns of dependent development and the persistence of patrimonial 
politics (Bratton and van der Walle 1997; Lindberg 2006), while those in 
Asia have had to democratize powerful state structures responsible for 
successful export-led growth strategies. Throughout the second, third and 
fourth waves of democratization, countries such as Colombia, Venezuela 
and India have struggled to maintain democracy in the face of income 
inequalities and heightened levels of violence.
In addition to the economic and political challenges associated with 
transitions to democracy, the new democracies have also had to contend with 
a growing gap between the formal institutional dimensions of democracy 
and the human rights dimensions (see Diamond 1999; Zakaria 2003). Cases 
such as Brazil and Mexico, which are now economically successful, have 
had a series of relatively free and fair elections with healthy competition 
between political parties and yet, have worrying records with respect to the 
violation of civil and political rights and a general struggle to fulfil economic 
and social rights despite such high rates of economic growth. During the 
presidential term of Felipe Calderón (2006–12), the Mexican government 
has been struggling against organized criminal organizations associated with 
trade in illegal drugs, which has been characterized by an unprecedented 
increase in extra-judicial killings (Philip and Berruecos 2012). During this 
period, there have been 48,000 reported killings that are associated with 
the struggle against organized crime, while it remains unclear about the 
unreported killings and the main perpetrators responsible for the killings. 
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Moreover, efforts by the Mexican state have brought allegations of serious 
violation of human rights (see Landman 2012).
Against this backdrop of cautious optimism, the Arab Spring presents an 
analogous set of questions about the prospects for democracy in the region, 
including the geographical proximity of the countries undergoing transitions, 
their relative levels of economic development, their ‘prior regime’ types and 
the variation in political outcomes that have thus far been obtained. Arguably 
the most dramatic set of changes took place in Tunisia and Egypt, which, 
according to World Bank development indicators, have lower average per 
capita incomes than Libya. Change thus was initiated in countries that were 
not necessarily the wealthiest in the region (see Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 
in this volume on modernization and democracy) and which have had 
underlying economic discontent behind much of their initial mobilizations. 
The leaders in Tunisian and Egypt were toppled relatively quickly, but there 
are serious questions as to whether the rest of the state apparatus is being 
transformed more towards democracy. In the run-up to the new elections, 
the Egyptians opted to put former president Hosni Mubarak on trial, much 
like was done in Iraq with Saddam Hussein. But it is not at all clear that 
the trial and elections and new government of Morsi provide a meaningful 
opening for the establishment of long-term democracy in the country. The 
uprisings in Libya and Syria (and to some degree in Bahrain and Yemen) 
have been met with a fierce response from the incumbent regimes, while the 
international community responded to the situation in Libya with NATO air 
strikes and some support for the rebels, who ultimately overthrew Gaddafi. 
Despite the horrific reports of violent repression of dissidents and deadly 
conflict in Syria, there has not been a similar intervention.
It is tempting for commentators and policy analysts to compare the 
Arab Spring to earlier waves of democratization and ‘project’ a particular 
model of democratization with a particular set of ‘sequences’ on the 
region. Such a view is both optimistic and inappropriate. It is optimistic 
since it assumes that regime change in the region necessarily converts into 
democratization, it is inappropriate since it assumes that there is a standard 
sequence through which transitional countries proceed. It is clear from the 
developments in the region that protest mobilization was largely initiated as 
an economic critique based on rising expectations primarily among young 
people coupled with a real decline in economic opportunity. When met with 
government repression, efforts at mobilization focused on regime change 
framed politically as the primary objective to address the economic crisis. It 
is not clear that democracy and democratization were central in the framing 
of the protests. Rather, much mobilization focused on the incumbent regime 
and regime change itself. The protests in Tunisia began in rural areas that 
are remote from the capital Tunis and became nationalized and generalized 
over time in the face of repression and an unyielding incumbent regime, 
which in the end was overthrown (see Anderson 2011; Breuer et al. 2012). 
The protesters in Egypt were more based in Cairo initially, while in Libya, 
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the rebels were more organized along tribal lines (Anderson 2011: 2). Out of 
three cases that have undergone regime change, Tunisia and Egypt have had 
elections, but while elections are an important feature of democracy, they 
do not mean that democracy has been achieved. Moreover, the countries 
in the region need to reconcile over issues around Islam, secular law, legal 
frameworks for democracy and the competition between political parties, 
some of which are not popular and may not share value orientations that 
resonate favourably with Western governments.
notes
 1 On 27 September 2012, the representation to the European Union of the State 
of North Rhine Westphalia along with the German Development Institute 
hosted a policy event in Brussels on democratic diffusion, the Arab Spring and 
EU democracy promotion, where precisely these kinds of issues were raised 
with the respect the dramatic development across the Middle East and North 
Africa.
 2 Such a characterization refers to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who 
sought to bring about his Bolivarian Revolution through populist means.
 3 President Obama condemned Zelaya’s removal as ‘illegal’; see http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/8125292.stm; last accessed 22 July 2011.
 4 I exclude Turkmenistan, since after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it never 
engaged in what could be described as an electoral process and the death of 
its leader President Saparmurat Niyazov (the Turkmenbashi) in December 
2006 led to his successor Kurbanguly Berdymuhamedov maintaining the 
authoritarian regime, who has reduced the more cultish aspects for which 
Niyazov was famous.
 5 For thorough analyses of this period, see Levine (1989) and Peeler (1992).
 6 The law was passed in July 2012 and threatens the work of such NGOs as 
Amnesty International and Transparency International. See http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-europe-18938165; last accessed 24 October 2012.
Diamond, Larry (2011) The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free 
Societies Throughout the World. Henry Holt and Company.
Huntington, Samuel (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century. Norman, UK: University of Oklahoma Press.
Keane, John (2009) The Life and Death of Democracy. New York: Simon and 
Schuster.





We saw in the previous chapter that the experience of democracy, 
democratization and the advancement of human rights are both vast and 
highly variegated. Many countries and regions have made great progress 
in establishing democracy and protecting human rights during the course 
of the twentieth century and early years of the twenty-first century, while 
other countries have seen setbacks or continued forms of authoritarian 
rule where democracy continues to be elusive and human rights continue 
be violated. For analysts of global politics, these trends across time and 
space are referred to as ‘variation’, and as we shall see in this chapter, such 
variation is in need of explanation. The social sciences have developed and 
continue to develop theories and methods that help us understand how, 
why and under what conditions are the advance of democracy and human 
rights possible. This combination of theories and methods seeks to reduce 
the complexity of what we observe in the world and look for common sets 
of factors that account for the kinds of changes that were discussed in the 
previous chapter.
The different theories involve concentrating either separately or an in 
integrated fashion on (1) broad sets of social and economic conditions; (2) 
different kinds of choices and strategies made by leaders, followers and 
opposition groups; and (3) a host of international factors that both hinder 
and help the advance of democracy and human rights. Methods for testing 
these theories and providing explanations for the variation in democracy 
and human rights that is observed involve statistical analysis of a large 
number of countries over time and space; comparative historical analysis of 
a smaller subset of countries within and between regions; and case studies 
that map out the processes and pathways that particular countries have 
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taken on the road to greater democracy and a fuller protection of human 
rights. Throughout these analyses, the focus is on identifying a series of 
generalizations that can be made about why and under what conditions 
democracy comes about and how the protection of human rights can be 
improved.
This chapter thus discusses these different sets of explanations to 
show how analysts have sought to explain the trends in democracy and 
human rights. The discussion examines the underlying assumptions of the 
explanations, the factors upon which they focus and the methods that they 
have used to support their arguments. There are many debates surrounding 
these different explanations since they have significant implications for the 
ways in which we understand the current state of global politics and what 
we think we can do to make a positive difference. You will see how different 
explanations have had an influence on policymakers and practitioners 
that are working to bring about and support the advance of democracy 
and human rights. The explanations considered here include (1) the so-
called modernization perspective (both in its original and revised forms); 
(2) comparative history and ‘macro-historical’ change; (3) rational choice 
and ‘games of transition’; (4) democratic transformation and transnational 
advocacy; and (5) international dimensions and diffusion. The chapter does 
not settle on any one of these explanations as superior, but examines their 
strengths and weaknesses while identifying in what ways they can be (or 
have been) linked to international policy and practice.
modernization
As we saw in Chapter 2, attention to the trade-offs between ‘abundance’ 
and ‘freedom’ is based on a basic assumption that high levels of economic 
development are related to higher levels of democracy and, by extension, 
better protection of human rights. This assumption has been a bedrock of 
the ‘modernization’ perspective, which posits that as countries undergo 
large processes of socio-economic development, they experience a series of 
changes that also encourage the development of democratic institutions. 
This theory began in part with a book entitled Political Man published 
by Seymour Martin Lipset in 1960 and in part with a book entitled The 
Stages of Economic Growth published in 1961 by Dankwart Rustow, 
which both see a (a) direct link between economy and politics and (b) a 
natural process of development through ‘stages’ that are increasingly 
progressive. Modernization theory claims that as countries save and invest 
at appropriate levels (usually 20% of gross domestic product is taken as a 
good proportion of national savings) that help enhance their infrastructure 
and social institutions, liberal democratic institutions will flourish. The 
stages of development lead to higher levels of education, improve social 
and spatial mobility and promote the political culture that supports liberal 
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democratic institutions. In this way, the theory assumes that the process 
of socio-economic development is ‘a progressive accumulation of changes 
that ready a society to its culmination, democratization’ (Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997).
The theory has been hugely popular and hugely influential and in many 
ways ‘rediscovered’ or given a new impetus with the end of the Cold War, 
where the defeat of Communist ideologies led to a certain triumphalism 
for Western ideals relating to democracy and human rights. Indeed in The 
End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama (1992) argues that the 
Western model was not only successful, but the only possible set of ideas 
for the world, and that it was only a matter of time, that the rest of the 
world would arrive at state of well-developed capitalist democracy. In an 
article in 1997, Max Singer summarized the optimism of the modernization 
perspective as follows:
Because some societies learned to increase productivity, presently about 
1/7th of the world’s population lives in wealthy, democratic, and peaceful 
countries – unlike anything seen in history. The process that changed 
them is still continuing, probably accelerating, and there is every reason 
to believe that it will continue until by the end of the coming century, 
or the one after, essentially all the world will be wealthy, democratic, 
and peaceful as North America and Western Europe are now (Singer 
1997: 28).
The appeal of and the arguments that sustain the modernization perspective 
have been supported primarily by large-scale statistical analyses across many 
countries at different periods of time. The original analysis conducted by 
Seymour Martin Lipset used multiple indicators for economic modernization 
and categories of countries that included stable and unstable democracies 
and stable and unstable dictatorships. He found that, on average, stable 
democracies had higher values for his measures of economic modernization 
than any of the other categories of countries. He concluded from this that 
the ‘more well to do a nation, the more likely it is to sustain democracy’; a 
claim that has then been subjected to increasingly sophisticated statistical 
analysis that continues to this day. Analyses have added more sophisticated 
measures of democracy and economic development, a greater coverage of 
time, and have controlled for a number of factors related to modernization. 
The result of these analyses, as outlined already in Chapter 2, is that there is 
a positive and significant relationship between economic development and 
democracy.
The assumptions of the modernization perspective and the methods 
for supporting it have also influenced analysis of the variation in the 
protection of human rights. Studies from the 1980s compared indicators on 
the protection of different kinds of civil and political rights and correlated 
them with measures of economic development. More sophisticated analyses 
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that followed, as in the research on democracy, added different measures 
of human rights and more time to their analysis, as well as additional sets 
of factors that help explain the variation in human rights protection. The 
results of these studies are very similar to the work on democracy: wealthy 
countries have better records at protecting these sets of human rights than 
poor countries, even after controlling for other key factors like democracy, 
war and the size of the population (see, e.g. Poe and Tate 1994; Landman 
2005b). Additional measures on the quality of economic development also 
show that wealthy countries with better distributions of income have better 
records of protecting civil and political rights (Landman and Larizza 1999). 
The theorizing and discussion of these results make less of a straightforward 
appeal to modernization per se, but the assumptions and impulse behind 
such studies are very much in line with the modernization perspective. In 
this case, it is assumed that wealthy countries have more resources necessary 
to protect human rights, but the direct connection between economic change 
and transformation is not seen as such a critical factor as in the work on 
democracy. Indeed, one study found no relationship between economic 
change and the protection of human rights (see Poe and Tate 1994).
Despite the political interest and robust statistical support for the 
modernization perspective, there are continued worries about its limitations. 
It places too much emphasis on economic modernization and economic 
progress, effectively making a highly material and deterministic argument 
for political change. It tends to ignore historical processes, which are often 
highly contingent and where change occurs in less than uniform ways 
across different countries. It ignores the individuals either at the elite or 
popular level who have had a stake in the creation of democracy and the 
struggle for human rights. It ignores the timing of economic modernization, 
since the global powers of the today modernized in some cases more than 
100 years before other countries, which has given them a ‘head start’ as 
well as a dominant position in the global political economy that may 
well prevent other countries from modernizing in the same way, or at all. 
Indeed, some studies have shown that the relative position of a country in 
the global political economy conditions the relationship between economic 
development and democracy (see Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Foweraker 
and Landman 2004).
Finally, from within the perspective itself there have been revisions to 
its basic premise. For example, in Political Order in Changing Societies, 
Samuel Huntington (1968) has argued that economic modernization leads 
to raised expectations within different social groups and that in the absence 
of proper institutions for channelling and representing these expectations, 
a country undergoing rapid modernization may actually become less 
politically stable. This view is of course is a direct challenge to the optimism 
of the modernization perspective. It does not undermine it completely 
but adds these further dimensions of institutions and order that need to 
be taken into account. The main differences between modernization and 
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revised modernization are captured in Figure 5.1, where the automatic 
association between economic development and democracy is modified 
so that economic development could have a negative impact on political 
stability (read democracy) which can be tempered by the degree of political 
institutionalization.
Interestingly, many years later in the Clash of Civilizations, in addressing 
global challenges after the Cold War, Huntington (1996: 192) argues 
that ‘economic development is the major underlying factor’ generating 
democratic transitions, which shows that his position is more or less in line 
with the modernization perspective broadly understood. The attraction 
of the modernization perspective continues until today, and as Chapter 2 
argued, many of its assumptions formed the basis for the neo-conservative 
view that political change could be accelerated through force (see Fukuyama 
2006). And no doubt there will be a connection made between the relative 
wealth of the Middle East and China (or at least its rapid economic advance) 
and the process of political mobilization and liberalization that is apparent. 
There is a strong impulse for policymakers and practitioners to take the 
modernization perspective and its statistical findings as a basis for foreign 
and aid policy, which privileges economic development as a means to 
democratization, and it assumes that democratization itself is a sequential 
affair that necessarily moves from one stage to the next in linear fashion.
My own cautious optimism in this book about the appeal of democracy 
and human rights is not necessarily linked to economic development 
per se (although wealth in a country does provide more flexibility for 
governments), as many of the cases discussed in this book have achieved 
democracy and increased protection of human rights in the absence of 
large-scale economic modernization. And the Arab Spring does renew my 















FIGURe 5.1 Modernization and revised modernization.
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and authoritarianism. It may be that Fukuyama’s argument in The End of 
History is correct in his claim that democracy and human rights represent 
a set of ideas that are unrivalled in their appeal to and respect for human 
dignity and that such appeal motivates individuals and groups to push 
for change. But this motivation is not necessarily borne of their economic 
circumstances. Rather, the values associated with democracy and human 
rights have a natural appeal to those living under oppressive regimes. The 
Reith lectures from Burmese dissident Aung San Suu Kyi on liberty1 and 
dissent2 illustrate the power of these ideas, particularly for those to whom 
they have been denied. A few excerpts from her lecture are apt for our 
consideration here:
The freedom to make contact with other human beings with whom 
you may wish to share your thoughts, your hopes, your laughter, and 
at times even your anger and indignation is a right that should never be 
violated.
. . .
If pressed to explain what the word means to them, they would most likely 
reel off a list of the concerns nearest to their hearts such as there won’t 
be any more political prisoners, or there will be freedom of speech and 
information and association, or we can choose the kind of government we 
want, or simply, and sweepingly, we will be able to do what we want to do.
This may all sound naïve, perhaps dangerously naïve, but such statements 
reflect the sense of freedom as something concrete that has to be gained 
through practical work, not just as a concept to be captured through 
philosophical argument.
macro-historical change
While the appeal of the modernization perspective is strong, much doubt 
remains about the ‘mechanisms’ that connect economic development to 
higher levels of democracy and/or better protection of human rights. For 
many, it is precisely the unevenness of economic development and the great 
variation of that process across countries in terms of factor endowments 
(i.e. land, labour and capital), timing of development (e.g. before or after 
the industrial revolution; before or after decolonization), the role of the 
state (command economy, state-led development, laissez faire modes of 
development), and the different models of development and the degree to 
which a country pursues so-called import-substitution (as in Latin America 
between the 1930s and 1960s) or export promotion (as in case of the East 
Asian ‘tiger’ economies in the 1970s and 1980s). This great variation, many 
have argued, will condition the probability that democracy will flourish 
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and whether the country embraces a ‘rights-protective’ culture in its legal 
framework and state institutions (see Donnelly 1999). Over-reliance on 
particular factor endowments (oil for example) can concentrate wealth 
and power in the hands of those who have no interest in democracy or 
rights. Rapid state-led development may encourage a mindset that thinks 
the repression of labour is essential in the short term for economic advance 
(see Geddes 1990). Market protections for primary exports may skew the 
distribution of wealth and power to landed elites who block any moves 
towards democracy.
Common to all these kinds of arguments about the establishment of 
democracy and rights, is a focus on groups of countries that are compared 
across periods of economic transformation as instances of macro-historical 
change and typically do not involve the use of statistical analysis. Rather, 
these arguments and explanations focus on broad sets of economic 
change, large social variables such as social classes and the alliances that 
form between them; state power at the domestic and international levels; 
the distribution of land, labour and capital; and models of development 
followed by particular sets of state elites. Countries are not seen as all on 
the same linear trajectory, but as discrete units that follow pathways of 
development that take them the traditional to the modern world. The key 
message from this kind of work is that democracy is not the inevitable 
outcome of economic modernization, that different routes to modernity 
might actually involve significant violence and conflict and non-democratic 
solutions to maintaining order such as communism and fascism and that 
routes followed by some countries (such as the United States and some 
European countries) are not available to those that undergo subsequent 
processes of economic development.
Three particularly notable studies are Barrington Moore (1966) The 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy and Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. 
All three studies are motivated by a connection between economic 
development and democracy, but none of them see a necessary or direct 
connection between the two. Rather, they argue that processes of economic 
development unleash different sources of power for different groups of 
people in society, each of which will have different motivations to bring 
about (or not) democratization. The first two studies engage in various sets 
of comparisons across countries with similar pathways or routes to the 
modern world, while the latter study provides historical case examples that 
confirm more formal economic models of the incentive structures that are 
conducive to democratic and non-democratic systems.
The comparison of routes to modernity reveals that democracy is 
but one outcome alongside fascism (a so-called revolution from above) 
and communism (a revolution from below). Barrington Moore’s (1966) 
comparisons of the so-called liberal route include a focus on the violent 
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nature of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ that are necessary for democracy, since 
they allow a country to break from its feudal past and pave the way for 
democratization. In comparing a larger number of countries than Moore 
(1966), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) show that such 
violence may not be necessary and that the true agents of democratization 
are the working classes, whose success in obtaining political inclusion is 
tempered by the dominance of particular sets of elites. Thus, the type of 
economic modernization and who benefits from it, along with the ways 
in which subordinate groups such as the working class are included in the 
political system, determine whether a country achieves democratization. 
In both cases, the comparison of pathways and processes, and not simple 
measures of statistical association, provides a richer and more nuanced 
understanding of how democracy does or does not come about as a result 
of economic development.
In many ways, the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) study is a natural 
outgrowth of these two earlier studies. They too are intrigued with the 
empirical reality that many countries in history underwent profound 
economic development, but did not achieve democracy. They too focus 
on the mixed set of incentives that occur whenever a country undergoes 
economic development. But they model these incentives using the tools of 
modern economics, and they focus on the allocation of political power 
and resources and how that allocation links to public preferences for 
democracy. They examine the costs and benefits associated with the use of 
Character of Economic Development
Class relations
Role of the state
Outcome
Commercial agriculture
Balance of class power
Revolutionary break from the past
Strong state that protects trade
interests, industry and controls labour
Capitalist Parliamentary democracy
Britain, France, United States & India
Capitalist fascism
Germany, Italy & Japan
Communism
Russia & China
Centralised state and labour
repression
Dominance of upper classes Weak upper classes
No commercial agriculture
FIGURe 5.2 Routes to the modern world.
Source: Moore 1966 adapted from Landman 2008: 117. 
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repression and show how the consolidation of democracy is the function 
of many different factors, including the strength of civil society (stronger 
civil society is good for democracy), the structure of political institutions 
(aggregating different interests is good for democracy), the nature of 
political and economic crises (severe crises are bad for democracy), the 
structure of the economy (over-reliance on a few industries is bad for 
democracy) and the level of economic inequality (high concentrations of 
wealth are bad for democracy).
These historical and somewhat ‘longer-term’ studies are helpful for us to 
understand the contingent nature of the establishment and maintenance of 
democracy and certainly shed light on such processes taking place today. It is 
clear that democracy is not an automatic outcome of economic development 
but one that relies on a set of necessary and sufficient conditions falling into 
place. Lower-class mobilization for inclusion that is met with some form of 
accommodation and balance of power and institutionalized through political 
party organizations that can compete under a system in which victory is 
possible provides a good set of conditions for the successful installation of 
democracy. Such an institutionalized system carries with it the need for basic 
rights protections, such as the right to vote, the right to exercise free speech 
and the rights to association and assembly. The contestation for power 
needs systems in which independent associations such as political parties 
can form, aggregate their interests, express their demands and grievances 
and seek political power through the electoral process. But as we saw in 
Chapter 3, democracy also requires the guarantee of social and economic 
rights as well as the protection of minority and cultural rights. The former set 
of rights provide avenues for the least well-off to participate in democracy, 
while the latter set of rights protect individuals from undue discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, religious affiliation and other social 
categories.
Games of transition
The broad attention to the economic ‘preconditions’ of democracy, whether 
seen as having necessary or contributing influences on the establishment of 
democracy, does not have much to say about the actual individuals involved 
in bringing about democracy. The economic accounts focus on large ‘macro’ 
variables such as classes, class relations and alliances, state power and 
underlying processes of economic change. These accounts do not give the 
actors that make democracy possible their full attention, and it is this dearth 
of attention to individuals that has spurred a lot of analysis that focuses 
precisely on ‘who did what, when, how, and why’. General Franco decided 
to legalize the Spanish Community party, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to 
pursue a policy of glasnost and perestroika, Augusto Pinochet decided to 
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have a plebiscite for his continued rule, F. W. De Klerk decided to release 
Nelson Mandela from prison, the Generals of Burma Myanmar decided 
to release Aung San Suu Kyi and the Egyptian military elite decided not 
to support Hosni Mubarak (and have proved reluctant to leave power). 
These and other intentional choices have had profound implications for 
democratization and the advance of human rights. But these choices can 
also be subjected to systematic and stylized analysis that moves beyond 
the narratives and delves into the motivations of leaders, the different 
calculations they make about preserving their power and their interactions 
with others at the moment of decision.
Any analysis that focuses on such choices typically uses the power of 
‘game theory’ to explain the trade-offs leaders face in making such profound 
decisions, the likely response from their opponents and the structure of 
different outcomes that result from their strategic interaction with others. 
Based on the modelling of choice behaviour from the so-called prisoners 
dilemma’ in which two criminal suspects are held in separate cells and 
presented with different choice scenarios, game theory applications in 
democratization focus on the choices that elites make and how such choices 
either lead to democracy or maintain authoritarianism. Such analyses 
assume that authoritarian leaders in power (government) want to remain 
in power and leaders out of power (opposition) want to win control over 
power. But each set of leaders – either in government or in opposition – 
can choose different strategies for obtaining power. So-called hardliners in 
government will want to use repression to hold onto their power and resist 
moves towards liberalization, such as the release of celebrated political 
dissidents. So-called softliners in government see partial liberalization (e.g. 
eliminating restrictions on the press, freeing political dissidents, allowing 
independent associations to form) as a way to appease the opposition 
and maintain their hold on power. In the opposition, two groups are also 
present who hold different views on their strategy for engaging with the 
authoritarian government. On the one hand, ‘radicals’ have no desire to 
negotiate with the regime and seek its overthrow, even if that requires 
violence to do so. On the other hand, ‘moderates’ are willing to negotiate 
with the government to move a reform agenda forward in the eventual hope 
of establishing democracy.
The crucial aspect of this kind of explanation for democracy is what 
the softliners in the government choose to do and what the moderates in 
the opposition choose to do. These two groups of leaders represent the 
‘democratic potential’ for a country about to undergo a transition. If the 
softliners truly have more power vis a vis the hardliners, then it is in their 
interest to liberalize the authoritarian regime and seek a deal with the 
moderates in the opposition. If the moderates in the opposition truly have 
more power than the radicals, then it is in their interest to seek some kind 
of negotiated settlement with the softliners in government. However, such 
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a formulation leaves open the possibility that the softliners do not seek 
to liberalize and that moderates do not seek a settlement. Such a state of 
affairs means that the strategic interaction between softliners and moderates 
can lead to four different outcomes in which democracy is but one 
possible outcome. Figure 5.4 summarizes the game theoretic approach to 
democratization where it is clear that softliners in government can liberalize 
(i.e. ‘cooperate’ with the moderates) or maintain the authoritarian regime 
(i.e. ‘defect’ from the moderates), and where moderates can negotiate (i.e. 
‘cooperate’ with the softliners) or reject any negotiation and seek violent 
overthrow of the regime (i.e. ‘defect’ from the softliners). The figure also 
shows that there are four ordered ‘payoffs’ associated with these different 
choices:
 1 The temptation to defect (T) is the most preferred
 2 Reward for cooperation (R) is the next preferred
 3 Punishment for defecting (P) is the next preferred
 4 The so-called sucker’s payoff for choosing the losing strategy (S) is 
least preferred
Only when the softliners and the moderates cooperate with each other is 
democracy possible and both sets of actors are rewarded (R, R). Otherwise, 
the three other outcomes are obtained, which include maintenance of the 
authoritarian regime with some concessions (e.g. release of prisoners and 
relaxation of press censorship), democracy with no real guarantees (highly 
unstable) and survival of the authoritarian regime.
Such an approach reveals the precariousness of democracy and its reliance, 
at least in the early years, on deal making, assurances and the balance 
of power within the previous authoritarian regime and within the new 
democracy. On this view, democracy is not the automatic outcome of social 
processes, but the contingent outcome of political choices. For example, in 
Poland, game theory can explain both the continued authoritarianism of the 
Jaruzelski government during the period of martial law in the 1980s and 
the transition to democracy in 1989. In the early 1980s, several ‘moves’ in 
the game between the Solidarity Movement and the government resulted 
in stalemate, open confrontation and the declaration of martial law. The 
changing political environment in Moscow under Gorbachev led the Polish 
government to change its preferences and issue a series of reforms that 
included the legalization of Solidarity and at least nominal representation 
in the Polish Parliament (see Colomer and Pascual 1994). A similar analysis 
can explain democratic transition in Chile. In a very careful analysis of over 
40,000 internal documents of the Chilean military, Darren Hawkins (2002) 
shows that a ‘rule-oriented’ faction within the military regime of Augusto 
Pinochet had become increasingly worried about international criticism of 
the regime for its violation of human rights. This faction gained influence 
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within the regime and was behind many of the concessions that were made 
and that culminated in holding a plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued rule 
in 1988. In the event, Pinochet lost the plebiscite and Chile underwent a 
transition to democracy during 1989 and 1990. In both cases, the changing 
calculations of softliners in the government led to different outcomes from 
their interactions with moderates in the opposition and to transitions to 
democracy.
For the contemporary period during the Arab Spring, hardliners in the 
Ben Ali regime in Tunisia were not strong enough to counter the rise of 
popular protest, and the regime fell relatively quickly. New elections were 
held in October 2011, just 10 months after the uprising. In Egypt, the 
military opted not to repress the opponents of Mubarak (although some 
exceptions did occur) and it became increasingly clear that his resignation 
was imminent. Like Tunisia, Egypt held elections in a relatively short period 
after the fall of the regime given how long it had been in power. In Libya, 
the situation was different. Mohamar Gaddafi had strong support from 
loyal followers and calculated that he could survive the rebel advances. The 
changing external environment from the NATO intervention gave more 
advantage to the rebels who ultimately captured and then killed Gaddafi 
in October 2011. Across these three cases, it is possible to focus on the 
decisions and calculations made by elites in the regime and in the opposition 
to compare and contrast the different outcomes that were obtained. As in 
the theoretical range of possibilities, these cases show variation in outcomes 
that differ in terms of the timing of regime change and the potential for 
democratic transition. Tunisia and Egypt have embarked on the first steps to 
democracy with their elections, but the subsequent period of consolidation 
will require tolerance of and accommodation between different political 
forces in these countries.
The making of democracy
The game theoretic approaches have value in moving the explanation 
of democratization beyond the focus on structural conditions such as 
economic modernization and showing the array of different political 
outcomes that can be obtained from the strategic interaction of elites. 
But both the structural and rational explanations for democratization 
tend to leave out any sense of other forms of agency, such as those 
from popular protest, social movements and civil society organizations. 
In popular accounts of democratic transition during the third wave of 
democratization (e.g. O’Donnell et al. 1986), there is a passing reference 
to the ‘resurrection of civil society’ that coincides with elite pact making, 
where some role for social mobilization is acknowledged. However, history 
has shown that the making of democracy is also about mobilization from 
below, and it is clear that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Arab Spring 
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have had a large role for popular forces for change. Ordinary people 
gathered together in public spaces to contest the power of incumbent 
regimes. It is here that the idea of human rights has a significant role 
to play. The history of the struggle for rights is one in which popular 
groups mobilize for the extension of rights protections from the state, 
and if such protections are not forthcoming, continued struggle can lead 
to regime change, followed by a process of democratization that carries 
with it an improvement in rights protections (Foweraker and Landman 
1997). Cross-national and quantitative research has shown that even 
during the first year after a democratic transition, rights conditions 
can improve dramatically (Zanger 2000). But the differences across 
categories of human rights matter as well. Popular mobilization can often 
take the form of a critique of the absence of protection of social and 
economic rights. Such mobilization and organization of protest can in 
turn provoke a repressive reaction from the state. If the crackdown and 
limitation on freedom are significant, then the demands and language 
of rights articulated by popular movements can shift to demands for 
the protection of civil and political rights, as well as a call for regime 
change.
In a study on social mobilization and citizenship rights in Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Spain, popular movements arose initially through a critique of 
the socio-economic problems of authoritarian regimes and their impact on 
the lower classes of society. Group formation and mobilization, however, 
led to crackdowns and a shift in demand to civil and political rights, which 
over time led to regime change and transitions to democracy in three of 
the four cases (Brazil, Chile and Spain) (Foweraker and Landman 1997). 
The transition in Mexico arguably took place in 2000 with the victory 
of the National Action Party over the PRI (see the Introduction in this 
volume) and has been seen by many as the culmination of long and multiple 
waves of social mobilization (see Haber et al. 2008). More recently, the so-
called occupy movements that have sprung up in cities in the United States, 
United Kingdom and Spain, for example, much of the critique and demands 
have been articulated in terms of economic problems. The construction 
of ‘1% versus 99%’ is a direct critique of income inequality, corporate 
greed and dysfunctional systems of governance and regulation. Repressive 
responses from city police forces, for example, in Oakland, California, in 
November 2011, can expand the critique beyond economics to one of civil 
and political rights and the proportionality of state response. In similar 
fashion, many of the initial demands from the protests in the Arab Spring 
focused on the inability for the authoritarian regimes in the region to deliver 
economic prosperity to those that are less well-off. The critique quickly 
shifted to a broader call for regime change that involved demands for civil 
and political rights. In addition, the alternative use of new technology and 
social media has illustrated the ability for common people to find new 
avenues for expressing their voice. Thus freedom of speech and assembly 
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become topics of contention as these various movements have sought to 
have their message heard.
The emphasis on the struggle for rights from below and variations 
in state response from above suggests that democratic transformation 
involves what Dankwart Rustow (1970) called a ‘long period of inclusive 
struggle’. Social mobilization around rights helps build the popular 
foundations for democracy, but as in some of the explanatory frameworks 
outlined in this chapter, there are no guarantees that such mobilization will 
lead to democracy. Rather, at a crucial ‘decision phase’, states can make 
concessions and maintain the bulk of their authoritarian institutions. 
States may crack down and seek to quash an emerging movement (as 
in Tiananmen Square in 1989 or the Monk’s protest in Burma in 2007), 
but such a move always brings with it the memory of the event and a 
long-term desire within the populace for regime change and justice (see 
Chapter 7 in this volume). This interaction between society and the state 
suggests a much longer view on political change that involves both the 
macro-variables of economic modernization and the micro-variables of 
choice and strategy. Democratic transformation (see Figure 5.5) takes 
place through several key phases, none of which are inevitable and none 
of which are irreversible.
International dimensions
The final set of explanations focus on what can be broadly understood as 
the international dimensions. Countries are not isolated units in ‘autarky’ 
but part of a larger system of interaction and inter-dependence. What 
goes on in one part of the world can have an impact on what happens 
in another part of the world, but how this happens can vary across 
different international dimensions. The dimensions of most interest that 
help us understand the advance of democracy and human rights include 
direct state-to-state (i.e. bilateral) interactions, multilateral interactions 
involving institutions such as the United Nations or the World Bank, 
transnational engagement from international non-governmental 
organizations and ‘agentless’ processes of diffusion brought about by 
the increase in the flow of information and value sets from one part of 
the world to another. Variously described as ‘contagion’, ‘diffusion’ and 
‘globalization’, these processes that spread democracy and human rights 
through both intentional and unintentional means, and it often difficult to 
disentangle the two when seeking to explain the international dimensions 
of democracy and human rights.
The idea of contagion refers mostly to the influence of processes among 
a set of contiguous or nearly contiguous countries. Thus, the democratic 
transitions in Southern Europe all happened in the space of a few years 
between 1974 and 1977, while in Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin 
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Wall and subsequent transitions in Eastern Europe were geographically 
and temporally close to one another. In Latin America, contagion processes 
began in 1978 and were more or less completed at least in South America 
by 1990 when Chile elected its first democratic president since 1970. One 
could argue that contagion processes have been at play during the Arab 
Spring, as events that began in Tunisia quickly spread to Egypt (not entirely 
contiguous but very close), Yemen, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and beyond. While 
proximity and time are fascinating to see as the call for democracy and 
rights spread, the concept of ‘contagion’ remains largely descriptive in that 
some sort of change is ‘caught’ by neighbouring countries, but it begs the 
question as to why a country is susceptible to catching the new ideas and 
how groups within the receiving country pick up those ideas and try them 
in their own systems.
Contagion is part of the idea of diffusion, which is understood both as 
a process and an outcome of political change. In my own view, diffusion 
should be seen more as a process than an outcome. Diffusion effects 
(also called neighbourhood effects, demonstration effects and social 
‘bandwagonning’) manifest themselves in the spread of norms, ideas and 
practices not only among neighbouring states, but between states that can 
be quite far away from one another. Indeed, the protesters at the Occupy 
Wall Street site in New York were selling badges that said ‘Fight Like an 
Egyptian’, making direct reference to the occupation of Tahrir square in 
Cairo. Here, a popular ‘repertoire of contention’ (see McAdam et al. 1997) 
was diffused from protests in Egypt to those in New York (and as it happens 
in other cities). Diffusion as a process means that it is a mechanism through 
which a set of norms, ideas and practices gets transferred between states. 
It is time-dependent and exhibits a temporal causal flow in ways that can 
be tracked and explained using empirical methods. It has both intentional 
and unintentional dimensions, which is to say, the flow of norms, ideas and 
practices can proceed in an uncoordinated fashion, but equally there are 
occasions in which certain intentional behaviours from state and non-state 
actors can accelerate the process of diffusion.
Intentional dimensions of diffusion include coercive and non-coercive 
agencies. Military intervention such as the coalition invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 to ostensibly bring about democracy are the most 
salient recent examples of coercive intervention. The NATO operation in 
Libya is another example of coercive imposition. Even though the intervention 
was ostensibly to protect civilians who were vulnerable from attack by the 
Gaddafi regime, it certainly contributed to the efforts of the rebels seeking to 
overthrow of the regime. The Marshall Plan in Europe and the rebuilding of 
Japan by the West after World War II are also good examples of intentional 
intervention that was made possible after the recipient country had been 
defeated in war. But a lot of diffusion takes place through the exercise of 
‘soft power’ (Nye 2009), diplomacy and transnational advocacy networks 
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(TANs) comprised of large and influential international non-governmental 
organizations (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). In the latter case, international 
non-governmental organizations communicate with domestic NGOs and in 
conjunction with inter-governmental organizations put pressure on states to 
bring about political transformation. The most notable examples of these 
kinds of diffusion have been presented in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s (1999) 
Power of Human Rights, which shows that pressure and activity from 
transnational advocacy networks on authoritarian states in many case led 
to regime change and the development of an institutionalized human rights 
culture. Activism from the international arena complements and supports 
the mobilization phase of democratic transformation outlined above (see 
Figure 5.5). But again, such activism from above does not guarantee such a 
transformation if intransigent elites seek to hold onto to power, as was the 
case in Libya under Gaddafi, or as is the case in China with respect to Tibet, 
or Cuba under Fidel Castro.
The spread of ideas is not just some ephemeral phenomenon, but also 
has a material base that is important to understand. Increased levels of 
trade, labour mobility and technology transfers (i.e. material processes and 
exchanges) bring with them associated values, norms and practices and 
thus act as a social ‘transmission belt’ for diffusion. The economics of trade 
and comparative advantage shows that as countries specialize in economic 
activity for which they have comparative advantage (i.e. capital intensive 
or labour intensive production), the increased exchange of goods and 
services bring countries and their cultures closer together. The search for 
new markets (including cheap labour markets) brings not only a transfer 
of technology but also ideas and tastes, which in the long run can have an 
impact on the demand for democracy and human rights. These material 
and non-material bases for diffusion are clearly different but not mutually 
exclusive. Moreover, with the spread of information and communications 
technology (ICTs) along with the democratization of that technology, 
ideas and practices in one part of the world can easily be captured and 
assimilated into another part of the world. Diffusion thus has intentional 
and unintentional as well as material and non-material dimensions, which 
complement one another in ways that help explain an increase in demand 
for democracy and human rights.
Finally, it is important to point out that the process of diffusion for 
democracy may be different than for human rights. The discourse and 
advocacy for human rights since the Universal Declaration in 1948 have 
increasingly become reliant on the international law of human rights and 
its associated institutions and agencies at the international and regional 
level. The international law of human rights provides a certain amount 
of jurisprudence about the content of human rights and establishes state 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. These obligations 
carry with them the obligations to report to the various bodies that monitor 
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compliance with UN human rights treaties. While deeply flawed and seen by 
many as nothing more than a paper tiger, the process of filing reports and 
receiving comments from the treaty bodies places human rights discussions 
firmly in the public domain and as such provides international and national 
non-governmental organizations with significant leverage to call states to 
account over serious human rights abuses; leverage which may well serve 
to bring about regime change in the long run. Treaty ratification has been 
shown to have a positive and significant influence on state practice, but an 
influence that is conditioned by other factors, such as levels of economic 
development, domestic mobilization and international linkages (see 
Landman 2005; Simmons 2009).
The international architecture for human rights has grown in depth and 
breadth, as more and more rights become enumerated for protection, more 
states ratify international treaties and more regions establish their own 
mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. In contrast, 
no such equivalent mechanisms, jurisprudence or content (at least derived 
from an international set of legal standards) exists for democracy. On the 
one hand, this means that there is no standard against which to make 
appeals and no set of institutions with which to engage such as the Human 
Rights Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or 
the Treaty Bodies. On the other hand, the absence of such institutions for the 
promotion of democracy means that it is less well-defined and democracy 
advocates can remain flexible in how they define it, how they establish it 
and how they build it over time. As I argued in Chapter 3, democracy is less 
contentious and ‘absolutist’ in discursive terms and thus offers more room 
for manoeuvre for those seeking to bring it about.
summary
This chapter has considered a variety of explanations and the kind of 
evidence used to support them for the spread of democracy and human 
rights. It has shown how earlier attention focused on the so-called structural 
conditions or the macro-social variables relating to the large-scale processes 
of economic modernization. Studies since the 1950s have shown a positive 
and significant relationship between levels of economic development and 
democracy, but the precise relationship between the two is still open to debate, 
even though there is a general consensus that development is certainly good 
for democracy. From a purely economically rational perspective, a wider 
economic base allows a democratic government to deliver benefits to key 
constituents and thus ‘buy’ loyalty to democracy itself. But when attention 
is focused on the changes unleashed by socio-economic modernization, the 
direct association with democracy is thrown into question, as the nature 
of development, classes, class alliances and state power all have contingent 
effects on the probability of democracy taking root and surviving in the long 
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run. And even if the macro-conditions are favourable, analysis of the micro-
conditions suggests that strategic interactions at the ‘moment of decision’ 
can lead to outcomes that are not democratic, while subsequent ‘games of 
transition’ may eventually lead to democracy.
The ‘transformational’ perspective advanced in this chapter recognizes 
the starting conditions for democracy, as well as the contingent nature of 
its arrival, but it also focuses on the role for popular agency in the struggle 
for democracy and how that struggle can be both long and inconclusive. 
This perspective challenges the patience of policymakers, particularly those 
working in the business of ‘democracy promotion’ who are often dependent 
themselves on the electoral cycle at home to ‘deliver’ on their foreign 
policy objectives. The chapter has shown that any attention to democratic 
transformation must take into account the international dimension in 
terms of contagion and diffusion and the (un)intentional aspects of 
democratization. It has also argued that in many ways the struggle for rights 
and the ‘right to have rights’ has been an important catalyst for processes 
of democratic transformation, where demands for economic and social 
rights shift to demands for civil and political rights. This struggle for rights 
has had further support with the advent and subsequent development of 
the international human rights regime that began formally with the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, the ‘architecture’ for 
human rights makes their international diffusion easier in many ways as 
popular groups can use the language of rights as leverage for regime change 
within their own countries.
While it is difficult to present an entirely coherent assessment of the 
different findings from the different kinds of explanations available that 
account for the growth in democracy and human rights, there are some 
common lines of agreement and perhaps even a consensus. The installation 
of democracy and the development of institutions that guarantee the 
protection of human rights are precarious. The interaction between and 
among regime strength, power, individual and collective rationality and the 
incentives that structure that rationality all have an impact in the degree 
to which democracy and human rights can develop in any one country. 
Democracy is one outcome of many, which is contingent on a variety of 
different factors falling into place, but history has shown that it is an 
outcome that continues to be obtained.
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The ‘transformational’ approach to understanding the development of 
democracy and human rights advanced in the previous chapter is seen as 
a series of phases that are not necessarily automatic or inevitable and that 
certainly contain a high probability of regression or reversal. These phases 
include the coming together of necessary and sufficient conditions for at 
least the decision to embrace democracy, but that decision is subject to a 
wide range of strategic calculations from elites who in turn are conditioned 
by popular mobilization and demand making from groups in civil society. 
Historical developments in the latter half of the twentieth century and 
beginning of the twenty-first century, however, suggest that the notion of 
popular ‘agency’ and the proliferation of ‘advocates’ for democracy and 
human rights have changed in ways that are important to consider here. 
Domestic struggles for rights and regime change have particular modalities 
and pathways that are of significant importance for us to understand 
political change. But these domestic struggles do not take place in isolation. 
Rather, they are joined by advocates at the international or ‘transnational’ 
level in ways that place additional pressure on states to at least make 
concessions to opposition movements and at most contribute to all out 
regime change and democratization. The connections between and among 
these actors have become enhanced and in many ways made more complex 
through the recent ‘democratisation of technology’ and the direct forms of 
voice that the democratization of technology encourages (see Crook 2011). 
This chapter considers the domestic and international agents and advocates 
responsible for bringing about democracy and the promotion of human 
rights. It examines the domestic dynamics of social movements and their 
relationship with regime concession and change. It then looks at how such 
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efforts of domestic change can be ‘transnationalized’, which is to say, how 
domestic groups seek assistance from international non-governmental and 
international governmental organizations to put pressure on regimes to bring 
about reforms. It concludes with a consideration of how the democratization 
of technology has contributed to these processes of change, particularly with 
the advent of the Arab Spring.
domestic mobilization
Any analysis of the mobilization of domestic agents for change is predicated 
on a number of assumptions about why and how individuals either form 
or join protest movements. Early theories of social protest concentrated on 
the idea of ‘grievance’ that is shared among a large group of individuals 
who engage in collective action against the incumbent regime. In this view, 
grievance has been seen as a sociopsychological phenomenon that was 
related to perceptions of ‘relative deprivation’ (e.g. see Ted Robert Gurr’s 
seminal book, Why Men Rebel) or mass action based on the psychology 
of the crowd (e.g. see Elias Canetti’s classic book, Crowds and Power). 
Subsequent theories questioned the grievance models, which failed to 
explain how equally aggrieved people come together to form groups 
and manage to coordinate collective action in ways that could challenge 
the power of existing regimes. These critiques argued that ‘grievance is 
everywhere’, but it is not clear how such grievance can be converted into 
sustained collective action in ways that can overturn unpopular regimes 
(see Foweraker 1995).
Theories based on the ‘rationality’ assumption from economics 
questioned how it was possible to keep individuals motivated to remain 
in a protest group and to sustain collective action over time. The ‘problem 
of collective action’, as it became known, pointed out that as group size 
got large, the benefits for any one person to remain committed to the 
movement decreased dramatically (see Olson 1965). The problem is also 
known as the ‘free rider’ problem, since in areas of mobilization involving 
so-called public goods, it is irrational for someone to participate in a 
movement if the benefits would accrue to that person even if they did 
not participate. Interestingly, at the time the Logic of Collective Action 
(Olson 1965) was published, many countries experienced widespread 
social protests in the forms of anti-war movements, student movements 
and women’s movements among others. There is thus a paradox between 
the theory of the free rider and the actual outbreak of social unrest. The 
struggles for democracy and human rights are struggles for the extension 
of public goods and thus fall within the paradox. Freedom is indivisible 
even if our understanding of human rights is based on protection of the 
individual person. If a group is successful in toppling a regime and bringing 
about democratic change, benefits of life under the new regime would be 
aGenTs and adVoCaTes 85
extended to the whole society not simply to those who were involved in 
the struggle. By this reasoning, it would be irrational for any one person 
to join the protest movement, particularly if it means a risk to life as we 
have seen in President Bashar al-Assad’s repressive response to political 
dissidents in Syria since 2011.
The classic solution to the free-rider problem has been for analysts and 
commentators to identify what kinds of ‘private’ or ‘selective’ incentives 
there are for those individuals who participate in social protest and popular 
mobilization against incumbent regimes. Such selective incentives can 
include material gains and the promise to hold power once the regime has 
been removed. Throughout history, individuals that have participated in 
collective action and protest across many different groups in society have 
received income for their participation, such as money or goods (landowners’ 
livestock, silverware, etc.) that result from successful mobilization (see, 
e.g. Mark Lichbach’s The Rebel’s Dilemma). But this history also includes 
multiple examples of social struggles for democracy and human rights. 
For example, the struggle for citizenship rights in Europe and North 
America across the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been 
characterized by groups that have mobilized for reasons other than for 
strict material gain (see, Marshall 1963; Barbalet 1988; Foweraker and 
Landman 1997). Thus, the less ‘economic’ explanations tend to focus on 
different kinds of incentives that may include factors such as pride, moral 
victory, being involved in something that is ‘right’ and being motivated by 
values that underpin a commitment to democracy and human rights (Risse 
et al. 1999).
Many struggles against authoritarianism have a strong economic 
component, but this is much different than social mobilization being 
motivated by strict individual material gain. Rather, economic critique 
forms part of an overall critique of regime ineffectiveness or corruption, 
which helps galvanize an opposition movement to seek overthrow of the 
regime. Economic failure or predatory forms of economic development in 
which the proceeds of economic expansion are not distributed fairly or when 
government elites are perceived to have misused funds, hoarded national 
income and exhibited opulent lifestyles can motivate popular mobilization 
through an appeal to an economic argument. Indeed, the Mubarak regime 
in Egypt, Gaddafi regime in Libya and Ben Ali regime in Tunisia (not to 
mention regimes such as those of Baby ‘Doc’ Duvalier in Haiti, Charles 
Taylor in Liberia, Idi Amin in Uganda and Saddam Hussein in Iraq) were all 
guilty of hoarding a significant proportion of national income and engaging 
in extremely opulent lifestyles. In the case of Tunisia, dissident groups used 
websites that track airplanes by enthusiasts to show that Ben Ali’s presidential 
airplane was being used for leisure activity; a fact that contributed to the 
mobilization against him.1 In Egypt, the discourse of the protestors who 
occupied Tahrir Square had significant elements of economic critique about 
the regime. In these cases and many others, however, it is important to stress 
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that initial economic critiques become joined by larger political critiques 
that, depending on regime responses, can lead to the call for an overthrow 
of the incumbent regime and the installation of democracy.
Within the broader economic theories of social protest is an attention 
to the resources that movements have and the constraints under which 
they operate. Resources include money, membership, skills, communication 
networks, organizational coherence and strategic alliances between different 
groups with a common interest in regime change. The nature and extent of 
such alliances and the degree of organizational coherence are quite dynamic 
and subject to change, but across a ‘cycle of protest’ (Tarrow 1994), groups 
come together and can produce quite large public manifestations. Both the 
timing and shape of such cycles of protest are contingent further on the 
opportunities available for mobilization. Within democratic societies, such 
opportunities can include significant shifts in political alignments among 
elites and or political parties, ‘critical elections’ (Key 1955), government 
inquiries, economic crisis, declaration of war, among other major events. 
Political opportunities also include the relative openness and responsiveness 
of government to the demands of social movements, where countries vary 
from closed and unresponsive systems to open and responsive systems (see 
Kitschelt 1986). In non-democratic societies, political opportunities include 
key decisions from leaders, (e.g. F. W. De Klerk releasing Nelson Mandela 
from prison in South Africa or the Generals in Burma/Myanmar releasing 
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest), death of a leader (e.g. the death 
of Kim Jong Il in North Korea), defeat in war (e.g. the British defeat of 
Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas War) and severe economic crises or 
economic critique. They may also include events that attract widespread 
international attention, such as the April 2012 Grand Prix in Bahrain, in 
which opposition groups stepped up their activities in the run up to the 
event, called for the event to be cancelled and increased their protests on the 
streets of the capital.
Beyond these considerations of motivation and the formation of 
successful challenging groups, theories of domestic mobilization also assume 
the existence of some form of ‘civil society’ in which independent groups 
are able to become established and mobilize for change. Civil society has 
been variously describes as the ‘private realm’ (Foley and Edwards 1996) of 
voluntary associations, clubs, guilds, interest groups and other non-profit 
organizations that are distinctly different from private households on the one 
hand and the state on the other (see also Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; Cohen 
and Arato 1992).2 While they are part of a private realm, civil society groups 
occupy the ‘public sphere’ and are seen to be a crucial component or ‘arena’ 
for democracy (see Linz and Stepan 1996). Within civil society, like-minded 
groups come together and form larger social movements and challenge the 
state in ways that seek change within particular issue areas (e.g. women’s 
rights legislation, nuclear power station construction, or student fees) or 
seek fundamental change of the political system. It has been argued that 
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civil society is a necessary precondition for social protest movements, and 
the work on transitions from authoritarian rule suggests that civil society 
must at least be ‘resurrected’ before challenges to rule can begin in earnest 
(O’Donnell et al. 1986).
Such a precondition, however, is problematic if one is to explain how 
collective action leads to democracy and a greater protection of human 
rights. Indeed, comparative research has shown that social mobilization is 
entirely possible under authoritarian conditions with virtually no presence 
of civil society as it is popularly understood. This research shows further 
that networks for mobilization exist in latent form that are then the basis 
upon which social movement activity develops. For example, comparisons 
of social mobilization in authoritarian Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Spain 
showed that protest from labour movements and other social movements 
was not only possible but actually contributed to regime transformation (see 
Foweraker and Landman 1997). Other studies have shown similar patterns 
of social mobilization for human rights have been possible across a wide 
range of country cases in Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe (see 
Risse et al. 1999; Hawkins 2002).
Whether civil society is present or not, however, the key to any successful 
pattern of mobilization is the formation and aggregation of groups. Some 
groups can be unrelated to political questions initially but can become 
politicized over time as they engage with the state for prolonged periods. 
The classic example from the United States is the fundamental role played 
by Baptist Churches and religious networks in the civil rights movement 
(see Chong 1991). In Latin America, particular kinds of self-help groups 
such as women’s organizations, soup kitchens, neighbourhood associations 
and religious ‘base communities,’ most notably associated with the Catholic 
Church, became politicized during prolonged periods of authoritarian 
rule and served as the foundation for challenges to incumbent rulers (see 
Foweraker 1995; Foweraker et al. 2003; Cleary 2007; Philip and Panizza 
2011). Other groups, however, are intentionally political in their advocacy 
for particular causes, such as women’s liberation groups, gay rights groups, 
anti-war groups, green groups, among many others. Such advocacy 
groups have been crucial for the kinds of large-scale patterns of domestic 
mobilization that have led to significant political transformation of the 
kind relevant to our discussion here. Their day-to-day activities include 
fund raising, awareness raising, education, research and report writing and 
documentation of problems within their own issue area. But in times of 
crisis, networks of advocacy groups form an important social movement 
‘infrastructure’ that can help mobilize large numbers of people.
Differences between these groups tend to be minimized during the build-
up to large protests, but continued tensions can have an impact on the 
longevity of protest and coherence of a mass movement itself. Indeed, a 
cycle of protest typically peaks at the time of a major event (regime change 
or massive repression) and during the decline of the wave after such an event 
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old divisions reappear, movement cohesiveness disappears and numbers of 
people mobilized decrease significantly. Moreover, groups that obtain power 
after regime change may not be in line with the expectations of those who 
took part in the cycle of protest. For example, the emergence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a significant contender for political power in Egypt after the 
fall of Mubarak has not sat comfortably with many who were involved in 
the protests against him.
Any optimism about the potential for civil society actors to become 
mobilized under authoritarian conditions needs to be tempered, since 
it is very important to understand that there are no guarantees that such 
mobilization will lead to positive change. The comparative study of protest 
movements under conditions of authoritarian rule has shown a great variety 
of outcomes around the world. Cycles of protest and regime response unfold 
over long, contested and inconclusive periods, which may or may not result 
in regime transformation towards democracy and a greater protection of 
human rights. Rather, protest can be met with increased repression and 
further consolidation of authoritarian rule. Key factors for change that are 
outside the process of social mobilization include new external factors that 
provide different signals and opportunities for regime opponents, and/or a 
change in the calculus of authoritarian leaders themselves as they seek to 
maintain their power. The interaction between these different factors means 
that regime transformation may well be partial, halting and regressive even 
though there is widespread popular support for change.
For example, analysis has shown that attempts by the Solidarity 
movement led by Lech Walesa in Poland in the early 1980s failed to bring 
about regime change, as the Jaruzelski regime was able to rely on external 
backing from the Soviet Union. Martial law was imposed between 1981 
and 1983, where political opponents of the regime were interned or killed, 
and those in prison not released under an amnesty until 1986. Real regime 
change did not occur until the Gorbachev administration in the Soviet 
Union initiated the glasnost and perestroika reforms (see Colomer and 
Pascual 1994). In similar fashion, increased social mobilization in the early 
1980s during the Pinochet regime in Chile was met by a harsh state of siege 
that lasted for nearly 2 years in which political opponents were routinely 
detained and tortured (Hawkins 2002). It was only when Pinochet made a 
bid to prolong his stay in power in an calculated decision to hold a popular 
referendum (or plebiscite) did a new possibility for regime change become 
possible. The ‘No Campaign’ mobilized supporters to vote against Pinochet, 
whose ultimate defeat led to a relatively rapid period of regime change that 
ushered in democracy.
In both the Polish and Chilean cases, it was not inevitable that social 
mobilization, though possible under conditions of authoritarian rule, would 
lead to regime change. Rather, initial mobilization was met with a harsh 
repressive response and prolonged period of continued authoritarianism. 
Changes in external signals and internal decision-making provided new 
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opportunities for mobilization, which in both cases ultimately saw the 
ousting of dictators and regime transformation. These cases are not unique, 
as across the world, there are numerous instances in which mobilization 
is shut down, authoritarianism prevails and supporters of democracy and 
defenders of human rights struggle on until conditions open up for new 
rounds of mobilization. The period of regime transformation in Burma/
Myanmar, for example, has been very long indeed, with many fits and starts; 
however, it has now emerged as a ‘least likely case’ of democratization 
(see Landman 2008; also Howarth 1998: 182). The military has been in 
power since 1962 and pro-democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi has been 
repeatedly placed under house arrest, while successive anti-government 
protests (e.g. in 1988 and 2007) have been met with harsh repression. 
Beginning with the 2008 referendum, however, Burma has seen a gradual 
and halting liberalization, with the release and 2012 electoral victory of 
Aung San Suu Kyi, who gained a parliamentary seat. In 2001, an article 
published in The Journal of Democracy argued that at best, Burma had 
been engaging in liberalization but not democratization, since many of its 
small reforms were rescinded in the face of increased social mobilization 
(Reyolds et al. 2001). The election of Aung San Suu Kyi, however, signals 
that the regime accepts the legitimacy of the opposition (a key criteria 
for democracy) and now reforms will need to continue with respect to 
constitutional issues (federalism, agreements with minority communities 
and systems of representation), dismantling a predatory state (particularly 
the military complicity in the drug trade) and the professionalization of the 
armed forces subject to civilian rule (Reynolds et al. 2001).
International mobilization
There are a number of agents and advocates at the international level that 
also form part of my understanding of democratic transformation. The 
communities of practitioners for democracy and those for human rights are 
markedly different in many ways; however, they share a number of similar 
goals: (1) provide assistance to those seeking to bring about political change 
at the domestic level, (2) establish and work with international legal standards 
and standards of best practice and (3) provide a normative ‘transmission 
belt’ that helps diffuse the ideas, values and practices associated with 
democracy and human rights. These individuals work for inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs). The different status of these organizations often means that they 
have different mandates (and therefore work across different terrains of 
engagement) and different styles of carrying out their work, but there are 
many areas of complementarity and in my view, they represent an important 
set of actors for the advance of democracy and human rights. Typical inter-
governmental organizations include the United Nations, European Union, 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy90
the Organization of American States, the African Union, the Community 
of Democracies, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Typical international non-
governmental organizations include Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), 
Minority Rights Group International, Article 19, the International Service 
for Human Rights and the World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT).
Human rights and transnational advocacy
In many of the country examples described in the last section on domestic 
mobilization, there have been moments during a cycle of protest and 
campaigns for political reform during which an appeal is made to 
international groups for assistance. This may come in the form of such 
groups already having a presence in the country or domestic groups 
appealing to groups outside the country. Across a number of studies (e.g. 
Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse et al. 1999; Bob 2005; Tarrow 2005; Sikkink 
2011), it has become clear that networks form between domestic groups 
struggling for human rights and international advocacy organizations of the 
kind listed above. Since the network forms between groups on the ground 
and these international organizations, analysts have described this kind of 
phenomenon as a ‘transnational advocacy network’. The network transcends 
the traditional boundary of the state and makes possible coordinated forms 
of mobilization that join together domestic and international activists.
The basic cycle of events within this understanding of advocacy proceeds in 
a number of phases. First, the domestic-based groups mobilize for particular 
human rights issues in their own country. Second, the government of that 
country denies there is a problem and may well repress the group. Third, 
the group makes an appeal to international advocacy groups who in turn 
raise awareness through their networks of like-minded organizations and 
engage in advocacy work with inter-governmental organizations. Fourth, 
the transnational network puts pressure on the government in question to 
initiate reforms and redress the claims by the domestic-based group. This 
cycle of events has become known as the ‘boomerang model’ since as the 
name implies, the appeal outwards to the transnational network comes back 
to the original country from which a human rights challenge has been made 
(see Risse et al. 1999). The resulting process of reform is not necessarily 
a linear progression that sees dramatic improvement in the protection of 
human rights, but a halting process of reform that may well include periods 
of regression and stagnation. Nevertheless, the domestic struggle for rights 
is buttressed by the efforts of the transnational advocacy network, where 
the country in question may be raised as an issue for consideration by 
such bodies as the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, 
Human Rights Council or Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
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Rights. These bodies, however, would not consider such issues without 
the coordinated efforts of the non-governmental organizations who raise 
awareness, campaign for change and advocate for new standards and 
responses from the inter-governmental organizations.
Other research has shown that how domestic groups frame their struggle 
can have an impact on the degree to which their issue is taken up but 
international organizations. For example, in a systematic comparison of 
social mobilization in Nigeria and Mexico, Clifford Bob (2005) finds that 
how a group ‘markets’ its ‘rebellion’ affects its ability to garner international 
support. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni Poeple (MOSOP) 
in Nigeria mobilized around the oil exploration activities of Shell in 
the Niger Delta, but until the movement changed its frame from one of 
‘environmental damage’ to a struggle for ‘human rights’, it did not receive 
significant international attention. The charisma, leadership and subsequent 
assassination of its leader Ken Saro-Wiwa certainly raised global awareness 
of the issue, but international advocacy on behalf of the Ogoni was enhanced 
significantly with the human rights reframing. Analyses such as this suggest 
that there may well be ‘surplus demand’ in groups seeking international 
attention combined with ‘limited supply’ of support from the international 
community. Transnational advocacy is thus not a simple process of 
mobilization, but one that is subject to politics, contingent combinations 
of factors and skilled framing of human rights struggles to win over groups 
that comprise the transnational network. Indeed, Bob’s (2005) analysis 
shows that international human rights NGOs can act as ‘gatekeepers’ for 
those issues and causes that receive attention and support.
Exporting, importing and supporting democracy
The advance of democracy and human rights is not always a ‘bottom-up’ 
process initiated by domestically based groups who then capture the attention 
of international organizations. There are official policies of governments 
and inter-governmental organizations that seek to promote democracy and 
human rights through a variety of tools and instruments. The motivations 
and goals of the policies, the combination of emphasis on democracy 
and human rights and the instruments at their disposal for pursuing the 
policies vary greatly across different governmental and inter-governmental 
organizations. The motivations range from idealistic and value-based 
concerns over human well-being to the material national interests of the 
‘promoting’ state. Emphases on democracy and human rights vary and 
are often elided in formal policy documents that pronounce support for 
democracy, good governance and human rights across a range of different 
instruments. The tools and instruments include coercion and the use of 
force (Whitehead 1996), financial inducements through aid conditionality, 
budget support for democratic reform projects, electoral observation and 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy92
monitoring, financial support for civil society groups or political party 
organizations, among many others.
From Wilsonian interventionism in the early years of the twentieth 
century to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, coercion has often 
been used in the name of democracy to rid countries of unsavoury leaders 
and try to induce domestic political transformations that result in long-
term democracy. Such interventions are part of the ‘liberal international’ 
tradition and have been motivated by a variety of interests, many of which 
are not related to democracy or human rights, but may create a network of 
allied states for the state that is promoting democracy in this way. Beyond 
direct coercion and intervention, they are many avenues through which 
democratic states and inter-governmental organizations seek to promote 
democracy and human rights. Indeed, the unintended consequences of overt 
interventionism have created reticence and criticism among many states to 
engage in large ‘nation-building’ projects, such as NATO in Afghanistan since 
2001. Democratic states and inter-governmental organizations typically 
have different financial means to pursue policies that promote democracy 
and human rights. Budget support and programme funding can range from 
large-scale reform of state institutions to specific projects that build capacity 
and bring about incremental change in line with larger objectives to promote 
democracy and human rights. Such forms of ‘aid conditionality’ tie financial 
assistance to demonstrable improvements in democracy and human rights. 
Some programmes like the US Millennium Challenge Account match aid to 
achievement across specific assessment criteria. Other programmes look for 
areas of reform where assistance is likely to make a difference, such as the 
development programming carried out by the United Nations Development 
Programme and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development.
In addition to these differences in policy motivations and means 
for realizing different outcomes, often the ‘verb’ that is used to describe 
policies matters significantly for the ways in which they are implemented 
and perceived. During the early 1990s, for example, the verb ‘export’ was 
used to describe US approaches to promoting democracy around the world, 
where it was argued that ‘advancing the democratic cause can be America’s 
most effective foreign policy in terms of not merely good deeds but of 
self-interest as well’ (Muravchik 1992: 6). Here, democracy is conceived 
as a product that can be exported abroad and that it brings benefits to 
the country that imports it as well as the one that exports it. Perhaps an 
extreme form of the exportation approach was seen in the neo-conservative 
policy objectives of taking initial interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
turning them into longer-term commitments to bring about democracy 
through force. The Obama Administration has been described as having 
a more pragmatic than ideological approach to promoting democracy and 
like his predecessors; Obama has had to maintain close relations with less 
than democratic countries. Indeed, Obama has pursued a mixed strategy 
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that combines democratization ‘where it appears to be occurring with a 
willingness to continue to close ties with seemingly stable authoritarian 
governments’ (Carothers 2012: 6).
The verb ‘promote’ has been used by the European Union whose 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights ‘provides support 
for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU countries’ 
(Landman 2012). The instrument includes efforts to enhance respect for 
human rights, strengthen the role of civil society, support and strengthen 
international and regional frameworks and build confidence in electoral 
processes.3 Through its process of enlargement, the European Union has been 
able to move beyond the logic of economic integration to one of political 
integration, where its most well-known Copenhagen criteria for membership 
include achievements in democracy and human rights. This internal logic 
to EU enlargement, however, has also influenced its external relations, such 
that the European Union fully recognizes that as an ‘[a]s an economic and 
political player with global and diplomatic reach, and with a substantial 
budget for external assistance, [it] has both influence and leverage, which 
it can deploy on behalf of democratization and human rights’ (European 
Commission Communication 2001). There is now a combined interest within 
the European Union in promoting democracy, good governance and human 
rights in ways that are linked with questions of security, enlargement, technical 
cooperation, poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals, as 
well as conflict-prevention, crisis-management and conflict resolution.
In contrast to the verbs ‘export’, ‘import’ and ‘promote’, the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), a 27-member inter-
governmental organization founded in Sweden in 1995 intentionally uses the 
verbs ‘build’ and ‘support’ for its work on democracy (IDEA 2005, 2008). 
IDEA’s choice of verbs reflects its overall understanding of democratization 
as a process that is built within societies by people who live in them, and 
not by an external model that imposed from without. Since its founding, 
IDEA has worked on providing expert comparative knowledge across many 
different issue areas relating to democracy building and now has a range of 
programmes on electoral processes; constitution-building processes; political 
parties, participation and representation; and democracy and development. 
IDEA is thus a significant global ‘knowledge broker’ for individuals and 
organizations seeking to bring about democracy or to improve the quality 
of democracy worldwide.
New technology and the ‘norms cascade’
The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century 
have shown an exponential growth in new technology that has become 
increasingly faster, more powerful, less expensive and more widespread than 
ever before. The integration of smart phone technology with the power of the 
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internet has led to an explosion of communication and a democratization 
of voice that has been possible hitherto. A single video captured on a 
smart phone can transform criminal investigations, accountability for 
multinational companies and responsiveness of governments. Increasingly, 
information of consequence can be obtained and disseminated rapidly in 
ways that challenge ‘official’ versions of events. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, video footage captured during the G20 riots in London have 
changed the nature of a case against the Metropolitan Police and its rough 
handling of newspaper salesman Ian Tomlinson, who was caught up in the 
protests and died as a result of his encounter with the police. In the absence 
of the public-produced video footage, there would not have been enough 
evidence to find the police responsible for his death.
The use of social media such as Twitter and Facebook has made the 
kind of mobilization discussed in this chapter even more possible, where 
key multimedia messages can be shared in seconds contribute to social 
mobilization in two important ways. First, it is possible to see the new 
technologies as a ‘resource’ like money or membership that can be used 
by a movement to encourage its growth and coordinate its activity. 
Shared on-line spaces can be used for mobilizing groups and coordinating 
activities. Indeed, during the student protests in London in November 
2011, a group of students from an organization called Sukey made a 
phone application freely available that allowed individual students to 
provide real-time updates of police activity and protest dynamics, which 
were then aggregated, mapped and sent back to individual smart phones 
(see www.sukey.org). The organization FrontlineSMS has devised cost-
effective ways for groups to aggregate text-based information to monitor 
events ranging from electoral violence to sexual harassment of women 
(see www.frontlinesms.com). Second, through iteration across networks, 
messages from social mobilization have become more ‘modular’ and 
easier to apply to multiple settings with localized modifications. Charles 
Tilly, the seminal analyst of ‘contentious politics’, argued that social 
movements utilize different ‘repertoires of contention’ which become 
modular and ‘transportable’ between contexts. The new technologies 
accelerate this modularity and flexibility as new repertoires of contention 
are shared around the world. Indeed, it is telling that the imagery and 
messages coming out of the Arab Spring have been replicated through 
the ‘Occupy’ movement in countries such as the United States and United 
Kingdom.
It would be an exaggeration to say that this new technology is the 
cause of such momentous change, but it has been a remarkable means 
through which the messages of change can be communicated rapidly. In 
Tunisia, for example, local protest activities and state response caught on 
mobile phones and posted in local dialects were picked up by the Tunisian 
diaspora community, translated into Arabic and then fed back into Tunisia 
through mainstream media organizations such as Al Jazeera. In this way, 
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new technology allowed protest groups to ‘leapfrog’ the state, communicate 
their message to a larger audience that was then fed back into their country 
and helped mobilize national protests against their government. In this case, 
grievance was present, communicated, expanded and nationalized through 
new technology. In an on-line survey of approximately 400 Tunisians, 97 per 
cent of the sample kept up to date with developments during the revolution 
during December 2010 and January 2011 on Facebook, 55.3 per cent on 
YouTube and 22.9 per cent on Twitter. Between 45 per cent and 59 per cent 
of the sample felt that social media was more informative, safer way to 
communicate about the developments during the revolution, and both made 
them angry about the regime and hopeful for the future. More importantly, 
more than 75 per cent of the sample learnt through social media about local 
protests and friends and acquaintances who were going to take part (Brauer 
et al. 2012).
summary
It is clear from the discussion in this chapter that democracy is ‘made’ and 
human rights are ‘won’ through social struggle. This struggle has a large 
domestic component as locally based individuals, groups and organizations 
come together at critical junctures and seek change ‘from below’ in ways 
that transcend differences and coalesce around the common cause of 
political transformation. Where local mobilization is blocked through state 
retrenchment, groups have the possibility of taking their struggle to the 
transnational level, where their cause becomes part of a large advocacy 
network comprised of international non-governmental organizations 
which interact with states and inter-governmental organizations. These 
international agents in turn can put pressure on recalcitrant states to 
implement political reforms and accommodate the demands of local 
groups. The appeal from below can be in line with the foreign policy 
interests of states and inter-governmental organizations in ways that bring 
about political transformation; however, this chapter has made clear that 
there are many factors that come together in contingent ways that limit 
the probability of successful transformation. The recent changes in the 
Arab Spring have many of these different features and offer a stark set 
of contrasting examples of that illustrate the variety of outcomes possible 
during significant moments of political transformation. Some domestic 
mobilizations have been successful in toppling their non-democratic 
leaders (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia), others have been embraced internationally and 
supported through military intervention (e.g. Libya), while still others have 
been met with international paralysis and national resistance (e.g. Syria). 
The making of democracy and the struggle for human rights are not easily 
achieved, but as this chapter has shown, they are nonetheless well worth 
the effort.
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On 26 April 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Charles 
Taylor, former president of Liberia, on 11 counts across a range of crimes 
against humanity and other offences. These included murder, rape, sexual 
slavery, enslavement, terrorism, violence to life, health, physical or mental 
well-being of persons, outrages upon personal dignity, cruel treatment, 
pillage, inhumane acts and, most notably, enlisting and conscripting or 
using children younger than 15 to participate actively in hostilities. This 
is a long list of offences and is quite particular to a number of laws that 
comprise the body of what is described as international humanitarian law 
and the international law of armed conflict (ILAC). The court found that 
these crimes were committed alongside Mr Taylor’s aiding and abetting of 
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC). The case is significant since he is the first head of state 
to be indicted, tried and convicted by an international tribunal since the 
Nuremburg trials in 1945–46. Between Nuremburg and the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone, the international community has constructed an ever-
increasing and elaborate legal framework that can be used to hold people 
to account for crimes against humanity. Special tribunals such as those for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have been joined by the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague, The Netherlands, which was 
established by the Rome Statute and came into force on 1 July 2002. This 
development of international law and its culmination in the establishment 
of the ICC have been described as the international ‘institutionalization of 
criminal liability’ (Falk 2000: 4).
Such developments, however, have not only occurred at the international 
level, as throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, more than 100 
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countries have embraced legal and quasi-legal processes to address ‘past 
wrongs’ of some kind, which typically include large-scale human rights 
violations and crimes against humanity committed during periods of civil 
war, authoritarian rule and foreign occupation (see Hayner 2002; Olsen 
et al. 2010, 2012; Sikkink 2011). Popular processes include trials, amnesties, 
truth commissions, commissions of inquiry, reconciliation forums, human 
rights commissions and ‘lustration’ processes which seek to provide a public 
accounting of what has happened, who is responsible, who the main victims 
of the crimes against humanity are (or were) and what should be done about 
the truth that is discovered. Between 1970 and 2007, there have been 848 
of these different processes, where the most popular have been amnesties 
(424 or 50% of the total), followed by trials (267 or 32% of the total), 
truth commissions (68 or 8% of the total), lustration policies (54 or 6% 
of the total) and reparations (35 or 4% of the total (Olsen et al. 2010: 39). 
Between 1979 and 2009, there have been more than 425 cumulative years 
of prosecution for human rights violations (Sikkink 2011: 21). The use of 
trials has increased dramatically over this period, while the use of truth 
commissions has declined dramatically since 2000 (Olsen et al. 2010: 100, 
2012: 208). Despite the overall decline in the use of truth commissions, 
however, Brazil, after many years of delay and alternative approaches, 
launched its own truth commission on 16 May 2012 to investigate the 
human rights abuses committed during the period of military rule between 
1964 and 1985. It is telling that Brazilian President Dilma Roussef, herself a 
political prisoner during the military regime, personally launched the truth 
commission.
This proliferation of international law and development of domestic 
processes of accountability for the past since World War II – what Sikkink 
(2011: 96–7) calls the ‘two streams of justice cascade’ – demonstrate a very 
real and very strong human desire to ‘never forget’ what has happened and 
to ensure that such atrocities occur ‘never again’ (nunca mas in Spanish and 
nunca mais in Portuguese). Embracing the truth in this way, however, is 
not automatic or an inevitable part of political transition in the ways that 
have been outlined in this book. Indeed, whether and what kind of process 
is embraced is a function of possible routes to political accommodation 
after periods of conflict, authoritarian rule or other periods during which 
large-scale human rights violations have taken place. For example, both 
Northern Ireland and Spain are still debating whether and what kind of 
truth processes to undertake. In Northern Ireland, there has been the Saville 
Inquiry into the Bloody Sunday incident, but there has not yet been a truth 
commission of the kind seen in countries such as South Africa (1996–98), 
Peru (2001–03) or Sierra Leone (2002–04). In Spain, there are continuing 
debates about having a truth commission for the Spanish Civil War and for 
the authoritarian period under General Franco.
These examples are broadly understood as fitting into the idea of 
‘transitional justice’, where some accounting of the past becomes a feature 
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of political transition from one regime type (typically but not always 
authoritarian) to another (typically but not always democracy). The 
international and domestic examples have both temporary and permanent 
features to them. At the international level, there are specific legal bodies 
that have been established to deal with specific cases (i.e. Rwanda, the 
Former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone) and there are permanent bodies 
that deal with emerging, ongoing and past cases such as the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). At the domestic level, there are temporary truth and 
justice mechanisms (e.g. trials and truth commissions) that deal with specific 
time periods and there are permanent National Human Rights Institutions 
(NHRIs) that have oversight for all matters relating to human rights within 
a domestic jurisdiction. As of August 2011, there are 70 such NHRIs that 
have been accredited by the ICC across the globe from Afghanistan to 
Zambia.1
This chapter focuses on four key questions for the domestic level. First, it 
considers the choices that countries make at the time of transition (or many 
years later) about whether and what kind of truth and justice process to 
undertake. Second, it discusses the legal mandate and scope of any formal 
body that is established and how that is linked to the type of truth and justice 
made possible. Third, it outlines the different methods that have been used 
for discovering the ‘truth’ through these processes and how these methods 
are important for the kinds of truths that are produced. Fourth, it examines 
the different kinds of justice that are made possible by them. These four 
elements – choice, mandate, methods and justice – are both inter-related 
often highly contested. They also shape the kind of politics that are possible 
during and after a period of transition.
Choice of truth mechanism
The two previous chapters showed that democratic transformation in any 
country involves highly contingent processes of challenge, contestation, 
mobilization, compromise, negotiation and deliberation. One key aspect of 
this transformation concerns the question as to whether a country should 
embark on some sort of truth process or truth mechanism. The arguments 
for having a truth process are numerous: in order for a country to move 
forward, it must address the problems of the past; give people voice over 
what has happened; restore the dignity of those who were victimized under 
the previous regime; provide an opportunity for perpetrators to acknowledge 
their actions; and to pursue some form of justice against those who 
committed offences and offer redress to those who suffered. The moment of 
reckoning made possible by a truth process can provide significant catharsis 
for society and be a period of public acknowledgement that provides the 
basis on which to build a new democratic society. The arguments against 
having a truth process are equally numerous: any uncovering of the truth 
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will be biased and partial (and may reflect the values of ‘victors’); will run 
the risk of ‘re-traumatizing’ the victims and their families; will raise the 
political stakes of the game and risk a return of the authoritarian forces to 
prevent a public process of acknowledgement; will incur huge expenses for 
very little tangible benefit; and will prevent rather than facilitate a country’s 
process of democratic transformation.
The question to have or not to have a truth process is a critical one and is 
often a function of underlying political power and the nature of the forces 
that have thus far succeeded in moving a country forward. The dynamics of 
choice can involve the relative power of the forces that are part of a political 
settlement at the moment of transition. For example, if the military retain 
some authority or threaten to disrupt democracy then any truth process will 
be difficult. Indeed, in Argentina, after the defeat of the military regime in 
the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and its withdrawal from politics, successive 
democratic governments struggled to bring accountability to past wrongs 
and suffered repeated and real threats from the military that sought to 
disrupt democracy. Even though Argentina had a truth commission (The 
National Commission on the Disappeared, CONADEP) and trials for the 
key actors in the military junta that conducted the ‘Dirty War’ between 
1976 and 1983, the years that followed the defeat of the military have 
been marred by the government enacting and rescinding amnesties for 
the perpetrators of egregious human rights violations. Only in the last 
few years has Argentina once again become a major protagonist for truth 
and justice (see Sikkink 2011: 60–83). In Brazil, the relatively peaceful 
extraction of the military from power between 1974 and 1985 meant that 
there was less pressure on (or more resistance within) the country to have 
a truth commission and only in 2012, more than 25 years after the end of 
authoritarianism has it been able to establish a truth commission. Spain 
underwent a relatively rapid period of democratic transition between 1975 
and 1977 (Foweraker and Landman 1997) and is still deliberating on the 
relative merits of having a truth process. In contrast, the rapid and ‘least 
likely’ transition in South Africa (see Howarth 1998) brought with it one 
of the most notable (for good and bad reasons) truth commissions in the 
post-Cold War period.
Once a decision has been taken to have some sort of truth and justice 
process, there is then the choice over what kind of process to have. Again, this 
choice is influenced by a number of political and economic factors as each 
option carries with it different costs and benefits with respect to material, 
moral and long-term cultural concerns. The evidentiary requirement for 
trials and full-blown legal proceedings can involve significant costs both 
in terms of time and money, and the choice of the mechanism is very much 
related to what kind of justice a country desires (see below). Politically, 
the strict legal outcomes (guilty, not guilty, no case to answer) associated 
with trials can be threatening to perpetrators from the previous regime 
and may not be politically possible for that reason. Truth commissions can 
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have punitive and non-punitive mechanisms attached to them and they may 
allow ‘amnesty for truth’ as in South Africa or seek some form of retributive 
justice once the truth is known. As in the case of trials, the prospect of 
this kind of justice may well alienate the very powers that are required to 
participate in the truth mechanism. The process of lustration adopted in 
many former Communist countries of Eastern Europe involves expunging 
government institutions of perpetrators of past wrongs. Here, the process 
involves identifying personnel within state institutions that had a significant 
role to play in repression and social control of society and then deciding what 
to do with them. The process can involve exclusion from the new system or 
some form of inclusion based on confession and truth telling (see Olsen 
et al. 2010; Roman 2011). Each of these options carries with it significant 
political risk and the possibility of backlash. If personnel from the former 
regime are excluded, then reconciliation could be undermined even though 
trust has been achieved. On the other hand, if these personnel are included 
in the new regime, reconciliation may be achieved at the expense of trust 
(see Roman 2011). There are these significant trade-offs associated with 
these choices.
There are many reasons behind the choices that countries make 
concerning the kind of truth and justice process that they adopt. A 
broader comparative view shows that there are some common factors that 
determine whether and what type of process a country adopts. Across the 
848 examples of different mechanisms that have been adopted around the 
world between 1970 and 2007, there are four common political factors 
that have been identified that help explain the adoption of at least two 
or more mechanisms: (1) the level of repression in the society (higher 
repression increases the probability of adoption); (2) the amount of time 
that has passed since the height of repression (more time increases the 
chance of adoption); (3) the democratic history of the country (many cases 
are countries like Chile where democracy was ‘interrupted’ by a period 
of authoritarianism); and (4) the degree of ethnic fractionalization in the 
country (higher fractionalization lowers the probability of adoption) (see 
Olsen et al. 2010: 56–8). In addition to these four political factors, analysis 
also shows that countries with significant economic growth (i.e. change in 
GDP) have a much higher probability of adopting one or more of these 
truth and justice mechanisms. Indeed, as the change in GDP increases, 
the probability of not having a mechanism drops and the probability of 
having a trial increases (trials are expensive). At comparatively lower 
rates of change in GDP (0% to 2.5%), the probability of adopting either 
amnesties or truth commissions increases, but for rates of growth above 
2.5 per cent, the probability for these mechanisms drops in favour of trials 
(Ibid., 73–6).
Beyond the identification of these key factors that account for adoption 
of these mechanisms, the analysis of these data show that the process of 
transition itself can have an impact on what mechanisms a country chooses. 
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Indeed, countries in which the previous authoritarian regime has collapsed 
tend to choose the combination of amnesty and trials (some with and some 
without truth commissions), while those countries that have undergone a 
negotiated transition tend to issue amnesties first and then have trials (some 
with and some without truth commissions) (Olsen et al. 2010: 153–9). The 
recent case of Brazil is illustrative, since it underwent a very long period of 
negotiated transition between 1974 and 1985, the enactment of its Amnesty 
Law in 1979 and now the establishment of a truth commission. This makes 
sense from a political point of view, since regime collapse brings with it a 
more open ‘political opportunity structure’ (see Chapter 6) for groups in 
civil society including human rights organizations to mobilize in favour of 
the adoption of a trial mechanism and/or a truth commission. Negotiated 
transitions, on the other hand, often involve actors from the previous regime 
which will reduce the probability that any truth or justice mechanism would 
be adopted.
mandate and scope of a truth process
The variation in the adoption of different truth mechanisms identified 
above is not only a function of the nature of the transition itself but also 
the legal mandate and scope for each mechanism. The mandate and scope 
will include what can be investigated, by whom and over which period, as 
well as the additional powers the mechanism will have in calling witnesses 
and investigating lines of inquiry to gather evidence. The mandate and 
scope will also have an impact on the kinds of evidence that are gathered 
and how they are gathered. For example, the Chilean truth commission 
was tasked with documenting those cases of human rights abuse that took 
place under the Pinochet regime for which a positive identification could 
be made. The fact that many individuals ‘disappeared’ during this period 
means that any such compilation was necessarily and grossly incomplete. 
In addition, a truth commission may be tasked with investigating only 
the most ‘egregious’ violations that have taken place, which can lead to 
an undercounting of particular types of crimes. For example, it is entirely 
possible for a victim to have been detained, tortured and then killed, 
where a project documenting the ‘most egregious’ violations will only 
count the killing. In this case, the detention and torture remain under 
counted and can lead to biased findings (see Landman 2006; Landman 
and Carvalho 2009).
Beyond these concerns over enumeration of atrocities (see below), the 
mandate and scope of a truth and justice processes produce five major types 
of mechanism: (1) trials, (2) truth commissions, (3) amnesties, (4) reparations 
and (5) lustration. These different mechanisms are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive as many truth commissions have also had the use of amnesties 
(e.g. South Africa) and reparations (e.g. Peru), and it is entirely possible for 
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a county to have a truth commission and trial, as in the case of Argentina 
(see Sikkink 2011).
Trials typically include those domestic or international legal bodies that 
try individuals for crimes against humanity and where the country in which 
the crimes were committed is involved in the trial (see Olsen et al. 2010: 32). 
Thus, trials can include the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, 
as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In addition to these legal bodies, 
there are some trials conducted under the auspices of ‘universal jurisdiction’ 
in which a state uses its own domestic court system to try someone from 
another state. For example, former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet was 
detained in the United Kingdom in 1998 as a result of a request from a 
judge in Spain who sought Pinochet’s extradition to stand trial in Spain for 
crimes against humanity that were committed against Spanish citizens while 
he was head of state. Even though Spain and the United Kingdom have an 
extradition treaty which would have allowed for the transfer of Pinochet, 
there was a long drawn out set of proceedings in the House of Lords in the 
United Kingdom, which resulted in (a) the Lords agreeing that he should 
be tried and (b) that he was of ill health and should be allowed to return 
to Chile. He was then indicted in Chile, but died before any conviction was 
secured. The principle of universal jurisdiction, however, was bolstered by 
the case (Sands 2006; Sikkink 2011).
Underlying the use of trials are three simple ideas, neatly summarized by 
Sikkink (2011: 13):
 1 [T]he most basic violations of human rights—summary execution, 
torture, and disappearance—cannot be legitimate acts of state and 
thus must be seen as crimes committed by individuals.
 2 [I]ndividuals who commit these crimes can be, and should be, 
prosecuted.
 3 [T]he accused are also bearers of rights, and deserve to have those 
rights protected at a fair trial.
It has taken until the passage of the Rome Statute in 1998, which established 
the International Criminal Court to realize these three ideas in practice and 
in ways that can apply to all states. Moreover, the commitment to the idea 
that perpetrators themselves have rights means that evidentiary standards 
need to be met and that conditions of a fair trial need to be upheld at 
all times. These conditions mean that such trials tend to be prolonged, 
expensive and most important for any conception of justice, highly selective. 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
has been in operation since 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) since 1994. The ICTY has an annual budget of $300 
million, while the 2002–03 budget for the ICTR was $208.4 million (Olsen 
et al. 2010: 66). Both bodies have successfully convicted perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity, but the convictions are for a selective number 
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of perpetrators. Trials such as the ones conducted by these bodies tend to 
focus on the main perpetrators and thus do not achieve widespread justice 
in convicting a large number of individuals involved. In Rwanda, domestic 
courts became overwhelmed with cases and a community-based process of 
justice known as the gacacca system has been used to provide reconciliation 
between opposing groups through alternative means that in many ways 
complement those of the international tribunal and the domestic court 
system (see Clark 2011).
In contrast to trials, truth commissions are less prolonged, are less 
selective in their attention to perpetrators and are less expensive. 
Typically, truth commissions last between 2 and 3 years and their cost 
can be as high as $20 million as in the case of South Africa, but such 
costs are nothing near the costs associated with trials. Depending on 
how one counts them, there have been between 40 (Hayner 2010) and 
68 (Olsen et al. 2010: 39; see also Landman 2006) truth commissions so 
far, where Uganda had the first in 1974 and Brazil is the latest country 
to establish one in 2012. Their main aims and objectives as well as their 
composition have varied over these many years and countries, but they 
share the following common features: (1) they focus on the past, (2) they 
do not focus on specific events, but seek to discover a broader picture, 
(3) they are temporary, (4) they have the authority to access all areas to 
obtain information (see Hayner 1994: 604, 2002: 14) and (5) they have 
a legal mandate to ‘clarify’, ‘establish the complete picture’, ‘investigate 
serious acts of violence’, ‘establish the truth’ and ‘create an impartial 
historical record’. Despite these common features, there has been a lot 
of controversy over their findings, their funding, the methods they adopt 
to investigate the truth (see below) and the degree to which they have 
achieved justice (see below).
Amnesties are seen as a ‘practical mechanism to secure democratic 
transition and rule of law by appeasing potential spoilers’ (Olsen et al. 
2010: 36). They are an official declaration of the state that protects 
individuals who have been accused or convicted of human rights violations 
from prosecution or pardon them and then release them from custody. 
For example, the 1979 Amnesty law in Brazil and the 1987 Law of Due 
Obedience in Argentina protected members of the armed forces from 
prosecution for such crimes as murder, disappearance and torture. In 
South Africa, amnesties were issued on an individual basis in exchange for 
evidence from perpetrators. Those that had committed human rights abuses 
during the period of Apartheid (from either side) were granted immunity 
from prosecution if they gave statements to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. It seems odd at first blush to refer to amnesties as part of 
a truth and justice mechanism, and there are spirited arguments on both 
sides, but the reality of politics shows that amnesties are used frequently 
and have constituted 50 per cent of all mechanisms adopted between 
1970 and 2007 (see above). The acceptance of amnesties whatever their 
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frequency as a viable component for any truth and justice process rests 
very much on the conception of justice one has, a subject that is discussed 
further below.
methods for uncovering the truth
The idea of ‘truth’ is contested. Even if ‘facts’ about a case are known and 
there is detailed forensic evidence of the victim, his or her cause of death, 
etc. the circumstances around the death, the context of the death and the 
interpretation of the death can vary greatly across different accounts (see, 
e.g. Wilson 2001). But truth processes seek to account for many deaths and 
associated crimes against humanity over many years of the kind detailed in 
the 2012 conviction of Charles Taylor. To provide some idea of the scale of 
these crimes, the civil war in El Salvador between 1980 and 1991 claimed 
more than 70,000 lives; the conflict in Guatemala between 1962 and 1996 
claimed between 119,300 and 145,000 lives; the period of the Dirty War in 
Argentina between 1976 and 1982 is estimated to have taken 30,000 people; 
while the 100 days of inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda claimed as many as 
900,000 people (Landman 2006: 107–25). As we shall see, however, it is 
crucially important to understand that each of these figures is an estimate 
and not a definitive total. For any period under investigation there are a 
circumscribed but unknown number of crimes against humanity that have 
been committed and there are different methods for counting this unknown 
population of violations. In other words, the total number of violations is 
finite, but what that number actually is remains unknown when a truth 
process begins. Counting large-scale human rights violations and crimes 
against humanity is thus a huge challenge (see Ball et al. 2000; Landman 
and Carvalho 2009; Taylor et al. 2012).
Moreover, counting is only one of many methods a truth process will use, 
as typically, many truth mechanisms include both quantitative and qualitative 
elements. For example, both the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(CVR) had quantitative and qualitative features. In South Africa, the TRC 
took 21,296 statements from deponents about the various human rights 
violations that took place under Apartheid between 1960 and 1994 and 
from these statements reported 46,696 violations (36,935 were deemed 
gross violations) that had affected a reported 28,750 victims. In addition to 
the data project that collected and coded all the statements, the TRC also 
conducted public hearings around South Africa to hear people’s stories and 
to give voice to the many different communities affected by Apartheid. In 
Peru, the CVR took 16,917 statements and then through comparison and 
careful statistical estimation determined that between 61, 007 and 77,500 
people had died or disappeared, where the most likely estimate was 69,280 
(see Ball et al. 2003). In addition to the data team, the CVR also conducted 
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30 estudios en profundidad (in-depth studies) and conducted public hearings 
to provide a greater understanding of what it meant to live in conflict and 
to learn first-hand about the kinds of atrocities that had been committed 
by state and non-state agents during the 20 years of conflict between the 
government and the Sendero Luminoso (‘Shining Path’) rebel insurgency 
(see Landman 2006, 2012b; Landman and Carvalho 2009).
Common across both the quantitative and qualitative methods used 
during truth mechanisms is the importance of the narrative (Landman 
2012b). Narratives are at a base level ‘stories’ that people tell about things 
that they have experienced directly or indirectly, as well as the evaluative 
impressions that those experiences carry with them (e.g. the subjective 
experience and registering of emotions, feelings and insights connected to 
such experiences). Such stories are often complemented with other items 
that can form the universe of data and evidence a truth mechanism will use 
to develop its account, including journals, field notes, letters, conversations, 
interviews, photos, other artefacts and videos and films (see Clandinin and 
Connelly 2000: 98–115; Riessman 2008; Sandercock et al. 2012). These 
stories can be taken in and of themselves, or they can be used to develop a 
large picture of what has happened to a society during a period of conflict, 
authoritarianism or occupation. The quantitative projects that form part 
of truth commissions will collect thousands of narrative statements, 
deconstruct the ‘grammar’ of human rights events into databases according 
to a ‘who did what to whom’ model, and then analyse the patterns of abuse 
that occurred according to the legal categories made explicit by the truth 
commission (see Ball et al. 2000; Landman 2006; Landman and Carvalho 
2009). These narratives, however, also contain additional qualitative 
information about how people were feeling when the events took place; 
the social, political and cultural context under which they occurred; and 
the long-term impact that the events had on the victim (if they survived), 
their families and friends. The narratives provide the human element to the 
tales of atrocity that capture the meaning of inter-personal violence, state-
repression and fear of non-state actors such as death squads, paramilitaries, 
guerrillas and other militants.
In my own view, the quantitative and qualitative approaches are a 
necessary part of any truth-telling process. Not only can the quantitative 
approach provide a macro-picture of the pattern of violations that have taken 
place, but can also, if done using particularly advanced forms of statistical 
analysis, reveal which groups were more responsible for the violations 
and which groups were more likely to be victims. For example, analysis 
conducted across three different samples of narratives in Guatemala showed 
that indigenous people were six times more likely to have been targeted by 
government forces (Ball 2000) and in Peru, indigenous people living in the 
mountainous region of Ayacucho made up nearly half of all the documented 
deaths (Ball et al. 2003; Landman 2006). Analytical statements such as these 
could not be made in the absence of quantitative analysis of narrative reports. 
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Equally, however, the true human element of periods documented by truth 
commissions also needs to be captured through other means. Qualitative 
methods of ethnography and in-depth interviewing provide unique insights 
into the mindset of perpetrators and victims alike and provide the kinds of 
rich understandings that complement the statistical estimations.
Types of justice and the impact of 
truth processes
Just as there are ‘varieties’ of truth that emerge from different methodological 
approaches, there is much variation in the understanding of justice and the 
impact that truth processes have on the politics and psyche of a country. 
The United Nations defines transitional justice as ‘the full set of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with 
a legacy of large-scale past abuse, in order to secure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation’ (United Nations 2004: 4). Here, there is 
a direct link, and in my view, tension between the goals of accountability, 
justice and reconciliation. A truth process can identify perpetrators, victims 
and survivors of large-scale violations of human rights, but then a series 
of question remain. What to do with the perpetrators? If the perpetrators 
are not tried, convicted and sentenced does that mean that there has not 
been justice? Does conviction and imprisonment hinder or help the process 
of reconciliation? Does justice include material redress for survivors and 
families of victims? What is a fair settlement figure for material redress?
There are many arguments for and against a conception of justice that 
includes conviction and imprisonment for perpetrators, or what is known as 
retributive justice. Three strong arguments for this kind of justice have been 
outlined by Sandoval Villaba (2011: 4)
 1 international law obliges states to investigate, prosecute and punish 
such crimes;
 2 reparation under international law includes bringing perpetrators to 
account
 3 accountability for past crimes is crucial to prevent such atrocities in 
the future
We have seen so far in this chapter that the two streams of the justice cascade 
have indeed fortified the legal basis for the first two of these arguments. The 
development of international law between the passage of the UN Charter 
and the establishment of the Rome Statute and the increasing use of tribunals 
and trials show that this notion of retributive justice is becoming entrenched 
and in many ways is an expected and appropriate response to mass atrocity. 
Human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch are strongly behind the 
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idea of retributive justice and have been critical of the use of amnesties, for 
example, since they undermine the basic principle of accountability for past 
crimes, which here is defined as a perpetrator receiving his or her ‘just deserts’. 
For example, in its report Adding Insult to Injury on the accountability for 
human rights violations committed in Nepal during its civil war, Human 
Rights Watch (2011: 3) says,
The Nepal authorities have argued that transitional justice mechanisms 
(a truth and reconciliation commission and a commission to investigate 
enforced disappearances, which are provided for in the CPA but not 
yet established) trump the normal criminal justice system in relation to 
widespread human rights abuses committed during the conflict period. 
This is in contradiction to findings by Nepal’s courts and provisions in 
international law.
Under its international obligations, Nepal is obliged to initiate 
investigations and criminally prosecute those responsible.2
There are strong arguments against the strict application of retributive 
justice. First, achieving the goals of peace and reconciliation can be seen 
as coming before justice in its strict sense, where peace brings an end to all 
out confrontation or repression, and reconciliation involves all sides on a 
conflict or regime transition to reach some sort of political accommodation 
that allows a country to move forward. Second, tribunals and trials take 
time, while countries often want to move forward with a new system 
quickly. Third, retributive justice, to be effective, must be impartial and not 
seen as vengeance wrought by those who are now in power. Engaging in 
vengeance can undermine the credibility of the new power holders as well 
as the foundations being laid for the new society.
An alternative and in some ways complementary form of justice is 
distributive justice, where some determination of economic costs of violations 
has been made and a material or financial contribution to the survivors and 
families of the victims can be offered. It is entirely possible to have conviction 
and sentencing of perpetrators alongside the payment of reparations. The 
legal obligation for reparations lies with both the state and the individual 
(see Sandoval Villalba 2011: 6). Reparations are not only directly financial 
in nature and can include health programmes, rehabilitation and restitution. 
It is also possible for external actors, such as wealthy countries to set up 
programmes for reparations to be carried in third countries. The issue of 
reparations is highly complex as it is difficult to put a financial figure next 
to egregious crimes that have been committed. There are also the issues of 
identifying the victims and the perpetrators with a degree of verification 
that could yield a payment of reparation. More importantly, working out 
policies for reparation can exacerbate political tensions and may threaten a 
political settlement; re-traumatize victims and/or exacerbate harm; lead to 
the social marginalization or exclusion of victims; and create tensions for 
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development or nation-building processes following a period of conflict or 
authoritarianism (Llif et al. 2011: 2).
A relatively new form of justice (for transitional countries anyway) is 
restorative justice. Unlike an adversarial or tribunal approach as in retributive 
justice, processes of restorative justice involve perpetrators and victims coming 
together and seeking reconciliation and mutual understanding. It is typically 
practised on a community level and is founded on a different understanding 
of crime as not only an act against another person, but also the community 
from which that person comes. It also recognizes the large ‘social dimension’ 
of crime and the collective as well as the individual responsibility for crime. 
The process itself involves dialogue and negotiation, where the outcome 
is about problem-solving and healing rather than punishment per se. This 
is a radically different way of addressing the question of truth and justice. 
Outcomes under such a process may well include some form of punishment 
for the perpetrator, but it is one that agrees through a process of dialogue 
and negotiation of all parties affected, rather than a ‘case’ being made to a 
tribunal that then reaches a judgement and passes a sentence.
As mentioned above, owing to an overwhelming number of cases in 
the Rwandan court system, community gaccaca courts have engaged in 
this form of restorative justice to heal the wounds of the large-scale inter-
ethnic violence that took place in 1994. In the United Kingdom, Jo Berry, 
daughter of Conservative MP Sir Anthony Berry, who was killed in an IRA 
bombing that took place in Brighton in 1984, has worked with IRA bomber 
Pat Magee. Magee was responsible for the bomb that killed her father and 
their work together promotes a process of conflict resolution that is very 
much like the restorative justice model outlined here. At a micro-level, Jo 
Berry has transcended individual emotions and difference to reach out to 
Pat Magee as a way of dealing with her own past. She also sees that they are 
both a product of larger systemic forces and that individual-level blame and 
discussions of culpability are not particularly helpful for making long-term 
progress. Such processes of restorative justice are becoming more prevalent 
in the areas of community crime, schools, care homes, etc. but it is clear that 
this model of reconciliation is equally applicable for large-scale atrocities 
committed during times of conflict or authoritarian rule.
Beyond these different notions of justice, what has been the impact of 
the different truth and justice mechanisms? Since as we have shown already 
in this volume, transitional processes are highly complex and contingent, 
where is it difficult to establish direct links between particular mechanism 
and particular outcomes (see, e.g. Cesarini 2009), but it is possible to 
explore changes within and across different countries that have variously 
engaged with truth and justice processes. Large-scale comparative analysis 
has shown statistically significant and positive benefits for the presence of 
particular truth and justice mechanisms. For example, for Latin America 
between 1976 and 2004, Sikkink (2011: 150–3) shows that the average level 
of human rights violations was much lower for countries that engaged in a 
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long-term process of prosecutions for past crimes. For a global sample, she 
finds that while the average level of human rights violations has decreased 
slightly between the 1980s and 2005, the levels of violations were higher than 
the global average for countries that did not have prosecutions and lower 
than the global average for countries that did have prosecutions (Sikkink 
2011: 183–8, 273–7). These results were obtained for a measure of truth 
commission experience and the cumulative total of prosecution years over 
the period of her analysis. In similar fashion, Olsen et al. (2010: 131–51) find 
that the adoption and implementation of truth and justice mechanisms in 
general have positive and statistically significant effects on both democracy 
and human rights, where levels of each are higher for countries that have 
undergone various combinations of truth and justice mechanisms.
These findings are for aggregate measures of democracy and human 
rights are of the kind we have already seen in Chapter 3 of this volume, but 
are their attitudinal and cultural impacts of the truth and justice processes? 
It is difficult to assess such an impact in the same broadly comparative way 
since individual level data across such as wide sample of countries have not 
yet been collected. There has been some systematic research using survey 
data after the experience of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 
South Africa (see Gibson 2004). This research conceptualizes and measures 
what is meant by ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’ for a sample of 3,700 South 
Africans. The analysis reveals three distinct sets of findings. First, there is a 
high level of consensus across the sample on the truth that was discovered by 
the TRC. Second, there was some degree of reconciliation achieved. Third, 
the truth process itself contributed to that understanding and acceptance of 
reconciliation (Gibson 2004).The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in 
South Africa has carried out a regular ‘Reconciliation Barometer’ since 2003, 
which gauges the progress of reconciliation across different issues areas, 
including human security, political culture and democratic consolidation, 
national unity and the legacy of Apartheid. Despite mixed results for the 
degree of progress on many of these issues (e.g. increases in physical security 
but decreases in economic security; growing confidence in some aspects of 
governance, but distrust of local government), the barometer, like the study 
by Gibson (2004), shows that South Africans want to have a unified country 
and that they agree that Apartheid committed crimes against humanity. But 
with respect to justice, the barometer shows that South Africans want more 
to be done to prosecute the perpetrators of those crimes (see IRJ 2010).
Other country studies that do not utilize attitudinal data also find complex 
feelings and understandings of truth and justice processes alongside other features 
of transition. Historical analyses of Spain, Germany, Austria, Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua show remarkably different national experiences with confronting the 
past. In some cases (Spain), a policy of selective amnesia has prevailed, in others 
(Germany) direct and ‘top-down’ confrontation with the past has been fruitful 
in promoting reconciliation, while in others (Austria) absence of confrontation 
with the past means that authoritarian tendencies can haunt the present (see 
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Aguilar 1996; Sa’adah 1998; Cruz 2005; Art 2005 as discussed in Cesarini 
2009). Such variation in outcome and impact of transitional justice processes is 
not surprising given the many different experiences with atrocity that countries 
have had and the many paths that they have pursued in dealing with the past.
summary
Truth and justice remain contested and partial concepts. They are partial 
since the whole truth of what has happened can never be known and every 
last perpetrator can never be prosecuted. They are contested since that 
which is uncovered will be differently understood and ‘owned’ by different 
segments of society, while the actual judicial outcomes (if they take place) 
will not satisfy everyone. As we have seen, the decision to adopt a truth 
and justice mechanism (or mechanisms), the defining mandate and scope 
for the process and its eventual impact are subject to great variation across 
the world. Despite this variation, however, the record shows that countries 
continue to embrace truth and justice mechanisms of some kind as they seek 
to redress past wrongs. As countries such as those that comprise the Arab 
Spring (or the notable case of Burma) undergo remarkable and dramatic 
political change, the ensuing years will involve these societies coming to 
terms with their past, building a new future that recognizes that past and 
finding some way to prevent atrocities from ever happening again.
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The previous chapters have mapped out the advance (and setbacks) of 
democracy and human rights, the reasons (and explanations) for that 
advance and the attempts across many countries (through mechanisms for 
transitional justice) to redress the past wrongs that have been committed 
during periods of authoritarianism, conflict and foreign occupation. These 
accounts have shown a general positive and encouraging trend in global 
politics and certainly the regime change and dramatic developments in the 
Middle East and North Africa are seen as yet another reason to be optimistic 
about the overall direction of this trend. But as this is a cautiously optimistic 
book, it must be realistic in also considering the fact that there remain 
significant threats to the long-term sustainability of both democracy and 
human rights. These threats involve forces that are internal to democracy 
and the tensions between democracy and human rights. These threats also 
involve forces that are external to democracy that relate to a larger set of 
global transformations that have and that are taking place. The threats can 
be grouped as follows:
 1 inter-state and intra-state conflict;
 2 economic globalization and inequality;
 3 global terrorism and its response;
 4 environmental degradation and climate change;
Each of these threats is considered in terms of their internal and external 
impacts on democracy and human rights. We will see that the primary 
threat to the protection of personal integrity rights is intra-state conflict, 
which in itself is not too surprising given high levels of violence that are 
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experienced in times of civil war and other internal conflicts (e.g. one 
need only look at the violence of the conflict in Syria between the Assad 
regime and the Free Syrian Army in 2012). We will see that structural 
inequalities between countries and that poverty and inequality within 
countries related to processes of economic globalization can undermine 
the ability for the full exercise of human rights as well as the quality 
of democracy itself. While global terrorism presents a direct threat to 
democracy and security around the world (Enders and Sandler 2005), 
the response to the terrorist threat among the world’s democracies has 
undermined the very rights commitments that were the hallmarks of 
the twentieth century (Sands 2006; Brysk and Shafir 2007). Finally, the 
Rio 20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 
showed that the challenge of sustainable development is at the forefront 
of policymakers’ minds as the world finds ways in which to increase 
economic abundance and raise overall levels of welfare without long-term 
adverse effects on the environment. But the links between consumption, 
poverty, rights and democracy mean that there are additional political 
and legal challenges to the quest for sustainability. Let us consider these 
different threats and pitfalls in turn.
Conflict
Armed conflict of one type or another has been a constant feature of world 
politics. The twentieth century was a very bloody century indeed, and any 
kind of armed conflict poses a direct threat to democracy and the enjoyment 
of human rights (see Keane 2004). Not only do different kinds of armed 
conflict lead to the deprivation of the fundamental right to life, but countries 
in conflict have additional problems in the guarantee of ‘physical integrity 
rights’ on a day-to-day basis as state and non-state actors commit a variety 
of atrocities (see Poe and Tate 1994). Civil war has been identified as the 
most significant explanation for high levels of violation of these rights while 
other kinds of domestic conflict are also positively related to higher levels 
of integrity rights violations (see Poe and Tate 1994; Landman 2005b; 
Landman and Larizza 2009). While states engage in greater repression 
during times of conflict, which leads to higher levels of human rights abuse, 
democracies tend to use less repression than authoritarian states (Davenport 
2007). Nevertheless, the existence of conflict and the prevalence of human 
rights abuse can threaten the quality and stability of democracy if conflict 
remains prolonged and the violations that have taken place are widespread 
and egregious.
For example, in the case of Peru, successive democratic governments 
between 1980 and 1992 sought to combat the Maoist insurgency Sendero 
Luminoso while also trying to consolidate democratic rule. The conflict 
between the government and the rebels led to a large number of killings, 
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estimated between 61,007 and 77,552, where the state was found to be 
responsible for 30 per cent of the violence overall (see Ball et al. 2003). 
The conflict led to the breakdown of democracy in 1992, followed by the 
ousting of President Fujimori in 2000 and process of transitional justice 
under the auspices of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
In similar fashion, the conflict in Colombia between the state, the rebels, the 
paramilitaries and the drug cartels has been a constant threat to democratic 
stability in a country that established democracy in 1959 after a prolonged 
civil conflict known as La Violencia (see Hartlyn 1989; Roldán 2002; 
Roldán 2010). In contrast to Peru, Colombia has not succumbed to outright 
authoritarian rule and has had regular elections, the formation of new 
political movements and rising visibility for previously marginalized groups 
such as ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians and evangelical Christians 
(Roldán 2010: 63–4). However, the country has seen an increase in the use 
of authoritarian and antidemocratic policies in the face of increasing levels 
of violence, as Roldán (2010: 80) notes:
. . . the existence or threat of violence can very effectively be used to 
justify the expansion of executive powers, the restriction of civil rights, 
and the suppression or demonization of dissent, while appearing to do so 
in defense of democracy and political stability.
Beyond these two examples, what kinds of conflict are there in the world? 
And is the level of conflict getting better or worse? While definitions vary, 
there are effectively four different types of armed conflict in the world: 
(1) inter-state conflict, (2) intra-state conflict, (3) international intra-state 
conflict and (4) extra-systemic conflict (see Themnér and Wallensteen 
2012).1 Inter-state conflict involves armed conflict between two or more 
countries, where the primary belligerents are the states themselves. Intra-
state conflict involves the government of a country and a non-governmental 
party (typically rebel group, guerrilla organization, separatist movement, 
etc.) where the conflict itself remains within the jurisdictional territory of 
that country. International intrastate conflict involves the government of 
the country and a non-governmental party, but also involves troop support 
from a third country for the government, the non-governmental party or 
both disputants. Finally, extra-systemic conflict involves a state and a non-
state group that is outside its own territory, such as in colonial conflicts. It 
is clear that each of these different types of conflicts represents a threat to 
democracy and human rights, but each has not been equally prevalent. The 
most popular form of conflict is intra-state conflict, which between 1946 
and 2011 varied between approximately 15 conflicts and over 50, followed 
by inter-state conflict, extra-systemic (which ceased in 1974 with the fall of 
the Salazar government in Portugal) and international intra-state. Intra-state 
conflicts reached a peak of over 50 in the early 1990s and have declined to 
roughly 30 through the latter 1990s and early years of the twentieth century. 
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Inter-state conflicts have declined dramatically, while international intra-
state conflicts have become more prevalent (see Figure 8.1).
Terrorism
Domestic and international terrorism has been an enduring feature 
of politics long before the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 
September 2001. Democracies and non-democracies alike have suffered 
various forms of terrorist violence from sectarian groups (e.g. Northern 
Ireland), separatist movements (e.g. the Basque Country in Spain), urban 
guerrillas (e.g. the Tupamaros in Argentina), leftist groups (e.g. the Red 
Brigades in Italy), rightist groups and individuals (e.g. Timothy McVeigh 
in the United States or Anders Behring Breivik in Norway) and various 
forms of Islamist terrorism such as that which the world has experienced 
from Al-Qaeda; itself an ill-defined and amorphous network of terror cells 
operating around the world (see Holmes 2009). While terrorists carry out 
attacks on many different countries, there have been a large number of 
analyses that have examined whether democracies are more vulnerable to 
terrorist attack than non-democracies. Indeed, the logical combination of 
lower costs and bigger gains for terrorists makes democracies more likely 
to be attacked. The idea of lower costs comes from the assumption of the 
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open and free societies that makes it easier for terrorists to organize within 
them. The idea of bigger gains comes from the assumption that democracies 
need to respond in order to satisfy their publics and thus a targeted terrorist 
attack can reap the publicity benefits from such democratic response 
(see Plümper and Neumayer 2009). Comparative and statistical analysis 
using data on terrorist events and regime type has shown that countries 
classified as democracies are subjected to more terrorist attacks than those 
classified as non-democracies (see Pape 2003; Enders and Sandler 2006; 
Marshall and Gurr 2006; Li 2005). One consequence of this finding has 
been to think of democracies as having to confront a fundamental dilemma 
between security and liberty and that to increase security democracies must 
therefore decrease liberty.
Alternative analysis suggests otherwise. It is not clear that democracy 
as a system is the target for terrorists. Rather it is the national citizen 
from particular countries with high strategic value that makes particular 
countries more vulnerable to attack. Thus, in order to assess the relative 
vulnerability to terrorist attack, analysis needs to examine with whom a 
country is allied, whether the ally is powerful and whether that ally is also 
a democracy. Once this is done, it is clear that countries with powerful 
democratic allies (i.e. friends with United States and the United Kingdom) 
are more likely to be attacked (see Plümper and Neumayer 2009). Indeed, 
controlling for the alliance structure shows that if the terrorist’s home 
country is a democracy, the likelihood of attack decreases, and if the 
target country is a democracy, then the likelihood of attack becomes non-
significant (Ibid., 86–90). Taking the alliance structure into account thus 
undermines the strong case for restricting liberties.
Regardless the assumptions, theories and statistical findings about 
democracy and terrorism, the attacks on 9/11 fundamentally changed global 
politics in ways that have threatened the long-term sustainability of democracy 
and protection of human rights. The 9/11 attacks posed an immediate but not 
necessarily existential threat to the United States or to American democracy 
per se. The swift response in the United States and many other democracies 
(e.g. the United Kingdom, Israel, Spain, Canada and Germany), however, was 
to seek ways in which to enhance executive power and curb individual rights 
in order to fight terrorism more effectively. Typically, legislation sought to 
grant governments the power to detain individuals suspected of being engaged 
in terrorist activity indefinitely and without charge. Arbitrary detention of this 
kind, however, is prohibited across a wide range of international human rights 
instruments (e.g. Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights); and it is a typical right that receives full protection in national 
democratic constitutions and historically dates back to the Magna Carta of 
1215. While the obligation to uphold this particular right can be suspended 
during times of emergency if and only if a state is facing an existential threat, 
other rights, such as the right to life, freedom from slavery or servitude and 
privacy remain protected (see Landman 2007b: 90).
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Despite these constraints, many democracies have restricted liberties in 
the post-9/11 period and their mass publics initially supported the enactment 
of legislation that restricted them. With time, however, there has been a quiet 
‘judicial revolution’ among many democracies that has led to a rollback 
of the more draconian human rights restrictions. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, various anti-terrorism acts passed during the New Labour 
Government between 1997 and 2010 sought to empower the government 
to detain terror suspects indefinitely. The government made permanent all 
preceding anti-terror legislation through the Terrorism Act 2000, before the 
9/11 attacks on the United States. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks (and 
alongside the 2004 Madrid bombing and 2005 London terror attacks), the 
government argued that Britain was facing an existential threat that should 
allow it to suspend its rights obligation under Article 5 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees the right to liberty and 
security (see Ghandhi 2002: 216). Initially, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001 gave the government the power to detain foreign terror 
suspects indefinitely; a power which was expanded to include all terror 
suspects after the Law Lords deemed the previous power as discriminatory. 
But even this power was found by the Law Lords to be ‘disproportionate’ 
and that the government failed to make the case that the United Kingdom 
was indeed under an existential threat. Subsequent anti-terror bills sought 
to empower the government to detain terror suspects for different lengths of 
time, including 90 days, 42 days and 28 days. The political debates during 
the passage of this legislation led to the first defeat of the Blair government 
in the House of Commons (see Landman 2007a: 83–7).
The UK case is not unique in the types of restrictions democracies have 
sought to bring to fight terrorism. Indeed between 2001 and 2008, 20 
established democracies in North America, Europe and the Pacific have 
enacted laws that have increasingly placed restrictions on different categories 
of liberties, including privacy rights, procedural rights and rights for 
immigrants and foreigners (Epifanio 2011). The total number of restrictions 
varies between 1 and 28 with an average number of approximately 13 
restrictions across the sample of democracies, where countries such as 
the United States and United Kingdom have enacted the most number 
of restrictions and the Scandinavian countries, Canada and Switzerland 
the least (see Epifanio 2011; Epifanio et al. 2012). In some cases, however, 
the separation of powers as well as supranational legal authorities such as the 
European Court of Human Rights has meant that national and international 
judiciaries have been able to scrutinize the rights restrictions put in place by 
governments after 9/11. The initial impulse to curb liberties as the solution 
to fighting terrorism has been tempered by legal analysis and judgements 
which have found the key arguments for rights restrictions on the basis of 
threats to security wanting. In US domestic anti-terror policy, represented 
must notably by the Patriot Acts of 2001 and 2004, lower court challenges 
to provisions on material support to terrorist organizations (even if such 
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support is training in non-violence) have been overturned by the US Supreme 
Court (see Holder v Humanitarian Law Project 2009); however, in US v 
Jones (2012), the court held that secret deployment of a GPS tracking device 
on a suspect’s car violated the 4th Amendment protection to privacy found 
in the US Constitution. While not a direct challenge to the Patriot Act itself, 
the court’s ruling addresses an underlying desire among law enforcement 
agencies to use new technological means to pursue potential criminals and 
terrorists on US soil. The ruling curbs the use of these technologies on the 
grounds the right to privacy.
The more significant challenges to US anti-terror policy have come from 
the US Supreme cases regarding the detainees at the Guantanamo Bay 
facility. In its pursuit of terrorism after the 2001 invasion of the Afghanistan, 
the United States redefined individuals as ‘enemy combatants’ in order to 
circumvent the international law of armed conflict most notably found in 
the various Geneva Conventions. Rights guarantees normally enjoyed by 
prisoners of war were suspended for enemy combatants, many of whom 
were taken to third countries to be interrogated with the use of torture 
(i.e. ‘extraordinary rendition’) and/or ended up in the detention facility in 
Guantanamo Bay, where they stayed without judicial proceedings for many 
years. Across four separate cases – Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), Rasul v. Bush 
(2004) Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) and Boumediene v Bush (2008) – the 
US Supreme Court challenged the Bush administration’s denial of detainees’ 
right to challenge their detention, the use of military tribunals and the denial 
of habeas corpus. All but 169 detainees have now been released, and in May 
2009, President Obama ordered that the facility be closed:
For over seven years, we have detained hundreds of people at Guantánamo. 
During that time, the system of Military Commissions at Guantánamo 
succeeded in convicting a grand total of three suspected terrorists. Let 
me repeat that: three convictions in over seven years. Instead of bringing 
terrorists to justice, efforts at prosecution met setbacks, cases lingered 
on, and in 2006 the Supreme Court invalidated the entire system. 
Meanwhile, over five hundred and twenty-five detainees were released 
from Guantánamo under the Bush Administration. Let me repeat that: 
two-thirds of the detainees were released before I took office and ordered 
the closure of Guantánamo.
There is also no question that Guantánamo set back the moral authority 
that is America’s strongest currency in the world. Instead of building a 
durable framework for the struggle against al Qaeda that drew upon 
our deeply held values and traditions, our government was defending 
positions that undermined the rule of law. Indeed, part of the rationale 
for establishing Guantánamo in the first place was the misplaced notion 
that a prison there would be beyond the law – a proposition that the 
Supreme Court soundly rejected. Meanwhile, instead of serving as a tool 
to counter terrorism, Guantánamo became a symbol that helped al Qaeda 
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recruit terrorists to its cause. Indeed, the existence of Guantánamo likely 
created more terrorists around the world than it ever detained.
So the record is clear: rather than keep us safer, the prison at 
Guantánamo has weakened American national security. It is a rallying cry 
for our enemies. It sets back the willingness of our allies to work with us 
in fighting an enemy that operates in scores of countries. By any measure, 
the costs of keeping it open far exceed the complications involved in 
closing it. That is why I argued that it should be closed throughout my 
campaign. And that is why I ordered it closed within one year.
In the time that has passed since that speech, the facility has not been closed, 
as it would appear that the ‘costs of keeping it open’ have not exceeded the 
‘complications involved in closing it’; and it is not clear if, when or how the 
remaining detainees will be tried and or released. Alongside the redefinition 
of individuals that led to the creation of Guantánamo, officials in the US 
justice department sought to redefine particular forms of interrogation 
techniques, such as ‘waterboarding’ as not constituting torture, and this 
perception and the attitudes that accompanied it created an environment 
in which the scandal at the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq was made possible 
(see Greenberg and Dratel 2005). Again, in his May 2009 speech, President 
Obama declared that such practices were to be banned and stated ‘We must 
leave these methods where they belong – in the past. They are not who we 
are. They are not America’.
Obama’s speech does raise a number of significant points concerning how 
the anti-terror foreign policy of the United States has undermined the values 
and principles of democracy that it has sought to promote in the world (see 
Chapter 6 this volume). But he also defends the necessary balance that is 
required between and among accountability, transparency and security:
I ran for President promising transparency, and I meant what I said. 
And that’s why, whenever possible, my administration will make all 
information available to the American people so that they can make 
informed judgments and hold us accountable. But I have never argued – 
and I never will – that our most sensitive national security matters should 
simply be an open book. I will never abandon – and will vigorously 
defend – the necessity of classification to defend our troops at war, to 
protect sources and methods, and to safeguard confidential actions that 
keep the American people safe. Here’s the difference though: Whenever 
we cannot release certain information to the public for valid national 
security reasons, I will insist that there is oversight of my actions – by 
Congress or by the courts.
It would appear that with respect to the Obama Administration’s use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or ‘drones’ to attack suspected terrorist 
strongholds in places such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, the balance 
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has been towards security rather than transparency. Indeed, between 2008 
and 2012, the United States has carried out over 300 drone attacks in 
Pakistan, more than 40 attacks in Yemen (although there are many more 
unconfirmed attacks) and fewer than 10 attacks in Somalia (Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/; see also 
Becker and Shane 2012). The death toll varies depending on the use of 
different sources, where it is estimated that between 2,545 and 3,285 people 
killed have been in Pakistan, 339 to 977 people have been killed in Yemen 
and 58 to 169 people have been killed in Somalia. The contrast between 
the stated principles in the May 2009 speech and the reality of the use of 
drone attacks is stark. While President Obama oversees and approves each 
decision to attack using drones, there are an increasing number of concerns 
being raised about the utility of the policy and the potential moral and 
ethical dilemmas it raises (see Becker and Shane 2012).
Domestic and international terrorism poses a huge threat to democracy 
and human rights, where attacks on democracies have and can cause great 
loss of life and can create an extreme climate of fear, where levels of trust 
in fellow citizens decline, suspicion of ‘the other’ rises and an overall sense 
of insecurity prevails. The negative consequences of the persistent threat of 
terrorism, brought home in high relief since the 9/11 attacks, undermines 
the safety and security promised by democracy (see Chapters 9 and 10 
this volume). The response to terrorism from the world’s most established 
democracies has undermined fundamental principles of the rule of law, 
accountability and protection of human rights. When established democracies 
curb liberties in the name of security and cooperate with non-democratic 
and rights-abusive states in the name of the ‘war on terror’, strong signals 
are sent about the devaluing of fundamental rights commitments that have 
been the outcome of centuries of struggle (see Ishay 2008 and Sands 2006). 
When larger geo-strategic interests related to the ‘war on terror’ prevail, the 
true victims are the norms, morals, values and rights upon which modern 
democracies are meant to be based.
economic globalization
The world has been changing in an increasingly inter-connected fashion 
since the middle of the twentieth century. While inter-connectedness has 
always been a feature of the world of states (see Held et al. 1999), the 
pace of economic and technological advance in the latter half of the last 
century until now has meant that states are now more than ever affected by 
developments in other states. The volume and flow of information, capital, 
tastes, fashions, ideas and people between and among countries means that 
domestic political systems (of whatever kind) have become increasingly 
subject to outside influence. Economic globalization forms a large part of 
these dramatic developments and involves the flow of capital, labour and 
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tastes in ways that have implications for domestic politics and domestic 
regime dynamics. There has been much debate about the possible impact of 
economic globalization on democracy, with arguments for overall positive 
effects, negative effects and neutral (or no) effects (Li and Reuveny 2003). 
Drawing on the discussion in Chapter 5 in this volume, positive arguments 
make an indirect link between globalization and democracy through the idea 
that globalization promotes economic development, which in turn promotes 
democracy. Alongside such positive economic factors are additional factors 
relating to penetration of international business, lower information costs 
and the diffusion of democratic values, decentralization and the reduction 
of incentives for authoritarian leaders to remain in power (Li and Reuveny 
2003: 33). Arguments for no effect suggest that states are simply less 
vulnerable to global changes than suggested and that globalization itself 
has been exaggerated (Ibid., 38). The arguments for a negative impact of 
globalization include a reduction in state autonomy, internal inequalities 
and ethnic conflicts, destabilization of domestic balance of payments and a 
widening gap between rich and poor countries (Ibid., 35.).
This latter category of critique is worth closer examination for our 
present purposes on the threats and pitfalls that confront contemporary 
democracies and their ability to promote and protect human rights. There 
is a general consensus that global distribution of income is highly unequal, 
where various estimates suggest that the top 20 per cent of the richest 
countries in the world have roughly 80 per cent of global income; however, 
there is much debate and disagreement over (a) why this state of affairs has 
come about, (b) whether and how this is a problem and (c) whether trends 
are getting better or worse. The theory of free markets suggests that some 
inequality is natural but that through the free flow of economic resources, 
market competition will reach an equilibrium in which in the long run, 
inequality between states will decrease. Counter-arguments suggest that the 
assumption of a ‘free flow’ of goods and information is flawed and that 
powerful states have controlled market advantage through the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1946 and 1986 and now 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was created as part of the 
1986 Uruguay round. Such control has yielded a continuing dominance of 
wealthy countries over the share of overall global income. The overall trends 
in income distribution have changed. In his now famous book, The Bottom 
Billion, Paul Collier (2008) argues that 1 billion rich people face a world 
of five billion poor people, but that even more importantly, the ‘bottom’ 
billion people (i.e. the poorest billion people in the world) are indeed getting 
poorer, even though overall global wealth has risen.
This structure of the global economy suggests that opportunities vary 
greatly for people around the world and that this difference in opportunity 
will have an impact on political stability, political institutions and for the 
topic of this volume, democracy and human rights. In the 1960s, ‘dependency’ 
theory made the same observation about the structure of the world economy 
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and argued that it would be harder for developing countries to make progress 
in the face of this persistent structure. While this idea was largely dismissed 
by neo-liberal economic theory and analysis through the 1980s and early 
1990s (see, e.g. Brohman 1996; Cammack 1997; Meier and Stiglitz 2001; 
Stiglitz 2002, 2012), a focus on the links between structure of the global 
economy and the politics of development persisted. In the 1990s, analyses 
showed that the overall economic benefits of development for democracy 
were different for countries that occupied different positions within the 
global economic system (see, e.g. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Foweraker 
and Landman 2004). The positive relationship between development and 
democracy of the kind discussed in Chapter 5 in this volume appears to be 
strongest for countries in the ‘core’ of the global economic system (i.e. the 
world’s richest countries), followed by those on the ‘semi-periphery’ (i.e. 
middle income countries) and ‘periphery’ (i.e. the least developed countries). 
In practice, this means that democracies that do form in these peripheral 
economies may well have greater challenges to overcome and may well need 
more time to consolidate democratic rule. Since these studies, Collier (2008) 
has shown that the peripheral countries that largely comprise the ‘bottom 
billion’ have actually become poorer, which makes their probability of either 
establishing or maintaining democracy lower than before.
Global comparative analysis has also shown that poorer countries have 
higher levels of human rights violations (see, e.g. Mitchell and McCormick 
1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Landman 2004; Davenport 2007). While the 
exact causal mechanism that explains this relationship has not been fully 
specified, it is reasonable to argue that poor countries lack the necessary 
resources for the kinds of institutions and infrastructure required for the 
promotion and protection of human rights. All human rights cost money 
and therefore require tax and government revenue to invest in the judiciary, 
health service, prisons, schools, etc. in order for rights to be realized (see 
Donnelly 1999; Holmes and Sunstein 2000; Landman and Carvalho 
2009). It is also reasonable to argue that greater economic resource 
allows governments to satisfy competing demands from groups in society 
and thus create conditions in which the probability of overt conflict and 
associated forms of human rights abuse to be reduced. In both cases, poor 
countries struggle to make the kinds of investments that provide strong 
institutions for rights-protective governance and conflict resolution and as 
a consequence, may well see greater levels of human rights abuse than their 
richer counterparts.
Beyond these broader impacts on democracy and human rights associated 
with the structure of the global economy, internal disparities of income 
can also threaten democracy and the protection of human rights. There 
are various arguments from the academic literature on political violence, 
inequality and human rights violations that come together around this 
key question. At a micro (or individual)-level, there are incentives for the 
‘haves’ in society to engage in rent-seeking behaviour within governmental 
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institutions, to maintain control of their resources and to exclude access 
to those resources by the ‘have nots’ in ways that use coercive means that 
undermine the protection of personal integrity rights (see Heinisch 1998; 
Henderson 1991: 125; Poe 2004). The distribution, accumulation and 
defence of resource allocation at the micro-level are historically driven and 
when aggregated to the macro level, suggest that the means for maintaining 
these patterns of distribution may well include violations of civil liberties and 
personal integrity rights. In the context of many lesser-developed countries, 
there can be state complicity and even collaboration in acts of coercion. 
In following this line of argument, Landman and Larizza (2009) find that 
there is indeed a strong relationship between high levels of income and land 
inequality on the one hand and the violation of personal integrity rights on 
the other for a global sample of countries between 1980 and 2004. Stiglitz 
(2012) argues further that persistent inequality threatens democracy as large 
segments of a disaffected and marginalized population loses its ability to 
participate in democracy and thus erodes the fundamental principles upon 
which it is founded: popular sovereignty and collective decision-making (see 
Chapter 3). Thus, in addition to the structural threats to democracy among 
the world’s poorest countries, there are domestic threats to democracy 
and human rights that can come from persistent disparities in income 
distribution.
The economic crisis that began in 2007 among the wealthy democracies 
and the ‘Eurozone’ crisis that followed thereafter also need to be seen in this 
context. Popular movements such as the Occupy Movement are making their 
case on the grounds of persistent and increasing economic disparity. The 
‘99% versus 1%’ discursive construction raises questions about government 
policies that have redistributed wealth upwards, and some of the more 
heavy-handed repressive responses in American cities such as Oakland and 
Davis California have led some to worry about the nature and quality of 
American democracy. In Europe, the pursuit of economic austerity alongside 
the bailouts of major banks and high rates of unemployment in countries 
such as Greece, Spain and Portugal have led to popular protests and a 
critique of market capitalism and representative democracy. The economic 
and Eurozone crises in my view are not crises of democracy but are crises 
for democracy, which is to say, these crises developed through increasingly 
unregulated forms of economic activity (e.g. sub-prime mortgage lending, 
over-exposure and easy extension of credit), absence of accountability 
among particular governments (e.g. Greece) and rapidly changing economic 
circumstances that were arguably beyond the control of any one government. 
They are a problem for democracy since democratic governments in the 
countries affected by the crises now need to respond. Their uncertain and 
cyclical nature as they move through the electoral cycle means that any 
response will be partial and subject to ideological differences (e.g. compare 
the approach of the coalition government elected in the United Kingdom 
in 2010 to the French approach under President Hollande). Democratic 
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governments need to find solutions to these problems in the face of persistent 
unemployment that limit the scope for economic opportunity as economies 
struggle to recover, both of which may bring increased pressure on existing 
governments and a critique of democracy itself. Austerity programmes are 
creating problems of service delivery to the poor and marginalized sectors 
of society, which can undermine fundamental rights commitments found 
in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights (see 
Chapter 3).
Climate change
The final large and long-term threat to democracy comes in the form 
of climate change and environmental sustainability more generally. A 
number of different studies have identified the current precarious state of 
a large proportion of the world’s population that is directly linked to the 
environment and the relative scarcity of natural resources (Green Economy 
Coalition 2012). We saw above that the well-being of at least a billion 
people has gotten worse, where some estimates suggest that 1.2 billion 
people live in poverty, of whom 70 per cent depend on natural resources 
for all or part of their livelihoods (World Bank 2011). This dependence on 
natural resources means that any further decline in those resources will 
have a direct impact on the basic survival of a large part of the world’s 
population. In addition, 2.6 billion people lack access to good quality 
sanitation, 1.3 billion people lack access to electricity and 0.9 billion lack 
access to clean water (UNDP 2011), which compounds problems associated 
with water-borne diseases (e.g. high levels of infant mortality) and other 
ailments linked to poor hygiene and absence of clean water. At current 
rates of consumption, decline in natural resources is likely to continue for 
some time, as for 2010 alone, the ‘ecological footprint’ (i.e. an aggregate 
measure of environmental damage) was ‘52% greater than the capacity of 
the planet to replenish natural resources and absorb pollution and waste’ 
(Green Economy Coalition 2012: 4).
But what do all these trends in poverty and environmental change mean 
for democracy and human rights. The direct link between poverty, livelihoods 
and the environment means that the exercise of social and economic rights 
is limited if not absent for large proportions of the world’s population. 
Constraints on the exercise of these rights can limit the exercise of other 
rights, such as the right to education and the right to participation. Poor 
people have less access to basic education, which means levels of literacy 
required for meaningful participation in politics is naturally reduced or 
compromised. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action 
claims in Paragraph 8 that ‘Democracy, development and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing’. If this is the case empirically (which we have seen in this 
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volume is a complicated set of relationships), then limited exercise of social 
and economic rights owing to persistent and growing poverty will limit the 
exercise of other human rights and ultimately, the quality of democracy 
itself. Reduced or absent participation and inclusion undermines one of the 
fundamental principles of democracy as noted above and in Chapter 3. In 
this way, there is an inter-relationship between and among environmental 
consumption and decline, poverty and social exclusion and rights and 
democracy. The quality of democracy itself is thrown into doubt when 
meaningful participation is restricted only to those who have the material 
means to do so.
Moreover, the continued competition for natural resources as more and 
more countries develop economically represents long-term risk and a threat 
to democracy. So-called resource wars as competing groups and countries 
fight for continued access to natural resources needed for energy can lead 
to a new round of violent conflicts in the world and threaten the protection 
of human rights and democracy. Between 1980 and 2005, for example, 
there were 73 conflicts in which environmental factors played a key part, 
including water use, land use, biological diversity and fish resources (WBGU 
2008: 31). These different conflicts involved diplomatic crises, protests that 
included some violence, violent conflicts and systematic and collective use of 
violence (Ibid., 31). Both the level (or intensity) and the number of conflicts 
tend to be higher in the lesser developed countries in the world, where a low 
level of economic development increases the risk of conflict within societies 
(Ibid., 36, see also Collier and Heoffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
This interaction between poverty, climate change and conflict represents a 
significant threat both to the long-term sustainability of democracy and the 
progressive realization of human rights.
summary
It is clear that these different threats to democracy and human rights are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, conflict, inequality, terrorism 
and environmental degradation form a complex web of challenges for 
democracy and the protection of human rights. Individuals are rights 
holders and states are duty bearers, while each of these threats on their own 
and taken together impinge on the ability of the rights holder to exercise 
his or her rights and challenge the ability of the duty bearers to meet their 
obligations. Inequalities and the power differentials that are associated with 
them intersect with democracies in ways that create and reinforce unfair 
outcomes that in many ways are inconsistent with values of democracy and 
human rights. Conflict and terrorism present direct threats to the right to 
life. The response to terrorism limits the exercise of rights in the name of 
security. Poverty, inequality and environmental degradation can have direct 
and indirect effects on individuals depending on their relative level of poverty 
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and opportunity. The compromise of rights inherent in the vulnerability of 
the world’s poorest billion people can have long-lasting impact on their 
well-being, social mobility and meaningful participation in the way they are 
governed. Any book on democracy and human rights, however optimistic, 
needs to be realistic and acknowledge these threats and pitfalls and the 
challenges they represent for the future of governance. The next chapter will 
examine the benefits and outcomes of democracy before concluding with an 
overall assessment of the hopes and challenges that the world faces at this 
critical juncture.
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We have seen throughout this book that increasingly larger numbers of 
people around the world have over the last four decades or so expressed a 
desire and have acted on that desire to establish and maintain democracy, 
as well as articulate a set of human rights that have become increasingly 
codified in and adjudicated through international law. The growth of 
democracy and the proliferation of human rights instruments (quite apart 
from their actual protection) are indicators of both the attractiveness of 
these ideas and achievement in their realization; however, what are the 
benefits and outcomes that ordinary people can expect from their own 
country making a transition to democracy and establishing a more rights-
protective regime? In short, cui bono? Who benefits? And to what extent 
do they benefit? Do all good things come together? Or are their trade-offs 
between the normative achievements of establishing democracy and the 
realization of human rights on the one hand and real material benefits 
and outcomes on the other? There is an emerging global consensus that 
democracy is good for developmental outcomes and is seen as the preferable 
political system for the achievement of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGS), but is this necessarily the case? In the post-2015 era will 
the new Sustainable Development Goals include democratic governance as 
an end in itself or also as a means to an end?
This chapter seeks to address these questions and considers the benefits 
and outcomes associated with greater democracy and more rights-protective 
regimes. First, it begins with a discussion of the non-material and normative 
benefits associated with democracy and human rights. Second, it discusses 
the main findings of the democratic peace research, which shows both the 
international and domestic pacifying effects of democracy. Third, it examines 
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the overall benefits associated with having rights-protective regimes in 
place, especially with respect to economic distortions prevalent among 
market capitalist societies. Fourth, it outlines the main economic benefits 
of democracy with respect to poverty and famine, as well as the human-
related elements of sustainable human development. Finally, it considers the 
mixed record with respect to the environment, where it is becoming evident 
that democracy makes a positive difference in reducing environmental 
degradation among the wealthy countries of the world, but among the poor 
countries, its benefits have not yet been realized.
democracy qua democracy
Democracy has a number of internal values whose actual value to individuals 
is often intangible and difficult to measure. In talking to individuals in new 
democracies, there is a palpable sense of exaltation about just being able to 
move about without the constant fear of repression or suspicion of one’s 
actions. Beyond this micro- and personal sense of democracy, citizens in 
newly democratized countries value their ability to participate and it is 
typical during first elections after a prolonged period of authoritarianism 
that citizen turnout is quite high. The media depict scenes of long queues 
of voters exercising their rights for the first time, or in the case of a return 
to democracy, exercising their rights once again. Comparative analysis 
has shown that there is convergence in turnout rates between established 
democracies and other states (see IDEA 2002). While turnout itself is a 
crude measure of participation and subject to influence from mandatory 
registration and mandatory voting laws across a variety of different 
countries, it does provide a first insight into a key dimension of participation. 
Figure 9.1 shows that average global turnout rates over time for presidential 
and parliamentary elections have seen a secular decline over the last few 
decades, while the average level of democracy has risen across the same 
period. For the whole period, the average turnout for both parliamentary 
and presidential elections is approximately 70 per cent, which in relative 
terms is remarkably high.
Beyond formal participation through voting, which is also something 
that is available across a large number of non-democracies in the world, 
democracy allows for a wide range of alternative forms of participation, 
such as public inquiries, petitions, social movement activity, voluntary 
associations, participatory budgeting and other forms of activity in the 
public sphere in which the separation between the state and the citizen 
becomes more blurred than in non-democratic systems as multiple entry 
points are available for influencing government policy. There is great value 
associated with these kinds of participation and the rights that make them 
possible, such as freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of 
speech and freedom of information among others. Moreover, the mere fact 
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of knowing that one can participate in the political system is of great value 
to individuals who suddenly find themselves within a new democracy.
Closely associated with participation is the notion of accountability, 
which concerns the degree to which elected politicians and state officials can 
be held to account for their actions. This value can be achieved through a 
variety of ways, including the electoral process itself, through parliamentary 
committees, the courts and judicial system, special ombudsman offices and 
other specialized watchdog agencies (see IDEA 2008: 24). Knowing that 
one can ask questions, find answers and challenge officials in government 
on the grounds of evidence is a key feature of a mature democracy, and the 
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FIGURe 9.1 Voter turnout for parliamentary and presidential elections and the level 
of democracy, 1981–2010.
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credibility to any system of accountability. While there are many instances 
in which such challenges have not led to satisfactory outcomes within 
many democracies, the ability to challenge is available within democracies 
in ways that are simply not possible in non-democratic regimes, where 
challenges can be met with silence, misinformation or outright repression. 
As we saw in Chapter 6, social movements and civil society organizations 
have the ability to challenge governments through recognized institutional 
channels as well as through direct forms of protest mobilization and other 
manifestations of popular discontent. Democracies will naturally limit such 
activity should it turn violent or in the event that property rights are violated 
or public order breaks down; however, there is a wide range of activity that 
is possible among the world’s democracies upon which individuals place a 
very high value.
We saw in Chapter 3, that there is a positive relationship between 
democracy and human rights, where higher levels of democracy are 
significantly related to better protection of physical integrity rights (see 














































































































CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index
Pol IV Combined Polityscore
FIGURe 9.2 Physical integrity rights and democracy, 1981–2010.
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physical integrity rights between 1981 and 2010, where the advance of 
democracy since 1981 has been steady and positive and the change in human 
rights has fluctuated considerably with a slight improvement in the early 
part of this century. The overall correlation between the score of democracy 
used in the figure and the scale of physical integrity rights is .39 (at the 
99% level of statistical confidence), suggesting that while democracies are 
better at protecting this set of rights, there are still many democracies in the 
world with continued violations of these rights (see also Diamond 1999, 
2008). Across other categories of rights, however, the picture is slightly more 
positive. For example, the correlation with democracy is higher for such 
rights as empowerment (.81), assembly and association (.75), freedom of 
movement (.50), freedom of religion (.47), the rights of workers (.54) and 
women’s social rights (.47). Thus across a collection of different human 
rights, democracies have a better record than non-democracies, but the 
relationship between the two falls far short of being perfect.
While higher levels of democratic performance are evident across the 
world’s democracies, within them, there remains great variation across 
many different measures of performance. Such a variation in the ‘quality 
of democracy’ (O’Donnell et al. 2004; Diamond and Morlino 2005; IDEA 
2008) belies any quick observation about ‘Western’ biases in measures 
of performance or ‘Western’ superiority among democracies themselves. 
For example, studies on democratic performance show a certain amount 
of uniformity among Western democracies, but a remaining degree of 
differentiation with respect to some key indicators. Women’s representation, 
equal access to the law and income inequality are not all better for Western 
democracies compared to non-Western democracies, nor are they all the 
same within the group of Western democracies (Foweraker and Krznaric 
2003). Rather, countries such as the United States and Australia do not 
score very high on these measures compared to other Western democracies. 
Indeed, income distribution, which for many, is a basic measure of equality 
and linked to democratic participation is now worse than in the year that 
preceded the great depression (Stiglitz 2012). The United Kingdom and 
the United States do not score particularly well on comparative measures 
of prison population (incarceration rates) where variations in sentencing 
(particularly in the United States) show disproportionately longer rates 
for ethnic minority groups (see Foweraker and Krznaric 2003: 327–32). 
There has been a longstanding problem with the ways in which Australia 
treats its indigenous population that undermines the notions of equality and 
inclusiveness. In its report on electoral integrity, the Global Commission 
on Elections, Democracy and Security (2012) concludes that the pattern of 
campaign finance and the behaviour of political action committees (PACs and 
super-PACs) are eroding electoral integrity in the United States. Widespread 
commentary on the 2000 election debacle in Florida and voter registration 
issues associated with the 2012 elections have raised grave concerns over 
infringement of the right to vote that are politically motivated.
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In addition to the variation in performance in Western democracies, there 
are additional differences across many democracies that depend on the kind 
of institutional design that has been adopted. Institutional design includes 
the kind of executive-legislative arrangements that are in place, the type of 
electoral system that is used and the type of political party system that has 
developed. First, it is possible for countries to have a presidential system (as 
in the United States and all of Latin America), a parliamentary system (as in 
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Italy, among 
others) or a mixed system (as in France, Germany and Portugal). Second, it is 
possible for countries to have single-member district electoral systems (also 
known as ‘first past the post’ as in the United States or United Kingdom), 
proportional representation systems (as in Italy, Greece, Iceland, Belgium 
and all of Latin America) or mixed systems that combine features of both 
(as in Germany and Scotland). Third, it is possible to have dominant party 
systems, two-party systems, or multi-party systems, where the ‘effective’ 
number of parties in the national legislative assembly varies greatly across 
democracies.
These three main areas of difference among democracies are combined in 
ways that can have can direct impact on democratic quality and democratic 
performance. For example, single-member district systems where political 
parties compete for a plurality of votes in each electoral district tend to 
produce two-party systems, such as in the United States with the Democratic 
and Republican Parties and in the United Kingdom with the Labour and 
Conservative Parties. Many argue that such party systems provide a better 
framework for governance since the representation of interests is divided 
into two main parties and the process of government is about the leadership 
and the opposition. In contrast, proportional representation, where parties 
win seats in the main legislative chamber according to the proportion of 
votes they received across electoral districts, tends to produce multi-party 
systems. In countries such as Germany, coalitions between major parties 
are formed to create stable governments. Many have argued that multi-
party systems such as the German case tend to be more representative (and 
thus uphold a fundamental democratic principle) but are inherently harder 
to govern since multiple interests need to be accommodated through the 
political process and the need for coalition formation. In contrast, countries 
with single-member districts and two-party systems are less representative 
since they do not reflect the underlying proportion of support in the 
electorate, but are considered better for governance. There is thus a trade-
off between representation and governability that all democracies confront 
(see Foweraker 1998).
In similar fashion, there are different advantages and disadvantages 
associated with presidential and parliamentary systems. Within presidential 
systems, there is a ‘dual mandate’ from the people to the government. 
The president and the legislative assembly are elected separately and both 
therefore have independent sources of democratic legitimacy, which at times 
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can lead to conflict between the two branches over policy and, in extreme 
cases, can lead to constitutional crises and even democratic breakdown (e.g. 
as in the case of Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973; see Cohen 1994). Within 
parliamentary regimes, there is a mutual dependence between the executive 
and legislative branches, where the prime minister is typically the leader of 
the largest party, has the confidence of the parliament and there has been a 
single election to determine who governs. Comparative research has shown 
that presidential democracies tend to breakdown more than parliamentary 
democracies, but that among developing countries, parliamentary regimes 
break down more than presidential ones. Among presidential democracies, 
the real problem lies in those countries that have strong presidentialism 
(i.e. many unilateral powers that are at the disposal of the president). As 
we saw in Chapter 4, many ‘third-wave’ democracies are also presidential 
democracies and among some, there has been an increasing concentration of 
power in the office of the president. This problem of strong presidentialism 
can be compounded in countries where it is combined with a large number 
of weak parties (see Shugart and Carey 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993). 
The media stories about the dysfunctionality of American democracy often 
focus on the frequency of what is known as ‘divided government’ where one 
party controls the presidency and a different party controls the Congress. 
Systematic research has concluded that, despite the popular perceptions, 
periods of divided government are no less productive and any more 
conflictual than periods of unified government (see McKay 1994; Landman 
2008). Moreover research on presidential democracies with precisely the 
most difficult combination of institutions for governability (i.e. combined 
with weak multi-party systems) has shown that across many cases in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, presidents and legislators have learnt how to 
form governing coalitions and to avoid the kind of gridlock and conflict 
that leads to democratic breakdown (see Ellis et al. 2009).
In addition to the presidential and parliamentary debate, scholars have 
also examined different outcomes between so-called ‘majoritarian’ and 
‘consensus’ democracies (see Lijphart 1999, 2012). Majoritarian systems 
quite simply are those democracies in which a majority rule; a state of affairs 
that is made possible by particular sets of institutional arrangements and 
ways of ‘doing politics’ in which a ‘bare’ majority holds power. Examples of 
majoritarian democracies include the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Barbados. Consensus systems, in contrast, share and disperse power where 
the predominant way of doing politics involves inclusiveness, bargaining 
and compromise. Examples of consensus democracies include Switzerland 
and Belgium. In an analysis of 36 democracies across the basic distinction 
between majoritarian and consensus, Arend Lijphart (1999, 2012) has 
found that consensus democracies are better across a wide range of policy 
outcomes, such as government effectiveness, the rule of law, the control of 
corruption, low inflation and low unemployment (Lijphart 2012: 262– 8). 
Moreover, consensus democracies are also better for political stability, 
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low internal conflict, lower levels of violence, better protection of civil 
liberties, income equality and women’s representation and empowerment 
(Ibid., 270–2; 276–7). These findings are in many ways analogous to the 
findings outlined above with respect to institutional design and show that 
despite the overall superior performance of democracies for a wide range 
of indicators of well-being, there remains a large variation in benefits and 
outcomes across different kinds of democracy. In an assessment of the 
quality of democracy in South Asia, one of the conclusions that came from 
the Nepalese assessment was that ‘democracy has many stories’ (see CSDS 
2008; IDEA 2008), and the kind of variation discussed here confirms this 
basic insight from Nepal.
democratic peace
There is a longstanding claim that democracies are more peaceful than other 
states, which has become known as the ‘democratic peace’ proposition. The 
statement itself needs to be qualified in two important ways. First, it applies 
to the fact that democratic countries rarely, if ever, fight each other; an 
empirical observation which for many is ‘the closest thing we have to a law 
in international politics’ (see Levy 1989: 270, 2002: 359). Second, it applies 
to the fact that in any given pair, or ‘dyad’ of states, the presence of one 
democracy significantly reduces the probability of inter-state conflict (see 
Russett and O’Neal 2001). The overall claim (and its further qualifications) 
about the pacific benefits of democracy is important for our discussions 
here. The logic of the claim and the research that has been carried out 
to substantiate it are fairly straightforward. First, there is a normative 
argument that political elites within democracies adhere to democratic 
norms, which in turn lead them to prefer non-violent conflict resolution 
and negotiation to violent conflict. This general normative orientation is 
then shared by democracies that develop greater trust for one another in the 
international arena and leads any two democracies not to engage in violent 
conflict with one another (see Rosato 2003: 586). Second, there are several 
institutional ‘logics’ at play involving the inherent element of accountability 
within democracies that constrain leaders from engaging in warfare or 
conflict (see above).These institutional factors include public constraints on 
leaders, interest groups, difficulty in mobilizing the public for war, inability 
for surprise attacks and relative availability of information within the public 
domain (Ibid., 586–7).
Both the normative and institutional logics inherent within democracies 
suggest that they would be less likely to go to war with one another and 
that the presence of a democracy in any one dyad of states would lower the 
probability of inter-state conflict. These ideas have been tested and evolved 
over time from original studies conducted by Babst (1964, 1972) with the 
development of increasingly complex data sets of all the politically relevant 
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dyads between the late nineteenth century and the late twentieth century. 
One popular study on the democratic peace conducted by Russett and 
O’Neal (2001) compiles a database of politically relevant dyads from 1886 
to 1992. For inter-state conflict, they use a measure called a ‘militarised 
dispute’, which includes all instances when one state threatens to use force, 
makes an expression of force or actually uses military force against another 
state. Alongside a measure of democracy, the analysis uses traditional 
‘realist’ measures, such as the contiguity of the countries in each pair, the 
relative distance between them, the difference in power between them and 
any alliances that they may have. The results of the analysis show that even 
after controlling for these realist variables, ‘two democracies are 33 per cent 
less likely than the average dyad to become involved in a militarised dispute’. 
Russet and O’Neal (2001: 275) argue that this is a conservative estimate of 
the ‘pacific benefits of democracy’, and they show further that not only are 
democracies less likely to fight one another, but they are even less likely to 
become involved in disputes than autocracies (Ibid., 276).
Christian Davenport (2007) analyses the ‘pacific benefits of democracy’ 
at the domestic level and finds general support for this positive benefit of 
democracy, but qualifies it in several important ways. First, democracy 
overall does decrease the use of repression, but the decrease is most 
sensitive to two key features of democracy: electoral participation and 
competition. In other words, the ability to exercise ‘voice’ is an important 
feature of democracy that can help reduce the use of lethal repression at 
the domestic level; a feature in Davenport’s (2007: 179) analysis that is 
more important than constraints on the executive branch. Second, among 
different kinds of repression, physical integrity rights violations (see above) 
are more reduced among democracies than restrictions of civil liberties. 
Finally, these overall positive trends can be confounded by conflict, where 
the presence of conflict within democracies can lead to an increase in 
repression (see Chapter 8 in this volume). Moreover, the pacifying effects 
of ‘voice’ are strong in the presence of violent dissent such as that from 
riots and guerrilla warfare, but are mushy reduced in the presence of all 
out civil war (Davenport 2007: 178–80).
economic benefits
We already noted in Chapter 2 of this volume that there are particular 
economic benefits to democracy that reach far beyond the traditional focus 
on the annual growth in per capita GDP (see Donnelly 1999). We saw 
that democracies do not have superior growth rates to non-democracies, 
but because of the normative and institutional features of democracy, 
as well as the structure of incentives within democracies, the quality of 
economic benefits is different for democracies. In addition to Amartya Sen’s 
observation that democracies will never experience famine (see Chapter 2), 
hUman RIGhTs and demoCRaCy138
there are strong moral and rational arguments for why democracies ought 
to be produce better and more equitable economic outcomes. Morally, 
politicians in democracies ought not to have preferences for citizens to 
suffer unduly. Rationally, politicians have electoral incentives for more 
equal economic outcomes (see Meltzer and Richard 1981; Norris 2012). 
Indeed, if the focus is on sustainable human development, with its emphasis 
on overall well-being of the population, then democracies do outperform 
non-democracies.
For example, Figure 9.3 shows the difference in the values of the human 
development index (HDI) for competitive and non-competitive political 
systems for a global sample of countries between 1980 and 2010.1 Each 
curve in the figure is the distribution of the HDI, where the average value 
is much higher for competitive systems than non-competitive systems. The 
curves do cross over, such that there are some competitive systems that 
do not perform as well as non-competitive systems but at an aggregate 
level, they do. Figure 9.4 shows a comparison of distributions for caloric 
consumption (itself a measure of the provision of basic nutrition to the 
population) broken down according to regime type and levels of economic 
development. The figure shows that rich competitive systems have the 
highest levels of caloric consumption, followed by rich non-competitive 
countries, poor competitive countries and poor non-competitive countries. 
Again, there is some cross-over among the curves, but the overall ranking 
















FIGURe 9.3 Human development and executive competiveness, 1980–2010.
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level of development and democracy is an important one. Rich countries are 
better at providing basic nutrition, but within each grouping of countries, 
it is the more competitive systems that are superior (see also Norris 2012). 
In this way, among the world’s rich and poor countries, democracy still 
offers better economic outcomes than non-democracy. Both of these sets 
of findings are upheld in more complex sets of analyses that control for 
additional factors, such as economic growth, population size and natural 
resource endowments.
In addition to human development and caloric consumption, Norris 
(2012) finds additional support for the positive effects of democracy and good 
governance on longevity, child mortality, the level of health, gender equality 
in education and education more generally. Across these welfare indicators, 
Norris finds superior performance for ‘liberal democracies’ and countries 
with higher levels of ‘bureaucratic governance’. As above, the positive and 
significant findings are upheld in the presence of other explanatory factors, 
such as levels of economic growth and income, geographic factors (location, 
size and natural resource endowments), social structures (e.g. linguistic and 
religious divisions, human capital, population size and conflict) and cultural 
background. Thus, the combination of the findings in Figures 9.3 and 9.4 and 
those from Norris (2012) shows a great deal of support for the proposition 
that there are a large number of economic benefits to democracy. Across 
the world, democracy is a form of government that enhances the quality of 
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FIGURe 9.4 Caloric intake and competiveness, 1980–2010.
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environmental outcomes
In the previous chapter, we argued that climate change and environmental 
degradation presented significant threats to democracy and human rights. 
But are democracies good for the environment? We saw that they are good 
for overall levels of well-being, but enhancing human well-being involves 
a great degree of consumption of natural resources, and there have been 
many arguments about the putative benefits of democracy for overseeing 
the kinds of sustainable human development that includes guardianship 
of the world’s natural resources. Like the arguments for the democratic 
peace, those who argue the ‘green benefits’ of democracy make the case 
that freedom of speech and press raises awareness levels of democratic 
citizens, who in turn can put pressure on their respective governments for 
sound environmental policies. Counter-arguments suggest that democracies 
are prone to influence from vested interests, some of whom are from 
businesses operating in the energy and extractive sector, which may prevent 
democracies from enacting environmentally friendly policies (see, e.g. 
Whitford and Wong 2009: 191–2).
Testing this set of propositions involves different measures of 
sustainability and environmental degradation or ‘stress’. For example, 
Whitford and Wong (2009) use measures on sustainability (the 2002 
Environmental Sustainability Index or ESI), environmental systems (a 
combination of air and water quality, biodiversity, human impact on land), 
environmental stress and human vulnerability. They find that democracy 
has a positive impact on sustainability and systems, but not on stress 
and vulnerability. My own analysis for the United Nations Development 
Programme finds similar mixed results. For example, Figure 9.5 shows that 
countries with executive competitiveness on average are responsible for less 
water pollution than non-competitive countries. Figure 9.6 shows that if we 
take levels of economic development into account, rich competitive countries 
have lower rates of fossil fuel consumption than rich non-competitive 
countries, and poor competitive countries have lower rates of fossil fuel 
consumption than poor non-competitive countries.
This last example shows that levels of economic development are related 
to environmental degradation, where wealthy countries consume more 
of the natural environment, but democracy has a mitigating effect on that 
consumption. Across a variety of studies, the impact of democracy on the 
environment is mixed, since the consumption of natural resources and the 
damage that comes from that consumption will always be a function of 
economic development and political institutions. Moreover, a recent report 
from the Royal Society in the United Kingdom (2012: 9) entitled People and 
the Planet argues that human development must not be decoupled from the 
environment, as any large-scale demographic and economic changes will 
have a necessary impact on the environment. The report sees the need for 
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FIGURe 9.6 Fossil fuel consumption, wealth and competiveness, 1980–2010.
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governments to ‘develop socio-economic systems and institutions that are 
not dependent on continued material consumption growth’. The coupling of 
people, the environment and governance are thus of paramount importance in 
any consideration of the possible benefits of democracy for the environment.
summary
The case for democracy in terms of benefits and outcomes for human 
well-being and citizen life is very strong indeed. This chapter has shown 
that across a wide variety of tangible and intangible factors, democracies 
are superior to non-democracies; however, as it has also shown, there are 
many remaining problems, differences and challenges across democracies. 
We saw that basic democratic values and principles have personal value 
to citizens and that democracies have a better record at protecting 
physical rights and a wide range of other human rights. We have seen that 
democracies have ‘pacific benefits’ in reducing inter-state and intra-state 
conflict. We have seen that democracies have a better record across wide 
range of economic variables other than a strict focus on annual growth 
in per capita GDP. And we have seen that within different income bands, 
democratic countries have a better record for environmental sustainability. 
This basket of positive benefits of democracy, however, must be tempered 
by a consideration of the great variation that still exists among democracies. 
Western democracies are not uniformly superior across all measures of 
performance. The association between democracy and human rights, 
despite a normative and theoretical expectation, is nowhere near a perfect 
one, where many democracies continue to struggle to protect people from 
physical integrity rights violations and other human rights violations. 
The kind of institutional design that is chosen can have an impact on 
democratic performance and represents a trade-off across democracies 
between the principle of representation and governability.
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note
 1 The analysis presented here comes from a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) funded project on democratic governance and sustainable 
human development carried out by Todd Landman, Alejandro Quiroz 
Flores and Dorothea Farquhar at the Institute for Democracy and Conflict 
Resolution at the University of Essex. The data that appear in Figure 9.3 




a tale of three women
I began this book with a series of passages about travelling to ‘new’ 
democracies, and it thus seems fitting to conclude the book with another 
anecdote from travel to another new democracy in the world: Mozambique. 
The story of Mozambique is a familiar one in many regards. It was colonized 
by the Portuguese and was part of the struggle for independence and process 
of decolonization in Africa that took place from the 1960s onwards. It gained 
its independence in 1975 and was embroiled in civil war until 1992, when 
a United Nations negotiated settlement was achieved between the ruling 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo) and the main rebel group 
Mozambique National Resistance (Renamo). Frelimo has held power since 
1992 through a variety of presidents, but most commentators agree that the 
country has made a good start in its transition to democracy while at the 
same time continuing to address its remaining challenges (see EISA 2005; 
AfriMap 2009). I had the good fortune of spending time in Maputo, the 
Capital city, in late summer 2012 to engage with civil society organizations 
working on educational reform and seeking to engage with parliament 
more effectively as part of a larger DFID-funded project on parliamentary 
strengthening in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East.
The reason I mention Mozambique, apart from highlighting yet another 
case in which the appeal of democracy has triumphed, is that I was 
particularly struck by one thing that one of my Mozambican colleagues said 
on the last day in the capital:
People in Mozambique like to get together, have a few beers, a chat and 
be able to discuss anything they want. It is nice to know that we can move 
about freely and meet with people and talk without fear of being stopped 
by the police or watched by the government.
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Such an observation seems remarkably simple and even obvious, but for so 
many people in the world for so long, the simple pleasure of sitting with 
friends unhindered by the possibility of repression or suspicion from the 
state and being able to have free and lively discussions on any topic has 
simply not been possible. Ordinary citizens in the totalitarian states of 
Eastern Europe were not able to do this. Those in 1970s in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay were not able to do it. Those in South Africa were not 
able to do it. Those in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia were not able to do it. Or 
those in Burma/Myanmar were not able to it. The simple idea of not being 
able to walk about unhindered by a fear of the state or a non-state entity 
infringing one’s rights is connected to the kinds of dramatic scenes that the 
world witnessed in late 2010 and 2011 with the advent of the Arab Spring. 
This simple notion of the repressed individual brings to mind a passage from 
Georg Groddeck’s (1961) Book of the It:
What is repressed does not vanish, it only loses its place. It is pushed into 
some corner or other where it has no right to be, where it is squeezed and 
hurt. Then it always stands on tiptoe, pressing from time to time with all 
its strength towards where it belongs, and as soon as it sees a gap in the 
wall in front of it, it tries to squeeze itself through. Perhaps it may succeed 
in so doing, but when it has got to the front it has used up all its strength, 
and the next good push from some masterful force hurls it back again. 
It is a most disagreeable situation, and when anything is so repressed, 
crushed and battered, at length wins freedom you can imagine what leaps 
and bounds it will be taking (Groddeck 1961: 47).
The events of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa certainly showed 
what ‘leaps and bounds’ can really look like as popular mobilizations toppled 
the regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya while dissident and opposition 
forces continue to struggle against authoritarianism in Yemen, Bahrain and 
Syria. The repressed individual in these cases was not alone and the political 
opportunities that made possible collective action of the repressed showed 
that real change is possible. The period since the end of the Cold War and 
most recently has seen three remarkable individuals, who themselves were 
repressed under authoritarian rule, rise to political prominence in their own 
countries. It is also telling that all three of them are women: Michelle Bachelet 
in Chile, Dilma Rousseff in Brazil and Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma. Michelle 
Bachelet was elected the first female president of Chile from 2006 to 2010. 
In 1974, she was taken by the Chilean internal security police (known as the 
DINA) to the now infamous Villa Grimauldi detention facility in Santiago, 
where she was tortured as part of Augusto Pinochet’s campaign against the 
political left (her father was a General who served under former president 
Salvador Allende). She spent many years in East Germany before returning 
to Chile and serving under President Ricardo Lagos before being elected 
president (see Politzer 2011). Dilma Roussef was a victim of the Brazilian 
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military regime which held power between 1964 and 1985 and became the 
first female President of Brazil in 2010. In the early 1970s, she was part 
of the radical left in Brazil and was in the Tiradentes Prison in São Paulo 
between 1970 and 1972, where she was tortured by the regime. Found guilty 
by the regime for subversion, Rousseff resurrected her political career and 
had many different political positions before being elected President in 2010 
(see Roett 2011). Like Bachalet and Rousseff, Aung San Suu Kyi was also 
an ‘enemy of the regime’ and had spent many years under house arrest since 
the 1990s as the leader of the National League for Democracy and was only 
released in November 2010 and then won a seat in the national parliament 
in 2012.
Each of these women embodies the notion of the repressed individual. 
Bachalet and Aung San Suu Kyi had not committed crimes that led to their 
detention and ill treatment, but at the time of her arrest and detention, 
Rousseff was part of the armed revolutionary left and was carrying a 
weapon, neither of which justify the prolonged torture that she endured, but 
do make her a slightly different case than either of the other two women. 
All three have suffered state repression for long periods of time, and all 
three have since risen to occupy positions of political leadership and power. 
Bachalet and Rousseff despite (or in spite of) their pasts, have become the 
first female presidents of their countries; a remarkable achievement given 
the continued prevalence of gender bias in politics across the world, while 
Aung San Suu Kyi has symbolized freedom through her quiet determination 
to challenge the Burmese military. At a deeper and more resonant level 
with the themes that run through this present volume, these three women 
symbolize what is possible and how even the most repressed individuals 
can under the proper circumstances achieve remarkable and unforeseen 
success in politics. They have triumphed over adversity and have entered the 
political spotlight. Moreover, they represent new symbols for the politically 
repressed of today and join the ranks of inspirational political leaders such 
as Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela.
How does the liberation and ascendency of these three women connect 
to the larger themes of this book? We have seen large-scale and sweeping 
changes across the world and across many different dimensions of democracy 
and human rights. In order to bring our discussions to a close, I would like 
to assess the contribution that has been made by each chapter with respect 
to the hopes and challenges that now present themselves to the world. The 
‘thematic couplets’ that frame each chapter have been helpful signposts for 
understanding my own notion ‘precarious triumph’. At this point in the 
twenty-first century, it would have been impossible to imagine 30 years ago 
that people like Bachelet, Rousseff and Aung San Suu Kyi would (a) be 
able to survive their incarceration and ill-treatment, (b) rise to prominence 
within a typically male-dominated opposition and (c) achieve positions 
of power in transitional countries, two of which now have consolidated 
democracy. But it is crucial to the premise of this whole book that we 
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understand the basic point that their liberation and ascendency were not 
inevitable. Rather, they took part in complex and highly contingent political 
processes that have unfolded in dynamic contexts where larger structural, 
institutional and socio-economic changes have taken place. They remained 
steadfast in their determination, but that determination necessarily interacts 
and is constrained by these dynamic contextual conditions. Such changing 
contextual conditions have been outlined and examined throughout this 
book and are now discussed in turn.
abundance and freedom
There is and there will continue to be a natural affinity between democracy 
and economic well-being. We saw throughout the book that wealthier 
societies, on average, are also more likely to be more democratic and to be 
able to protect human rights better. We also saw that countries that make 
a transition to democracy under conditions of relative wealth are highly 
unlikely to reverse their democratic achievements. This is a comforting 
and often reinforced narrative about the world that creates a certain set 
of expectations among people who live in countries without democracy, 
wealth and/or good records of human rights protection. The coupling 
of economic abundance and individual freedom has repeatedly raised 
expectations in the post-war boom period of economic development, the 
period of decolonization, the third wave of democratization, end of the 
Cold War and during the prolonged Arab Spring since 2011. On the one 
hand, expectations have been raised that periods of successful economic 
development will naturally lead to democracy and better human rights 
protection. On the other hand, expectations have been raised that periods 
of democratic transition will naturally lead to better economic development 
and human well-being. The problem with the general finding of a strong 
relationship between economic abundance and individual freedom is that 
there will always be exceptions. A telling contrast can be seen between the 
2012 US Elections and the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress. One 
country is extremely wealthy with a faltering economy and relatively high 
levels of individual freedom, and one country is becoming wealthier with a 
rapidly growing economy and relatively low levels of individual freedom. 
Expectations in both countries are high for their new leadership as both 
populations desire economic abundance and its many associated benefits. 
But President Obama himself admitted after the election that democracy is 
‘messy’, while many commentators on Chinese political affairs argue that 
the regime will struggle to control the desire for freedom as it continues to 
enrich larger proportions of its society.
In the Middle East and North Africa, the economic critique was coupled 
with a political critique, which led to regime change and call across many 
groups and many countries for democracy. But what if the newly constituted 
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regimes of the region are not able to address the question of economic 
development and the demands of their disproportionately youthful 
populations? And what happens to the promise of democracy and human 
rights if agents in the new regime are equally responsible for violating 
human rights as we have seen in the case of Libya? The vision, fortitude and 
achievement exemplified by Bachelet, Rousseff and Aung San Suu Kyi runs 
the risk of being stifled by the adverse and unpredictable events in this region 
and others undergoing complex processes of transition. President Obama is 
the first US President to visit Burma, which bodes well for the opposition 
movement and the National League for Democracy, but will the reforms 
implemented by the regime go far enough and fast enough to meet and 
fulfil popular expectations about democracy and human rights? Will a post-
Assad regime in Syria be able to represent the different factions in Syrian 
society and how will the abuses of the regime, the war and the opposition be 
dealt with in ways that create hope for the next generations?
Beyond these cases and countries, there remain the multiple challenges 
associated with ‘the bottom billion’ for whom the type of regime under 
which they live arguably makes very little difference to their daily lives. 
Marginalization, social exclusion and global inequality have pushed just 
over one-seventh of the world’s population into a level of poverty that limits 
their ability to take part meaningfully in their societies. Regimes come and 
go, but their daily struggle for subsistence remains. If commentators like 
Thomas Pogge and Paul Collier are correct, then the distribution of wealth 
has gotten worse not better over the last 30 years and that for this group of 
people, poverty has deepened. We saw that inequality interacts with power 
and under certain conditions is intimately related to the violation of civil 
and political rights as the ‘haves’ have incentives to use coercive means 
to exclude access to wealth for the ‘have nots’ (see Landman and Larizza 
2009). For many, poverty and inequality on the scale evident within the 
bottom billion represent ‘structural violations’ of human rights in which 
access to the basic services of the state is extremely limited if not simply 
unavailable and satisfaction of people’s basic needs is not being met. The 
problem with structural violations is that it there are no ‘perpetrators’ just 
victims. Land tenure patterns, policies that exclude and lead to inequality 
and the power relations inherent in the global economic system make it 
difficult to find culpability and more importantly long-lasting solutions. The 
persistence of the bottom billion and its potential for expansion coupled 
with human rights violations present significant challenges for the growth 
of democracy in the world.
democracy and human rights
Many commentators think that democracy and human rights are different 
sides of the same coin and that advance in one necessarily brings advance 
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in the other. Conceptually, the two share a commitment to well-being and 
a set of principles around accountability, representation, transparency, 
participation and inclusion. Empirically, analyses have indeed shown a 
positive and significant relationship between the two across large samples 
of countries and time. At both the conceptual and the empirical level, 
however, there are certain challenges to the naive view that ‘all good things 
go together’. Conceptually, democracy and human rights share certain 
features, while other features remain quite distinct. Where democracy offers 
political accommodation, spaces for deliberation and negotiation and the 
possibility for peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights are grounded 
in a strong moral discourse and fortified through the rule of law, which has 
a particular judgemental and ‘adjudicative’ way of resolving disputes and 
finding particular actors and parties in breach of their legal obligations. This 
judgemental, adversarial and confrontational orientation of human rights, 
while motivated by a shared set of principles, can sometimes be at odds 
with democracy and its ability to find common ground between and among 
contending groups.
While there are many studies in political science and international 
relations that demonstrate the positive and significant relationship between 
democracy and human rights (Landman 2005a), it is vitally important to 
understand that such a relationship is very far from perfect. It was popular 
at the end of the last century to identify the problem of ‘illiberal democracy’ 
as a trend among transitional countries that had managed to establish basic 
democratic institutions, hold several free and fair elections and guarantee 
at least the chance that the opposition could win power while at the same 
time fail to provide protection for a wide range of different human rights 
(Diamond 1999; Zakaria 2003; Landman 2005a). This ‘human rights gap’ 
is a significant challenge not only for the new and restored democracies in 
the world but also for the old and established democracies. The nature of 
precariousness developed in this book is one that affects all societies, and 
defenders of human rights need to remain vigilant in all political contexts. 
Explanations for the gap include weak state institutions and the failure of a 
human rights culture to grip national consciousness in ways that inculcate 
human rights values throughout societies.
The post-9/11 ‘war on terror’ demonstrated how quickly long-fought 
and long-held commitments to human rights can be undermined through 
appeal to external threat and the priorities of national security. Democratic 
publics are quick to rush in legislation that centralizes executive authority 
and provides legal means to subvert rights protections at national and 
international levels. The international community roundly condemned the 
Bush Administration’s rewriting (or reinterpreting) of international law 
in ways that justified the use of extraordinary rendition, the detention of 
‘enemy combatants’ and the use of ‘intensive interrogation techniques’ 
such as waterboarding (Blakeley 2011). The election of Barack Obama 
in 2008 led many to expect a reversal of such policies, which by and large 
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has happened, but in their place, President Obama has increased the use 
of targeted assassination carried out primarily through drones and remote 
warfare, which many believe runs afoul of international law. In late 2011, 
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
which codifies into law indefinite military detention without charge or 
trial. The provisions in the act authorize the president to order the military 
to pick up and imprison people who are captured anywhere in the world 
indefinitely. The use of such practices sends strong and contradictory signals 
to both allies and enemies of the United States in ways that continue to 
undermine human rights and limit the ‘soft power’ (Nye 2005) of the world’s 
democracies.
Waves and setbacks
Analysts engage in ‘pattern recognition’, and one of the hallmarks of the 
last four decades has been the growth in democracy around the world. 
Where this growth can be characterized and catalogues in the different 
‘waves’ or not does hide the fact that since 1974, both the number and 
percentage of countries that are democratic have grown significantly. 
Any observation of this nature, however, rests on a particular definition 
of democracy and such counting of democracy typically adopts a thin 
and ‘procedural definition’ that focuses on elections and the existence 
of basic democratic institutions. We can thus celebrate and be somewhat 
triumphant about the democratic achievements that have been made 
since 1974, as well as the democratic inspiration that they have spread 
to countries that have not yet experienced democratic transition. Indeed, 
now with the advent of new technologies, democratic diffusion not only 
takes plays among contiguous countries, but the images and narratives 
associated with the struggle for democracy today can transcend barriers 
to information that in the past have been more fortified. Pro-democracy 
movements can observe, learn and absorb lessons from other political 
contexts and adapt them to their own circumstances in ways that 
challenge incumbent regimes and make possible democratic advance. The 
availability and use of social media are thus new factors to take into 
account in explaining the spread of democratic ideals and the potential 
for protest mobilization against non-democratic regimes.
Against the positive trends in democratization captured in the quantitative 
analysis and the hopes that such trends create, there is a wide range of 
remaining challenges to democratization to which we all must remain 
aware. The advance of democracy evident in the quantitative figures (see 
Figure 1.1) is of course for its most minimal features. Experience from a 
large number of democracy assessments that have taken place since 2000 
suggests that there are ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ features in any democratization 
process (IDEA 2008: 288). The easy achievements are those which occur 
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relatively soon after a democratic transition and key examples are as 
follows:
	 	Obtain a broadly agreed constitution with a bill of rights
	 	Establish some sort of office of ombudsmen and/or public defender
	 	Hold free elections and establish universal suffrage
	 	Support the revival of local government
	 	Ensure the protection of basic freedoms such as party association, 
press, speech and assembly
The more difficult challenges in democratization processes are as follows:
	 	The effective inclusion of minorities and women’s participation
	 	Equal access to justice and protection of the right to life
	 	Meaningful intra-party democracy
	 	Control of executives
	 	A reduction in private influence and private interests in the public 
sphere
	 	A significant role for opposition parties
The experience of many new and restored democracies around the world 
has been one of either ‘delegative democracy’ (O’Donnell 1994) where 
executives disregard the constitutional limits on the exercise of their 
authority, or ‘rollback’ (Diamond 2011) of democracy where executives 
centralize their authority and undermine democratic values and institutions 
as well as human rights commitments, as in the case of Russia under Putin 
and the Central Asian republics of the Former Soviet Union since the mid-
1990s. In addition to these challenges, there are long-term questions around 
elimination of so-called ‘authoritarian legacies’, access to justice, combating 
corruption, party finance, freedom of information laws and parliamentary 
oversight of executives, the security apparatus (military and police) and, in 
many countries, the extractive industries and foreign direct investment more 
generally (IDEA 2008: 300–2).
evidence and explanations
There is still a predominant view that economic modernization is the 
prime driver for processes of democratization. The theory of ‘endogenous 
democratization’ sees socio-economic development as unleashing a wide range 
of social and political changes that are conducive to democracy and the main 
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propositions of this theory are supported by large-scale statistical analysis. 
But as argued above, any generalization from such analyses will always carry 
with it a number of significant outliers and exceptions that make us pause 
about putting too much emphasis on so-called economic determinism. There 
are many cases of countries embracing democracy that are not particularly 
well-developed economically. I began this book with a stylized portrayal of 
the case of Mongolia, which at the time of its transition had remarkably 
low levels of national income, and the world has witnessed other such 
cases where democracy has emerged under conditions of economic scarcity. 
Indeed, the theory of ‘exogenous democratization’ posits that the process of 
economic modernization has very little direct relationship with democracy 
other than helping it sustain itself once it has been established. Countries that 
embrace democracy and that are poor are posited to have a lower probability 
of survival than rich countries that embrace democracy (Przeworski et al. 
2000). Thus the case of Mongolia is improbable but not impossible.
Cases such as Mongolia, among others, have forced us to look for 
alternative perspectives that account for democratization, and among these, 
there has been a focus on domestic elites, national opposition groups and 
social movements and significant international factors, such as coercion, 
contagion, diffusion and democracy promotion. A moment of transition 
presents elites in the incumbent regime opportunities to gamble on the future 
on whether they tolerate and make agreements with opposition forces that 
pave the way to democracy (e.g. Burma) or maintain authoritarianism and 
risk international condemnation (e.g. China). Opposition leaders gamble on 
allying with their more radical counterparts in challenging the incumbent 
regime and risking violence and civil war, or they can seek engagement 
with reformist elements in regime and reach some form of accommodation 
or elite ‘pact’ (see Przeworski 1991; Higley and Gunther 1994). In this 
elite-centred account, there are multiple outcomes for democracy (with 
and without guarantees), continued authoritarianism or conflict, where 
individual calculations about risk and probability of success are weighed 
against the desire for maintaining or increasing political power. The 
outcomes themselves are highly contingent on the strategic interaction 
between elites in the regime and within the opposition. It is never 
entirely clear in which direction elites will go and what kinds of choices 
they will make. This contingency of outcomes and the precariousness of 
the interactions themselves are important lessons to bear in mind when 
examining processes of democratization. There is a tendency to assume 
that particular outcomes were inevitable, while in reality, the outcome that 
is obtained (i.e. democracy) is one of many.
agents and advocates
The narrative about elites and ‘deal making’, which may or may not lead 
to democracy often ignores the role for popular agency. In this book, I 
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advanced a ‘transformational’ perspective on the making of democracy 
that gives fuller weight to social movements, popular mobilization and civil 
society organizations in the process of democratization. These groups and 
forms of collective action articulate a wide range of demands and come 
together in waves of protest that minimize the difference between groups 
within the opposition and maximize the difference between the opposition 
and the regime. Popular movements were a key feature in the transitions to 
democracy in Latin America (see Foweraker 1995; Foweraker and Landman 
1997; Foweraker et al. 2003) and Eastern Europe (see Linz and Stepan 
1996), while the Arab Spring featured remarkable waves of protest that 
resulted in regime change in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. But like the 
elite accounts of democratization, it is not inevitable that such challenges to 
incumbent regimes will be successful in (a) toppling leaders and (b) fomenting 
democratization. Indeed, the case of China and Tiananmen Square is a case 
of failure to topple leaders or bring about democracy, and the case of the 
Arab Spring countries has shown that regime change is possible in some 
countries, but it not clear that democracy will be established. Thus, popular 
mobilization carries with it a great risk of failure that is contingent on other 
significant factors.
One key factor that can contribute to the success of popular mobilization 
for democracy is the degree to which it enjoys support from the international 
community. Domestic groups often face stiff opposition and harsh repressive 
crackdowns from the incumbent regime, but if they are successful in forming 
alliances with ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (see Risse et al. 1999) 
and/or powerful pro-democracy states in the international system, then the 
costs for the regime of resisting the opposition increase considerably. The 
number of international non-governmental organizations working on human 
rights issues, campaigning for the release of political prisoners, documenting 
human rights abuses and advocating for human rights progress has increased 
dramatically during the third and fourth waves of democratization. The 
existence of this dense network of agents and advocates provides additional 
possibilities for challenging unsavoury regimes around the world. In 
addition, the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States and 
the European Endowment for Democracy in Brussels are governmental and 
non-governmental institutions that provide assistance, advice and networks 
for pro-democracy movements seeking to bring about regime change, 
while the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA) is an inter-governmental organisation that has expanded its regional 
presence and offers knowledge and advice on democracy building. The 
international environment for democracy support is this becoming more 
robust as governments and popular organizations engage more seriously 
with the pro-democracy agenda. The key challenge for any of these agencies 
and organizations is to respect the diversity of democratic forms emerging 
around the world and to encourage without prescribing pathways to greater 
democratization.
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Truth and justice
It is telling that Dilma Roussef is one the key actors who brought about the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in Brazil. As a former 
prisoner of the regime and president of the country, she sits with a particular 
moral authority in bringing about this development. The military regime in 
Brazil left power after 21 years in 1985. In that year, the military selected 
the next civilian president and it was not until 1989 that Fernando Collor 
de Mello became the first democratically elected President of Brazil since 
1961. Since 1989, Brazil has consolidated democracy, enjoyed the peaceful 
transfer of power between competing political parties survived the ‘perils’ of 
presidentialism in a multi-party democracy (see Linz and Valenzuela 1994), 
but throughout the post-authoritarian regime, Brazil has used amnesties 
for perpetrators of past atrocities until the establishment of the truth and 
reconciliation commission. Alongside Brazil, other countries such as Ireland 
and Spain are still considering whether they should adopt some kind of 
truth and justice mechanism to deal with the ‘past wrongs’ that have been 
committed. A formal reckoning with the past, public acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing and some form of redress (e.g. imprisonment of perpetrators, 
reparations to victims, etc.) can bring new hope and a positive outlook for 
the future as countries move beyond their own past histories.
The fundamental challenge for any truth and justice process if it is 
adopted, however, involves the degree to which a punitive and retributive 
approach is used as opposed to one that is more forgiving and restorative. 
Justice and punishment, while laudable from a legal and moral justice 
view, can carry with them certain risks of stirring past resentment, failing 
to achieve real justice and having selective application by focusing on 
the primary actors involved in committing atrocities. Retribution has the 
potential for undermining the hard work required in any democratization 
process. Restorative processes have the advantage of seeking understanding 
and healing deep wounds within a society, but run the risk of being too ‘soft’ 
on perpetrators and may well be perceived as an inappropriate means to 
address the problem of past wrongs. No doubt, these kinds of debates will 
take place in a post-authoritarian Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, among others.
Threats and pitfalls
The precariousness of democracy and human rights stems from a wide 
range of internal and external threats that are both direct and indirect. 
Democracies must defend themselves from overt challenges that involve 
violence, subversion and terrorist methods. Police, security forces and 
military all exist within democracies and have the responsibility to 
protect innocent civilians from such overt challenges. These forces in 
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democracies are subjected to civilian control and the rule of law, which 
is a larger reflection of the constitutional order. That constitutional order 
across many democracies is further complemented by international legal 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Democracies 
struggle with a perceived trade-off between security and liberty in ways 
that have compromised rights commitments and obligations. There are 
rights-based approaches to combating terrorism (see OHCHR 2012) 
and other threats where it is precisely the ability for democracies to 
uphold the rule of law and treat terrorism in a criminal justice rather 
than ‘war’ framing that can preserve the values upon which democracy is 
based (Landman 2007). On this precise point, former FBI agent Michael 
German (2005: 14) argues,
By treating terrorists like criminals, we stigmatize them in their community, 
while simultaneously validating our own authority. Open and public trials 
allow the community to see the terrorist for the criminal he [or she] is, 
and successful prosecutions give them faith the government is protecting 
them. Judicial review ensures that the methods used are in accordance 
with the law, and juries enforce community standards of fairness. The 
adversarial process exposes improper or ineffective law enforcement 
techniques so they can be corrected. Checks and balances on government 
power and public accountability promote efficiency by ensuring that only 
the guilty are punished.
The response to terrorism since 9/11 within the world’s democracies carries 
with it a double threat: (1) the permanent threat of attacks from terrorist 
groups that are ‘home-grown’ or foreign-sponsored and (2) the threat from 
a policy and legislative response that is based on the assumption that human 
rights commitments must be compromised in some way in order to combat 
terrorism itself.
Beyond the overt and direct threats to democracy stemming from violent 
groups and terrorist organizations, there are indirect and less obvious threats 
to democracy and human rights. Persistent, and in many countries, rising 
patterns of inequality threaten the social fabric of democracy. Unregulated 
market capitalism cannot provide the kind of social protections required 
to alleviate the worst outcomes of market failure. The development of the 
welfare state in post-war democracies went a long way to establishing what 
Jack Donnelly (1999) has called ‘rights-protective’ regimes. The neo-liberal 
revolution stemming from the 1980s, which is based on the assumption 
that the market mechanism is the best way to allocate good and services 
in an economy, has undermined the social safety net. The wave of austerity 
measures that have been implemented in response to the financial crisis in 
the United States and the Eurozone have laid bare many of the contradictions 
associated with free market economics, tax regimes that provide loopholes 
for the more well-off in society (including such multinational companies as 
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Amazon Apple and Starbucks) and government spending commitments that 
are simply unsustainable.
Benefits and outcomes
Our final thematic couplet in this book is based on the premise that the 
natural appeal of democracy and the full protection of human rights are 
their promise of the good life, a life without threat, without basic need and 
without fear. There are benefits inherent to democracy that are difficult to 
measure and quantify, but that are nonetheless very real for those individuals 
who live under democratic rule. The freedom and agency that come with 
democracy for ordinary citizens bring a number of intangible benefits that 
are embodied in such values as participation, inclusiveness, transparency, 
accountability and representation. Citizens in democracies can be left 
alone or can choose to become actively involved at the local and national 
levels of politics. They do not fear the arbitrary abuse of state power and 
know that when they have an encounter with the state, laws are in place 
to protect them from unnecessary intrusion by the state and due process 
throughout that engagement. Their participation takes place formally 
and institutionally through the electoral processes, or informally and less 
institutionally through civil society organizations and social movement 
activities. Moreover, they enjoy the freedoms to speak out, criticize and 
make demands on government without fear of repressive reprisals.
The basic framework of participation and accountability provided by 
democracy and a well-developed rights regime is seen as ultimately beneficial 
for outcomes not necessarily related to democracy. Alongside its more 
intangible benefits, we have seen that democracies are better at overseeing 
equitable forms of human development that take into account key macro-
economic indicators beyond simply measures of per capital national income. 
Democracies, on balance, have higher levels of human development (income, 
literacy and longevity) and higher levels of caloric consumption than non-
democracies. Among wealthy countries in the world, democracies have a 
better record at protecting the environment. In terms of peace and conflict, 
democracies have particular sets of ‘pacific’ benefits at the international and 
domestic levels, as they are less likely to engage in inter-state conflict and 
less likely to use harsh repression when facing domestic conflict (Russett 
and O’Neal 2001; Davenport 2007).
a precarious triumph
As we enter the second decade of the twenty-first century, there is much 
to celebrate. Fascism and communist totalitarianism have been defeated in 
Europe, authoritarianism has receded in Southern Europe, South America, 
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Eastern Europe and parts of Africa and Asia. This decade began with 
momentous changes in the Middle East and North Africa, the final outcome 
of which remains unknown but the origins and contours of the challenge 
to incumbents have been framed in terms of economic justice and political 
freedom. Any developments such as these at the national and regional levels 
are naturally embedded in larger power relations at the international level, 
where the geostrategic interests of the United States, the European Union, 
Russia and China lead to a wide range of double standards and contradictions 
with respect to democracy and human rights. The achievements that have 
been made in the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning 
of the twenty-first century must be celebrated and protected at the same 
time. Forces within states and between states can unravel these otherwise 
remarkable achievements. In the end, I am most deeply moved by the 
individuals who have the courage to stand up to oppression in all its forms 
and to take a stand against injustice. The events and developments that have 
formed the basis of our discussions in this book have featured a cast of 
characters that is by now well known. But much of the drama of the past 
decades has really been made possible by the ordinary people who simply 
want to have more say in the way that they live their lives. Let us hope that 
the answers to this simple quest continue to flourish.
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